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11 Introduction
"Success means the ability to predict things that were not objects of an
original theory (novel facts), and to unite previously distinct bodies of
knowledge" (Wendt, 1999: 65)
The feeling of internal harmony must be close to the wonderful sensation of happiness.
Sadly,  eloquent narratives of ancient history as well  as more mundane observations of
the contemporary remind us each day that both states appear constantly equally
unattainable to the average person.
As we shall see in the pages that follow, the quest for inner accord is so engraved in the
human mind that it appears a necessity on levels beyond the mind of the individual. The
purpose of this paper is to examine this phenomenon by its obverse. Specifically I
endeavor to find out whether there exists a state of cognitive dissonance – a disturbance
in internal harmony – within neoconservatism as regards the ideology's core values and
its positions on torture in the context of the current U.S. "global war on terror" (GWOT).
If such a state can be recognized then consequently also the magnitude of that
dissonance could be studied. However, all of the above requires an understanding of the
many dimensions of present-day neoconservatism.
It ought to be obvious that this ambitious task commits us to answer twice to a simple
yet well-grounded question "why?" In the first instance, one must be able to answer
why the theory of cognitive dissonance is suited for studying an ideology. In the second,
one should be able to explain why study neoconservatism in the first place. The answers
may not be self-evident to the reader.
But allow me to begin my answer to the first question, that of choosing to use the
relatively little-used1 theory of cognitive dissonance, by taking a small detour. I believe
this slight deviation to help to clarify the overall context of this paper. For, as we shall
see below, it is an almost uncontested assertion that international law is an essential
source of legitimacy in world politics (Cf. Scott and Ambler, 2007: 68). Furthermore,
1 As regards the study of international relations. Use of the theory has been extensive in social psychology.
2according to Scott and Ambler's discussion concerning the "idea of international law",
fundamental to this idea has been that international law would be distinguishable and
superior to world politics (Scott and Ambler, 2007: 72). In international law, the
prohibition of torture is an all but universally accepted norm, yet individuals acting in
the name of the United States government have been found guilty of such behavior.
Given the rather extensive role in foreign policy advocacy, neoconservatives in general
have had relatively little to say about the use of torture, but the attitude tends to be well
on the condoning side. Arguments calling for tough measures against "terrorists" 2
threatening the security of U.S. citizens are certainly understandable 3  and
neoconservatives  can  be  seen  to  preserve  the  rights  of  the  people  in  the  United  States
and other democracies by their proposed tough measures.
If, however, next to the wish to save innocent lives at any cost, there are competing core
values in neoconservatism – say, human rights or the right to mental and physical
integrity of all individuals in relation to state actors – the situation changes markedly.
And it is here that the theory of cognitive dissonance enters the picture. According to
Leon Festinger's enduring theory, a situation in which contradictory behavior and
cognition coexist gives rise to a state what he labeled "cognitive dissonance". This is a
state  where  the  contradictory  relation  between  two  or  more  cognitive  elements  (e.g.
knowing how one behaves, knowing something detrimental about that behavior's effects)
can be eased by displacing one or the other. To illustrate: a heavy smoker knows that
cigarettes are a major factor in many life-threatening diseases such as lung cancer and
cardio-vascular diseases. While she continues to smoke, she is in a state of cognitive
dissonance. To escape or alleviate this state, she has two major alternatives, namely, to
give up smoking (or reduce it, at a minimum), or change her thoughts on the hazards of
her habit. The latter alternative finds many ways in the individual's natural pursuit for
2 In order to avoid confusion and reduce the risk of misinterpretations the words "terrorist" and
"terrorism" will be used in quotation marks throughout this paper due to lack of one, universally accepted
use of the term. Walter Laqueur's article Reflections on Terrorism (1986) refers to Alex Schmid's book
Political Terrorism: A Research Guide, in which Schmid claims to have counted over 100 definitions of
"terrorism".  Emphasizing definitional challenges, Laqueur concludes that "it has been said it resembles
pornography, difficult to describe and define, but easy to recognize when one sees it." (Laqueur, 1984:
88-89)
3 Indeed, it is the duty of the State to provide safety for its citizens according to international law. This
principle is enshrined in the UN charter, article 2, say Evans and Sahnoun (2002) who spell out the most
basic duties of states: "sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of
other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state."
(Evans and Sahnoun, 2002)
3the state of consonance. A similar mechanism could be in play regarding a contradictory
relation between neoconservatism's core values and its pursued policies. Because the
object of this study is an ideology, as opposed to Festinger's original studies on the level
of individuals, a discussion on the study of social groups and ideologies is also included
in the study below.
What makes the effects of cognitive dissonance especially salient in relation to political
life is its tendency to extend to seemingly unconnected areas of decision-making, as
Robert Jervis (1976) among others has found. In spite of Jervis's path-breaking work, it
appears that there continue to be useful applications to be found in the linkages between
social  psychology and IR. In a nutshell  and in addition to love of academic adventure,
this is why the theory of cognitive dissonance has been deemed important enough to be
used to study the neoconservative ideology.
As for the second question challenging the wisdom of the decision to study the
neoconservative ideology, several justifying reasons can be found. The most cogent
reason at this hour in history is the ideology's extensive influence in world politics. I can
assert with relative confidence that attempts to fully comprehend the contemporary
foreign policy decisions and deliberations of the United States are doomed to fail
without an understanding of neoconservatism. The influence of neoconservatism has in
the  last  couple  of  years  been  exercised  to  a  large  extent  through the  administration  of
President George W. Bush and the administration itself has been labeled
"neoconservative" countless times. Indeed, many of the foreign policy paths of George
W. Bush have been chosen after neoconservative calls to action to the enjoyment and
with the enthusiastic approval of neoconservatives. One prominent neoconservative
even went as far as to call Bush – admittedly in a half-joking manner – "the Supreme
Leader"4. Naïveté aside, but statements such as this certainly mirror more approval than
rejection  of  the  president.  However,  all  in  all,  the  Bush  administration  can  hardly  be
labeled a neoconservative one, as a closer study of the term reveals.
4 On Fox News Sunday on June 4, 2006, William Kristol said: "Supreme Leader [Ali] Khameinei,
President Bush's counterpart over in Iran... maybe President Bush should become Supreme Leader Bush,
I like that."
4Finnish  discussion concerning neoconservatism has been surprisingly limited and
simplified thus far, as some scholars have both noted and shown with own example5.
Notable exceptions to the rule are James O'Connor's (2006) unpublished Master's thesis6
and a forthcoming article7 in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law. Internationally,
much has been written on neoconservatism8 (though this area has been in my view also
internationally exceptionally polemic and less than constructive for the most part), U.S.
foreign  policy,  the  use  of  torture,  human  rights  and  on  cognitive  dissonance.  Each
subject has been covered extensively (with the notable exception of neoconservatism in
my opinion) individually and from different angles, but my understanding is that no
study has thus far studied all of these together. I therefore feel rather confident that this
study will be unique in its composition, for better or for worse. I can only echo Jonathan
Monten (2005) when he claims that neoconservatism is frequently studied in a
"descriptive, often alarmist, and occasionally conspiratorial" fashion. This appears an
inadequacy waiting to be fixed.
Therefore, because neoconservatism is so well-placed yet little understood we will
below go through an account of the neoconservative ideology. A necessary intermediate
phase  of  this  account  is  a  discussion  of  the  term  "ideology".  Finding  the  most
fundamental or "core" values of neoconservatism is naturally one of the main objects of
this study. Fulfilling the task that I have set for myself requires one further discussion in
addition to those mentioned above. That discussion concerns torture, its nature, laws
5 See e.g. Markku Ruotsila (2006) in Politiikka 48:1, pp. 76-79, or Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs
Senior Researcher Henrikki Heikka's writings. Ruotsila evaluates three novel books on neoconservatism
and claims that they, read together especially, bring "new depth and a sense of nuance into the
interpretation of neoconservatism, which has - for some time already - followed established, self-
contained and banal paths" (my translation from Finnish). It is probable that Ruotsila, who works outside
Finland, refers here to a wider international context than just the Finnish one. Heikka makes in at least
one article overly direct equations between neoconservatism and President Bush's foreign policy (Cf.
Helsingin Sanomat June 28, 2005) and in the Finnish foreign policy magazine Ulkopolitiikka whirls
through some forms of right-wing politics in the US on a highly superficial level ("Abridged version of
US right wing politics", number 2/2006).
6 Titled "Exceptions, Distinctions and Processes of Identification: The 'Concrete Thought' of Carl Schmitt
and US Neoconservatism as Seen through Readings of Kenneth Burke and Jacques Derrida".
7 Titled " US Neoconservatism and the Rule of Radical Occasionalism - Carl Schmitt's War on Terror?"
8 Michael C. Williams (2005) notes that, unfortunately, "[d]ominated by the triadic division of Realism,
Liberalism and Constructivism, IR theory has shown remarkably little willingness to engage with the
neoconservative position at the level of its theoretical foundations." Reasons for this, he continues, are
easy to understand because of the "need" to address topical issues in U.S. foreign policy rather than
focusing on neoconservatism's theoretical foundations. While this justification is understandable -
especially in the light in which Williams presents it, namely that neoconservatives themselves "do not
generally write for academic journals" - it is very revealing of IR theory's underlying attitudes towards
other than canonized approaches. This effect is further amplified by the notion that neoconservatives
prefer engaging in day to day politics to theoretical debates.
5governing the use of torture and how torture has been used in GWOT. And in order to
be  able  to  examine  the  ideology's  positions  on  torture,  one  needs  also  to  discuss  its
relation to the individual. I sincerely hope that my analyses of neoconservatisms and
ideologies leave the reader better equipped to understand the full dimensions of
neoconservatism today.
Some Words on the Object and Context of the Study
This study spans temporally four years limiting itself from September 11, 2001 until the
signing of the U.S. Detainee Treatment Act of 20059, on December 30, 2005. The study
covers thus in this timeframe the intersection of the "Global War on Terror", the use of
torture  in  this  context  and  the  neoconservative  ideology.  Further  studies  will
undoubtedly undergo additional efforts to expose the effects of later developments, such
as  the  Military  Commissions  Act  which,  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  Detainee
Treatment Act, "allows for admission of evidence obtained by coercion, opens the door
to presidential authorization of abusive interrogation methods, and expressly immunizes
administration officials retroactively against possible legal action based on U.S. laws
outlawing torture" (Cooper, 2007).
Following the rhetoric of the Bush administration, members of Al Qaeda and other
people the United States has asserted to be after since September 11, 2001, seem to be
hostis humani generis - enemies of humanity10.  If  these  people  are  seen  as  "evil"  and
universal enemies, does this mean they are to go without some of the most fundamental
rights extended to all others? Some of the most fervent sources of criticism have been
human rights organizations who have felt the United States' reactions to the attacks of
September 11 and the foregoing attitude to "terrorists" have in effect meant an erosion
of an entire system of international human rights and humanitarian law.
I can foresee doubts concerning the inclusion of the legal perspective in this study. This
I will understand. As David Beetham (1999) has observed: there has been "an academic
division of labour which has assigned the study of democracy to political science, and
of human rights to law and jurisprudence: two disciplines which, in the Anglo-Saxon
9 Title X of the Department of Defense Authorization bill.
10 See e.g. Fred Baumann (2004: 69-70): "at long last, the United States was prepared to defend itself, as
well as the world, against an unappeasable, deeply evil enemy"
6world at least, have had very little connection with each other." (Beetham, 1999: 90)
However, I might quote University of Southern California Professor Emeritus of
International Law and Political Science Carl Christol to back my assertion that it is right
to do so: "There is much truth to the observation that issues which at the outset have
strong political, and in the present situation, both historical, cultural, and religious facets,
end up in a legal context" (Christol, 2004: 28). I agree.
Admittedly, the legal analysis here may be of very little substantive (jurisprudential)
significance, but – although it is below but a fraction from my original writing – it is not
omitted because of its important connotations for any and all further studies of the
subject. Beetham (1999) adds that "[d]emocracy and human rights, we now
acknowledge, belong firmly together" and that they would best be studied as an organic
unity rather than in some "empirical correlation or a matter of complementarity"
(Beetham, 1999: 90).
Claims of criticism toward neoconservatism being only thinly disguised and heavily
colored by anti-Semitism are abound.11 These can easily seem peculiar from a Finnish
standpoint and generally irrelevant and potentially racist. As a result, this paper will, in
effect, disregard all possible religious and racial aspects 12  of representatives of
neoconservatism. Criticism may or may not follow. Still, the fervor with which Joshua
Muravchik (2004) attacks many of neoconservatism's critics as being anti-Semitic is
noteworthy. Out of his thirteen page long article "Myths about  Neoconservatism", he
spends six pages in their entirety and parts of the remaining seven on discussing (or
refuting) Judaism playing a role in neoconservatism. Irwin Stelzer, too, gets involved in
this debate. I feel these precious pages could have been filled more analytically, and in a
calmer manner.
11 For a discussion on anti-Semitism and criticism toward neoconservatism, see Friedman, 2005.
12 Indeed, I do not see any. From my perspective, it would seem as absurd to say that neoconservatism is a
markedly "Jewish" political outlook as would be to assert that right-wing conservatism is a Christian one.
In Irving Kristol's obviously well informed opinion neoconservatives include "a fair proportion of secular
intellectuals" (I. Kristol, 2004: 35). Indeed, I want to echo Max Boot's words in asserting that "while
many neocons are Jewish, many are not" (Boot, 2004: 47). It goes without saying that same is true vice
versa.
7Briefly on "Success"
My sincere intention is to remain both understandable and academically relevant in the
account that follows. The structure of this paper follows from the definition of "success"
by Alexander Wendt (1999) in his unforgettable volume Social Theory of International
Politics, cited above. While the task is very hard, I will try to accomplish it by
amalgamating parts of jurisprudence (international law providing for the backdrop for
evaluating norms and/or universal ethical questions as well as definitions surrounding
torture), psychology (the theory of cognitive dissonance providing the invaluable,
though by no means final, indicator for potential discrepancies between neoconservative
ideals and practices) and political science defining the overall architecture and design of
this humble effort to construct explanation out of the bewildering wealth of information
"out there". I undertake this enterprise cognizant of the high risk of remaining sub-
academic in all three fields. Furthermore, I will approach the task spelled out by Wendt
in reverse order. By uniting previously (more or less) distinct bodies of knowledge, I
hope to gain some power to conclude with predictions that were not objects of an
original theory before.
What this means in concrete terms is that I will first discuss the theory of cognitive
dissonance generally, followed by a discussion on the theory's relation to IR, the study
of ideologies and groups, the role of circumstances and, finally, some of typical means
of reducing dissonance.
I will then discuss the different dimensions and phases of neoconservatism, making the
case,  i.a.,  for  neoconservatism as  an  ideology.  I  shall  also  examine  the  core  values  of
neoconservatism at this stage and some of their implications to the ideology. The role of
Leo Strauss is also briefly touched upon.
The definition and nature of torture is discussed in the next chapter. In order to gain an
adequate understanding of the implications of the use of torture, I present some typical
traits of torture to the reader. These include preconditions to torture, the nearly universal
prohibition of torture, the use of torture in GWOT and the relation between the
individual and torture.
8Finally, the aforementioned elements are brought together for an analysis to find out
whether  there  truly  exists  a  state  of  cognitive  dissonance  and  what  this  may entail  for
neoconservatism. To analyze this, one needs first to establish certain ground rules
following from the theory of cognitive dissonance. If a state of dissonance can thus be
located among neoconservatives, a further discussion on the magnitude of dissonance
and the means to alleviate dissonance becomes possible.
92 The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Being concerned with series of basic human behavioral patterns, first coined and
developed by Leon Festinger at Stanford University in the 1950s, the theory of
cognitive dissonance can be used to analyze and explain why certain things are
"tolerated" while others are not. Our use of the theory here is based on the notion that
the neoconservative ideology's position on torture and the ideology's core values might
be incompatible and collide, and thus potentially arouse a state of "cognitive
dissonance".
2.1 In Search of Internal Harmony
Cognitive dissonance is appositely described as being "an antecedent condition which
leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction", dissonance being "the existence
of nonfitting relations among conditions" (Festinger, 1957: 3). In other words still:
"[t]he  basic  background  of  the  theory  consists  of  the  notion  that  the  human  organism
tries to establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his opinions,
attitudes, knowledge, and values." (Festinger, 1957: 260)
To clarify the concept of cognitive dissonance further, an example: a person who
smokes cigarettes is most probably aware of the health risks involved. Should she
choose to continue to smoke over kicking the habit, a cognitive dissonance remains. To
do what is known to be harmful or in conflict with one's ideals cannot be sustained
without a feeling of discomfort that must be, in effect, "explained away". "Science has
not proven the adverse effects of smoking beyond reasonable doubt" or "I believe the
benefits of smoking in the form of enhanced pleasure, concentration and memory as
well as decreased anxiety to outweigh the potential harms" could perhaps be used as
ways  of  reassuring  the  smoker  of  the  habit's  harmless  nature,  in  spite  of  the  wealth  of
contradicting information.
Cognitive dissonance is not something exceptional, nor is its inception a morally
condemnable thing. It is a state in which we spend a large amount of our daily lives:
before and after having chosen one detergent over another at the local drug store, before
and after having bought a house, let alone before and after deciding to engage in a
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romantic relationship. Is/was it worth it? Is/was my behavior consonant with my ideals
and ideas of self? The state of cognitive dissonance is indeed inevitable and human, and
we all work it off by different means available to us. Most of the time we are successful,
and sometimes we are not. What the theory of cognitive dissonance gives us in political
science is a tool with which to examine the compatibility or incompatibility of two or
more variables in political thinking. Without a doubt, there are many more useful
purposes for the theory in addition to this.
2.2 The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and IR
Robert Jervis has done remarkable and groundbreaking work in the field of International
Relations (IR) and psychological factors. Among other theories of (Social) Psychology,
cognitive dissonance, too, has caught his attention. In his classic book Perception and
Misperception in International Politics, Jervis (1976) devotes a chapter to studying the
value and usability of cognitive dissonance in IR. In his analysis, "[t]he central
contribution of the theory of cognitive dissonance is the argument that people seek to
justify their own behavior". He continues to note that "in constructing defensible
postures to support their self-images, people must often rearrange their perceptions,
evaluations, and opinions". Importantly, Jervis sees that in order to view their own
decisions as having been correct, people may need to increase the value they place on
what they have gained by a decision, while simultaneously downplaying the value of
the rejected alternative. Even more critically, Jervis asserts that the consequences of
dissonance reduction extend to other areas, seemingly apart from the dissonance itself.
This is a natural outcome of dissonance reduction shaping attitudes and behavior.
(Jervis, 1976: 406)
In  spite  of  Jervis's  efforts  to  promote  further  use  of  the  theory,  applications  seem
difficult to find in the domain of IR. Recalling that Jervis had noted in the mid Seventies
that the theory clearly has explanatory power in relation to "a number of puzzling
misperceptions" (Jervis, 1976: 382), this seems somewhat odd, but, nevertheless, still
promising concerning its future uses. Indeed, Beasley and Joslyn have found that
"dissonance processes may emerge within choice contexts despite (or because of) the
presence of strong normative properties" (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001: 538). It is self-
evident that most decisions concerning foreign policy, let alone the use of torture and
11
other issues inherently tied to conceptions of "morality", are inevitably made in the
presence of "strong normative properties".
2.3 The Study of Ideologies and Groups
Is the theory of cognitive dissonance, created for the study of the individual and her
behavior, not ill-suited for the study of an ideology or network of like-minded
individuals, such as the neoconservatives in the United States? My answer is no. Jervis,
having studied the use of cognitive dissonance in IR, might agree, although, admittedly,
his main interest has tended to rather be individual decision-makers (and their cognition)
than collective ideologies. Festinger (1957: 10) himself departed from the assumption
that psychologically, opinions, values, beliefs and attitudes are all equal "knowledge" as
elements of cognition. And ultimately, what else is an ideology other than opinions,
values, beliefs and attitudes? Admittedly, some adjustment and mental strain are needed
to avoid pitfalls in moving the object of study from the individual to a more collective
level. This does not stop me from making a resolved claim that the theory of cognitive
dissonance is not only "not ill-suited", but especially well-suited for the purpose of
studying ideologies. Naturally, the object of study will be, in our case, an imagined
average neoconservative, representing the ideology at large. This means that there will
inevitably be some personal discrepancies between real-life neoconservative attitudes
and the ones presented below, especially when attributed to "neoconservatism". I argue
that this will be the case with any study of any ideology, however.
Concerning the foregoing categories of cognition on individual and/or group level, a
brief reference to Raul Hakli's (2006) interesting article on group beliefs and the
distinction between belief and acceptance seems appropriate. Hakli notes that a lengthy
discussion on the use and understanding of group belief and knowledge has taken place.
Concerning collective intentionality, Hakli says, there have been two types of analyses
made. According to one, groups' beliefs, emotions and attitudes are simply metaphorical,
a way of relaying the thought that all or most of a group's members feel this or that way.
This fundamentally reductionist13 view is called the summative view on group beliefs14.
The other view, labeled non-summative, gives in contrast "group beliefs an independent
13 "reductionist in the sense that they reduce group beliefs to individual beliefs" (Hakli, 2006: 287)
14 Or "acceptances" as I will later argue, echoing Hakli (2006).
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ontological status" (Hakli, 2006: 276). The non-summative view holds that "belief
attributions do not refer to combinations of individual beliefs but rather to something
like an agreement of the view of the group". It ought to be clear from what follows that
neoconservatives will typically claim the summative view, whereas my own
understanding, like that of Hakli's, is that a non-summative view of groups' beliefs is
closer to the truth, and therefore better.
Assuming a non-summative view has positive implications for the use of the theory of
cognitive dissonance, too. Indeed, if there were no group views as such but only
individual attitudes, cognitive dissonance could not feasibly be present at the collective
level either. It would also mean that distinctly "neoconservative" ideas and ideals could
not be found, only some very vaguely unifying themes or individual agreements
possibly crossing many other ideological lines. Hakli asserts that in this "agreement-
based sense, it is not a sufficient condition that the group members believe that p, and,
indeed, it is not even necessary that any of them believe that p." What is needed is the
understanding that all members of the group agree that they as a group believe in p
being correct (Hakli, 2006: 287). Understandably, the case is much clearer if there is a
party system, evidence of voting or similar expressions of opinion, and a clear
mouthpiece for the movement. With all of these elements either missing or being
contestable in neoconservatism, the case is weaker. Nonetheless, I argue that
"neoconservatism" is a distinct collection of thoughts, an ideology, which forms its own
distinct beliefs and attitudes.
Hakli  also  raises  the  question  of  voluntariness  in  his  article.  In  making  the  point  for
labeling group beliefs group acceptances, Hakli argues that "group beliefs are under
voluntary control of the group members, and thus the group itself, with the consequence
that group beliefs should be classified as acceptances" (Hakli, 2006: 287-288). I agree
fully,  on  both  of  Hakli's  points:  voluntariness  and  that  it  is  right  to  call  group  belief
acceptances. To clarify, Hakli lists five ways in which beliefs have been argued to differ
from acceptances15. The first distinction is essential for this point, for it predicates that
15 It should be noted that Hakli (2006) himself opposes clear-cut divisions between these categories. One
of the main arguments in his article is that certain misunderstandings on the definition of acceptance have
lead to erroneous argumentation. Having said this, the five differences are as follows: 1) Beliefs are
involuntary and acceptances are voluntary; 2) Beliefs aim at truth and acceptances depend on goals; 3)
Beliefs are shaped by evidence and acceptances need not be; 4) Beliefs are independent of context and
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while beliefs are involuntary, acceptances are voluntary. The theory of cognitive
dissonance stipulates specifically that dissonance can only arise where decisions are
made voluntarily; otherwise there is no compelling need to justify the action undertaken
(Festinger, 1957).
Another important dimension of the theory of cognitive dissonance in relation to
neoconservatism is its interest in social groups as both "a major source of cognitive
dissonance for  the individual and a major vehicle for eliminating and reducing the
dissonance which may exist" (Festinger, 1957: 177). The existence of disagreement in a
given  group  increases  dissonance  without  a  doubt,  as  the  example  given  below  of
Francis Fukuyama's secession from the neoconservative camp will demonstrate. The
group's potential to hold on to its conceptions will also be discussed later on.
In spite of Festinger's early remarks on the theory's applicability to groups, the theory of
cognitive dissonance has been mainly used on the level of individuals. Its application
has thus far remained somewhat limited on other levels, such as groups. This scarcity
has been noted, and consequent research has slowly been directed to tackle this
particular field (Cf. Matz and Wood, 2005: 22). Our point of departure here diverges
somewhat from this line of thinking in that the potential source of dissonance we wish
to discern arises from a gap between the ideals of an ideology, a collective entity, and
the practiced behavior of the same. Therefore, whereas one can say that the source of
this potential dissonance is the group itself, in fact the source is the discrepancy between
the ideal and the real, not necessarily the existence of disagreement in groups as with
Matz and Wood (2005).
2.4 Circumstances, Resistance to Change and the Extent of Dissonance
What are the circumstances, then, in which people find changing their behavior difficult,
asks Festinger (1957: 25) before proceeding to answer this in the following manner: 1)
Change may be painful or involve loss (magnitude of resistance to change determined
by extent  of  pain  or  loss);  2)  present  behavior  may be  satisfying  (resistance  to  change
being a function of satisfaction obtained from present behavior); and 3) making change
acceptances are context-dependent; 5) Beliefs come in degrees and acceptances are categorical. (From
Hakli, 2006: 288).
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is believed to be not possible (irreversible action, no knowledge or ability to function in
any other way; resistance to change not infinite but persistent). For neoconservatives in
their approach to the use of torture, the first two alternatives seem plausible, but not the
third, as it is obviously not impossible to reverse an opinion or approach to a given
policy.
Jervis notes that pressures that would appear significant in a controlled psychological
experiment might in fact seem slight in real life political situations. He explains this by
way of competing institutional interests, political incentives, and feelings of duty, all of
which obviously abound in political life, and all of which alleviate the pressures. (Jervis,
1976: 386-387) In spite of these weaknesses in the application of the theory in political
life Jervis sees it, as was noted above, as potentially quite usable in IR. Jervis also notes
that  while  the  basic  outlines  of  the  theory  "are  not  startling",  some  of  the  theory's
implications are contrary to common sense (ibid.) and can thus explicate phenomena
more than might otherwise be expected. To Jervis, one of the most exciting implication
of the theory is what is called the "psychology of insufficient reward", which appears to
persistently run against commonly held beliefs. This implication of the theory stipulates
that the bigger the incentive given in exchange for a change in attitude, the smaller the
change in attitude. Therefore, if, for example, two judges were to be bribed successfully,
one with a very modest amount, the other with a significant sum of money, the theory
predicates the smaller sum to be the more effective one in effective attitudinal change16.
It  may  be  rare  that  a  judge  would  comply  with  an  effort  to  be  persuaded  for  a  small
monetary reward, but non-material benefits, such as the strengthening of important
interpersonal relationships, seem slightly more believable. Jervis further asserts that this
effect has been investigated with a wide range of incentives as to be considered real
(Jervis, 1976: 399). What this finding gives us, in my view, is one further reason to look
into the allegedly approving neoconservative behavior concerning harsh interrogation
methods, including the use of torture, which at first glance seems to offer very few
incentives to neoconservatives.
16 The example only being valid if both take the bribe. In his book Jervis refers interested readers to
Milton Rosenberg's "Some Limits of Dissonance: Toward a Differentiated View of Counterattitudinal
Performance" in Shel A. Feldman, ed., Cognitive Consistency (New York: Academic Press, 1966) for a
fuller discussion of this phenomenon.
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Beasley and Joslyn note that "the magnitude of dissonance increases when people face a
choice between two relatively attractive alternatives" (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001: 533).
They continue that "dissonance theory quite directly suggests that absolute
attractiveness is important in  generating dissonance" and that thus, "individuals making
a choice between two attractive alternatives [...] will experience dissonance,  resulting
in a tendency to differentiate [...] attitudes" (ibid.).
Concerning environmental cognitive elements, Festinger finds (1957: 26-27) that the
resistance to change socially constructed reality has to do with how difficult it is to find
other people to support one's ideas. Another source of resistance which applies to both
behavioral and environmental cognitive elements lies in the element's relationship to
other cognitive elements. Festinger explains this: "[t]o the extent that the element is
consonant with a large number of other elements and to the extent that changing it
would replace these consonances with dissonances, the element will be resistant to
change". Hence, a change in a socially constructed reality such as the view on a given
policy would entail a silent bargaining including other political views, making the
analysis challenging but all the more intriguing.
The theory also holds that past decisions may easily be "locked in" so that even
otherwise significant amounts of dissonance will not be able to persuade the actor to
choose otherwise. In international politics specifically, Cameron G. Thies (2001: 706)
explains this as being an outcome of the normally high costs of changing policy in
domestic society and the reputational costs of breaking international commitments. For
neoconservatives, however, being, collectively speaking at least, outside the U.S.
government, the international reputational costs may be of secondary importance and,
ironically, sometimes even considered an added value.
2.5 Means of Reducing Dissonance
How  far  can  dissonance  go,  then?  Between  any  two  elements,  Festinger  finds,  the
maximum amount  of  dissonance  is  "equal  to  the  total  resistance  to  change  of  the  less
resistant element" (Festinger, 1957: 28). This is the point after which the less resistant
of the elements changes (at the very latest) and thus dissolves the dissonance.
16
However, this is not the only way to rid oneself of dissonance. As Ryan K. Beasley and
Mark R. Joslyn explain, an “individual may attempt to reduce dissonance by adding
consonant cognitions to the troubling inconsistency, decreasing the importance of the
elements involved in the dissonant relationship, or simply changing one of the dissonant
elements” (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001: 522-523). Festinger explains that decreasing
dissonance by means of adding new consonant cognitions is typically achieved by
acquiring supporting information and/or avoiding contradicting information and notes
that  this  type  of  dissonance  reduction  only  works  when  the  contested  decision  is  still
relatively new, i.e., in his view less than two years old. In the study Festinger explicitly
referred to, the decision concerned newly purchased cars, but this ought not to be of
excessive relevance, as the basic mechanism can be trusted to work in the human mind
in a dependable way relatively irrespective of the object of the decision. (Festinger,
1957: 50-52). It is also interesting to note that Festinger found out that the older the
decision, the more people tended to forget or deny that they ever even seriously
considered other alternatives than the one they ultimately went for (Festinger, 1957: 54).
This phenomenon is closely related to the "spreading apart" effect, according to which
people tend to increasingly perceive the chosen alternative as clearly better than the
rejected one(s) once the decision has been made (Thies, 2001: 706; Jervis, 1976: 388).
A note of caution should be added here. The foregoing does not mean that there exists
in every case a dissonance or a clear threat of one emerging. In fact, if very little or no
dissonance exists,  "there should be a relative absence of motivation to seek support  or
new information at all" (Festinger, 1957: 30).  If this is the case, no such selectivity is
naturally foreseen either. However, politics and foreign policy being a game of sorts,
involving huge amounts of issues of credibility, this will seem an unlikely scenario for
foreign policy advocates anywhere. Festinger also raises an important exception,
namely that of past experiences guiding present action into more prudent conduct
(Festinger, 1957).
Another way of adding new elements would be to "psychologically divorce" oneself
from the previous action that caused the current dissonance. To do this would be to
admit  that  if  one  were  to  make  a  given  decision  all  over  again,  it  would  be  different.
This entails no need to actually change one's behavior while simultaneously reducing
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dissonance. Of course, in political life such, admissions of one's false judgments can
prove fatal, but not always (Cf. Press, 2004). In Festinger's terms, this will create a new
state of dissonance whose maximum level would be determined by the resistance to
admitting to having been "wrong". (Festinger, 1957: 28-29)
For some reason, admitting to having been wrong is not commonly considered a
winning formula for making successful politics. In discussing relations among states,
Thies notes that expending resources "increases dissonance and the corresponding
pressure to believe that the policy is succeeding" (Thies, 2001: 706), even if evidence
would indicate otherwise. Referring to Jervis (1976), he also notes that significant
sacrifices  that  follow  from  a  policy  decision  (even  at  the  level  of  declaring   war)  can
paradoxically increase the feeling of having made the right decision by making the
effort appear "noble and worthwhile, despite any information to the contrary" (Thies,
2001: 706). Also, "winning" can at such a stage seem both more important and closer
than ever, and giving up would, in light of the sacrifices made, seem foolhardy (ibid.).
Another aspect of roughly the same phenomenon is raised by Tuomas Forsberg (1996)17,
who points out that if a person is committed to something and believes in this issue with
all her heart, she is not likely to alter her beliefs even when faced with cold facts. In fact,
in extreme cases, Forsberg explains, the exact opposite is to be expected - for if others
could be “converted” to see the issue in similar terms, no dissonance would have to
arise (other than that from the cognition of not being entirely truthful, presumably).
It is clear, then, that human behavior is not simply backward-looking, but consists also
of evaluating possible outcomes and effects of different available courses of action.
Naturally, this is the stage where people tend to, at a minimum, avoid any increase in
dissonance. This process is, however, as goal-oriented as any other form of human
activity, as Festinger notes: "the seeking of support and the seeking of new information
must be done in a highly selective manner. A person would initiate discussion with
someone he thought would agree with the new cognitive element but would avoid
discussion with someone who might agree with the element that he was trying to change.
A person would expose himself to sources of information which he expected would add
new elements which would increase consonance but would certainly avoid sources
which would increase dissonance" (Festinger, 1957: 30, emphasis added). This is
17 Forsberg (1996: 22, footnote 7) refers to Festinger, Riecken and Scnachter (1956).
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central to all political decision-making, including international relations, as the
paragraph below will aim to show.
But first, if we find that cognitive dissonance is very common, as it appears to be, why
should we care that there exists an occasional state of dissonance among
neoconservatives? The answer lies in the fact that the neoconservatives, however far
from a "cabal", form an important and influential interest group that will undoubtedly
continue to make recommendations concerning policies that future decision makers will
sometimes heed. It follows that it would benefit neoconservatives as all other decision
and policy makers, if they could keep their minds open when trying to find the most
beneficial way of conducting politics and foreign policy. Unfortunately, however, now
coming back to Festinger's thoughts on initiating discussions with those who react
positively to one's own thoughts and avoiding the company of the critic, in the words of
Robert Jervis, "[i]ronically [...], the drive to see one's self as a better, more rational
decision-maker will reduce the person's rationality by impairing his ability to utilize
information and examine his own values. The person will take positions that, while
consistent with his earlier ones, do not take full advantage of the circumstances he is
currently facing" (Jervis, 1976: 406). In my view, it is this odd and incongruous effect
that makes the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance especially salient to all politics.
To conclude, the rather straightforward theory of cognitive dissonance can be presented
in three short bullet points quoting Festinger (1957: 31):
1. There may exist dissonant or "nonfitting" relations among cognitive elements;
2. The existence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce the dissonance and
to avoid increases in dissonance;
3. Manifestations of the operation of these pressures include behavior changes,
changes of cognition, and circumspect exposure to new information and new
opinions.
However simple this three-pronged explanation seems, Festinger hastens to add that
although the core of the theory can be easy to understand, it has "rather wide
implications and applications to a variety of situations which on the surface look very
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different" (Festinger, 1957: 31). I will try to heed these wise words of caution with
appropriate care in the sections to follow.
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3 The Neoconservative Ideology
"Rarely in American history has such a cohesive and distinctive group
managed to exert so decisive an influence on such a crucial issue as the
neocons did on Iraq from the collapse of the twin towers through the early
stages of the occupation of Baghdad almost two years later" (Marshall,
2003)
Peter Steinfels (1979) wondered in the late 1970s why this group of intellectuals18 with
excellent ties to both industry and labor, the reading (and TV-watching) public,
officeholders and the political elite in general, would so easily be dismissed.
Unfortunately, this appears to be as easily done in the 21st century as in the 1970s.
Despite vast attention to the allegedly neoconservative policies of the United States, the
ideology itself and its deeper idiosyncrasies has remained relatively unknown.
Most scholars will agree that neoconservatism19 as a movement is exceptionally varied
and heterogeneous in its composition (Cf. Fukuyama 2006a, 2006b). And, like all
complex tangles of political opinions, neoconservatism cannot be properly understood
apart from its history, as Peter Steinfels noted of the ideology in the 1970s (Steinfels,
1979: 25). In his article aiming at bridging the gaping distance between IR theory and
neoconservatism, Michael Williams, too, notes that understanding the philosophical
background of neoconservatism is essential (Williams, 2005).
However varied and heterogeneous, the essentials of traditional neoconservatism can
nevertheless be summed up in a relatively concise manner, as former neoconservative
Francis  Fukuyama  shows.  He  asserts  that  neoconservatism  had  "[f]our  common
principles or threads [which] ran through much of [neoconservative] thought up through
the end of the Cold War: a concern with democracy, human rights, and more generally
the internal politics of states; a belief that U.S. power can be used for moral purposes; a
scepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security
18 Steinfels estimated that roughly a quarter of the scholars on the list of "the 70 most prestigious
Contemporary American Intellectuals" in Charles Kadushin's book "The American Intellectual Elite"
(1970) could be defined as neoconservative (Steinfels, 1979: 5).
19 The term "neoconservatism" has been attributed to former leader of the Democratic Socialists Michael
Harrington and others on the editorial board of Dissent, a leftist magazine. According to Lipset,
Harrington denied having come up with the term for a long time, but has since admitted that it was in
common usage among the editors of the magazine. Lipset writes the term was originally coined in the mid
1960s. (Cf. Lipset, 1997: 193, also footnote 59 on page 323, and I. Kristol 2005: 8).
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problems; and finally, a view that ambitious social engineering often leads to
unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends" (Fukuyama 2006b: 4-5).
Neoconservative Kenneth Adelman defines neoconservatism with even fewer words, as
regards its foreign policy positions; according to him, neoconservatism is "the idea of a
tough foreign policy on behalf of morality, the idea of using our power for moral good
in the world" (Adelman in Rose, 2006).
Seymour Martin Lipset suggested that neoconservatism had already in the 1990s ceased
to exist as the connotations of the label outgrew its original meaning, that of "strongly
anti-communist leftists" (Lipset, 1997: 200). Lipset finds support in the notable
neoconservative Norman Podhoretz, who also proclaimed neoconservatism "dead" in
1996 (Stelzer, 2004: 24). Since Podhoretz's manner of interpreting "dead" would mean
that virtually all Cold War definitions would have to be thrown into the litter basket, I
will dismiss this idea of discarding the term as a whole and insist on neoconservatism
being alive and, sometimes quite visibly, kicking. Admitted, neoconservatism has
changed its form and to my understanding even been factionalized, but some basic ideas
remain "neoconservative" today, as Fukuyama claims above. Lipset and Podhoretz's
spreading of premature news of neoconservatism's death can also be understood by way
of  interpreting  what  they  saw  as  passing  away  as  a  transition  to  another  stage  in
neoconservatism. My claim is that a change of generation of sorts rather than "death" is
what took place when Podhoretz was beginning to mourn. One of Lipset's arguments for
the death of neoconservatism is that mostly non-U.S. commentators have carelessly
applied the term "neoconservative" to anti-statist traditional conservatives. These
pundits have appeared to confuse the prefix neo with classical liberal and libertarian
thinking and, of course, in light of traditional neoconservative thinking on domestic
issues, not much could be further from the truth20. Confusion could be added by the fact
that representatives of distinctly anti-statist policy-making such as Margaret Thatcher
are included in books such as Irwin Stelzer's Neoconservatism21, making claims for
seemingly "neoconservative" policies.
20 Consider in this light for example the propositions by Irving Kristol to President Reagan concerning
federally funded stipends for all those below the poverty line and raising Social Security payments in
order to help the financial plight of some of the older people in the U.S. (Cf. Lipset, 1997: 200)
21 It ought to be noted, however, that Ms. Thatcher's article New Threats for Old appeared in part II of the
book, called "Neoconservatives and Foreign Policy with Some Comments by Friendly Dissenters", thus
not implying unreservedly that she be a neoconservative.
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Luckily, however, I am not alone but find support for my assertion that neoconservatism
is still alive on the "highest level" in the "godfather" of the movement himself, Irving
Kristol22. Like Lipset and Podhoretz, he, too, noted around the turn of the millennium
that neoconservatism had been absorbed into mainstream conservatism. However, he
has since reevaluated this assessment and concluded that neoconservatism may only
appear to have disappeared because it tends to "surface only intermittently". This notion
of disappearance is wrong, Kristol explains (I. Kristol, 2004: 33). Largely because of
the increase of the United States' relative power in the world, and because the 43rd
president could unexpectedly relate to the neoconservative ideals, Kristol finds that
"neoconservatism began enjoying a second life, at a time when its obituaries were still
being published" (I. Kristol, 2004: 37). Again, these "reemergences" are those
transitional moments which I claim mark the joints between different "generations" of
neoconservatism.
As noted, there are some basics of neoconservatism hardly open to much critical debate.
We shall  return  later  to  these  in  our  search  for  neoconservative  core  values,  but  let  us
for the moment turn our attention to a brief history of the ideology, as an insightful
reading of Steinfels' and Williams' analyses of neoconservatism obliges us to.
3.1 Evolution of a Political Outlook
Neoconservatism is an older ideology than one might intuitively think: Francis
Fukuyama, for example, notes that the "neoconservative legacy [traces] its roots back to
the early 1940s" and that it has since "generated a coherent body of ideas that informed
a wide range of domestic and foreign policy choices" (Fukuyama 2006b: 4). Irving
Kristol reminisces how "[e]ventually, by the 1960s and the early 1970s, something that
was to be called 'neoconservatism' came into being as a new category of political
identity for persons like myself. I found it a relief to be so designated and to be removed
from that narrowing portion of the political spectrum labeled as 'anti-communist liberal"
(I. Kristol, 1995: 485). So with its roots in the 1940s, but in many ways a product of the
1960s, the ideas that neoconservatism represented gained significant momentum in the
United States of the 1970s. At the time, this political orientation was considered in part
threatening, in part promising (Steinfels, 1979). Neoconservatism again blossomed
22 Kristol remarks himself that he has been frequently referred to as the godfather of neoconservatism, see
I. Kristol, 2004: 33.
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during the Reagan presidency and resurfaced in the late 1990s, and really made the
grade in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, finding heavy resonance in
the Oval Office (Cf. Stelzer, 2004).
While  neoconservative  writer  Adam Wolfson  doesn't  explicitly  advocate  a  division  of
neoconservatives into distinct generations23, he does find notable differences between
neoconservatives  of  the  past  and  those  that  are  active  today  (Wolfson,  2004),  as  does
fellow neoconservative Nathan Glazer (2005). Indeed, Glazer seems highly skeptical of
making evolutionary paths from the earliest neoconservatives to the present day
advocates of neoconservatism and notes that there "is very little overlap between those
who promoted the neoconservatism of the 1970s and those committed to its latter-day
manifestation" (Glazer, 2005: 17).
Nevertheless, following Steinfels's assertion that neoconservatism cannot be sufficiently
understood without an understanding of the ideology's past, what follows is a short
chronological presentation of three neoconservative "generations", stretching from the
beginnings of the ideology up until the 21st century. In contrast to Glazer, I believe that
there are certain similarities to be found in all three generations of the ideology, thus
justifying the label "ideology", however resolutely this label is opposed by most
prominent neoconservatives past and present.
3.2  Three Generations of Neoconservatism: Left to Right
The First Generation: From Socialist to Neoconservative (- 1970s)
The first generation of neoconservatives emphasized continuity with traditional
liberalism. Indeed, most were former liberals and even socialists by philosophical or
political background, Steinfels (1979: 2) notes. In a similar vein, Murray Friedman
(2005) notes that neoconservatives began as descendents of the Enlightenment; their
ideas included free markets, democracy, individualism, equal rights, and, later, Marxist
theories of class struggle and greater government intervention in society" (Friedman,
2005: 134). Eventually, neoconservatives of this age started to hold in common an until
23 Max Boot (2004) refers to William Kristol and Robert Kagan as being descendants of the "first
generation". His referral is, of course, mainly to family ties as both Kristol and Kagan's fathers Irving and
Donald, as well as William's mother Gertrude Himmelfarb, have been notable neoconservatives long
before their sons. It is certainly fascinating - but not part of the scope of this study - how strong the
bloodline appears in the neoconservative heritage. Gary Dorrien (2004) makes use of distinct generations,
similar to those used here, in his book Imperial Designs.
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then quite odd-seeming mixture of themes from liberal, conservative and socialist
traditions. Traditional conservatives saw these newcomers as not much more than "a
schism in the left", and didn't consider them "an authentic variety of conservatism"
(Friedman, 2005: 134).
The novelty of this controversial mixture of political views is arguably precisely what
justified placing the prefix "neo" as well as the label "conservative" on the new
ideology's lapel. These intellectuals began to perceive countercultures in the 1950s24,
and increasingly so in the 1960s, as utterly illiberal and destructive for liberalism itself,
liberalism being in a way self-contradictory, for it provided the liberties needed to
destroy the freedom-granting system itself (Steinfels, 1979: 4; see also Friedman, 2005:
100-115). Speaking of "suicide" or "self-destruction" of the West or liberalism has been
a neoconservative metaphor of choice ever since (Cf. Kimball, 2006).
Almost all of the prominent neoconservatives of the 1970s were born in or shortly
before or after the 1920s. For the bulk of them, the Red Decade of the 1930s embodied
a debut in politics, and most became scholars or writers in the Age of Apathy during the
1950s (Steinfels, 1979: 25-26). Things that can hardly be expected to have escaped the
notice of and, in turn, greatly influenced these "men [sic] that were changing America's
politics"25 include fascism's temporary triumph in the world and the frightening human
void of the holocaust. Going into the Cold War, these anti-Stalinist former socialist
intellectuals were not going to be duped into positioning themselves anywhere near
totalitarianism as  they  had  witnessed  the  horrors  of  such  regimes  relatively  closely.  In
response, their Cold War war effort became efforts in the name of "Cultural Freedom".
These hard-line anti-communist efforts were often run and paid for by what Steinfels
called sarcastically "the espionage and covert-action arm of a Great Power", the U.S.,
but this seemingly paradoxical fact appears "to have distressed these intellectuals very
little" (Steinfels, 1979: 30-31). Nevertheless, Steinfels attributes the "mystique behind
all their later politique" to these two factors - the rise of totalitarianism and the future of
socialism facing this threat (Steinfels, 1979: 26).
24 Lionel Trilling "warned of the rise of an adversary culture, a culture in revolt against the ordinary
norms of the society" in the 1950s (Friedman, 2005: 101).
25 Phrase from the title of Peter Steinfels's 1979 book.
25
Some disagree with Steinfels significantly. Admittedly, the clear and logical text of
Steinfels's argumentation can be interpreted in a number of ways. Nathan Glazer asserts
that "[w]hen Peter Steinfels wrote in 1978 The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are
Changing America's Politics, he scarcely said a word about foreign policy". This is not
entirely true, as much of Steinfels's narrative was about the primacy of the domestic
system predicating over any and all foreign policy considerations. Describing basic
neoconservative characteristics Steinfels writes, for example, that a "precarious
international order requires a stable, unified society at home; renewed emphasis on the
Communist threat and on the Third World's rejection of liberal values is needed to
generate the requisite national allegiance and discipline" (Steinfels, 1979: 67). At that
time, Glazer claims, however, that neoconservatism was more of a tendency of thought
in domestic social policy, while later on, there have been "an increasing number of
books on neoconservatives and foreign policy, bearing titles such as Imperial Dreams
[sic]: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana, and many other such treatments of
neoconservatism are no doubt on the way"26 (Glazer, 2005: 17).
Glazer's assertion seems to be somewhat at odds with the unifying issue of anti-
Stalinism or anti-communism, which would tend to direct thoughts to a large part
outside the United States27, but it seems indeed to a large extent true that, around the
time of its consolidating phase in the 1970s, neoconservatism was indeed more
interested in domestic issues than foreign policy (Cf. Wolfson, 2004: 216, Friedman,
2005: 120). Glazer appears to view this as a prerequisite for later evolution of the
ideology: "[b]ut foreign policy was no part of early neoconservatism: Had it been, there
would have been additional bases of division among the early neoconservatives. How
the term 'neoconservatism' morphed from a political tendency that dealt almost entirely
with domestic social policy to one that deals almost entirely — indeed, entirely — with
foreign policy is an interesting question", Glazer concludes (Glazer, 2005: 17).
Initially,  almost  all  neoconservatives  were  in  favor  of  the  welfare  planning  role  of  the
state and the New Deal. Nevertheless, be it the ambiguous new term, some confusing
26 Glazer refers here most likely to Dorrien's (2004) Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax
Americana.
27 Although it is not to be overlooked that socialism was surprisingly strong in parts of the US at the time,
New York being one such place. New York was, incidentally, also the place where the "original"
neoconservatives started forming commonly held ideas.
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element or the surprising combination of political views, neoconservatives were
generally taken to be supporters and advocates of hard-line right-wing domestic and
foreign policies. In Lipset's reading of the events at this time, this meant in reality a
simultaneous push from and pull toward two opposing sides: that from the old friends
on the Left who now rejected them "categorically", and that toward their new
appreciative audiences (at least as far as the subjects discussed were connective, as they
often were) and new-found friends on the Right. (Lipset, 1997: 193-194)
The spirit of the newly established and catholic movement still politically very transient
is well encapsulated in Jeane Kirkpatrick's 1979 article "Why we are not Republicans"28,
where she explains that the GOP is mostly an advocate for the well-being of the already
well-off  white  upper  and  middle  classes  with  no  or  little  regard  for  the  poor  and
minorities facing obstacles in getting by (Kirkpatrick as referred to in Lipset, 1997:
195).
In hindsight it would therefore seem that it was by no means clear that the
neoconservatives would have to drift as far to the political Right as they appear to have
started to do in the 1970s. One of their strongest passions, however, got clearly the
strongest support there and also, arguably, the least support from the Left. This unifying
theme was, naturally, firm and unforgiving anti-communism (Lipset, 1997: 194). By
this stage during the 1970s, at the latest, neoconservatives were deeply involved in
foreign policy discussions and handing out recommendations concerning the right way
to wage the Cold War. And so Albert Wohlstetter, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and
Democratic senator Henry Martin "Scoop" Jackson aligned themselves against
prominent Realists like Henry Kissinger or centrist Republicans and Democrats seeking
to use arms control as a strategic means in the Cold War (Fukuyama, 2006b: 34).
A significant turning point in the neoconservatives' moving further to the Right seems to
be the failure to capitalize on the success of campaigning for Jimmy Carter's presidency,
which yielded no major posts and very few minor ones. The failure to perform after the
elections must have been especially bitter in light of a list of sixty names submitted to
the president-elect regarding suitable neoconservative candidates for the new
28 Kirkpatrick did become a Republican in 1985, after having served in the administration of former
Democrat President Ronald Reagan for some years.
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administration's notable jobs (Lipset, 1997: 194). According to Friedman,
neoconservatives were, in spite of their disappointment in the Carter administration's
policy and composition, willing to aid Carter in the elections which he subsequently lost
to Ronald Reagan. A meeting with President Carter in which notable neoconservatives
were trying to get a feel of possible pleas for support, however, "did not go well", thus
further alienating the neoconservatives from the Democratic Party (Friedman, 2005:
150).
So with roots in socialist thinking and with longstanding Democrat aspirations, yet
today closely associated with the Right side of the political spectrum, one might think
that the neoconservatives themselves had gradually moved to the political Right. Lipset
writes, however, that Dan Himmelfarb contested this idea in the 1980s and claimed that
U.S. liberalism had instead moved to the Left while neoconservatives had all the while
stayed put. This interpretation seems slightly incredulous and just as one-sided as its
obverse, but what matters here is rather that the gap between the Left and the Right
seems to have grown in the U.S. and that, all things considered; the neoconservatives
today are generally found to lie more to the Right than to the Left. (Lipset, 1997: 196)
Coalition for a Democratic Majority CDM and Committee on the Present Danger
The founding of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority was an attempt to move the
Democratic Party more to the political Center and away from the Left (Friedman, 2005:
142). Although it preferred to be called neoliberal, Lipset called the CDM "the one
important neoconservative organization during the seventies and early eighties". It
dissolved as a result of the 1984 elections (Lipset, 1997: 198)
A closely related organ was the Committee on the Present Danger, designed to spread
the neoconservative analysis according to which the Soviet Union had already by then
(i.e., 1976) achieved "superiority in arms by concentrating its modest resources there".
This threat could be responded to only by means of an ambitious increase in strategic
weaponry, with freedom as "the ultimate prize" (Friedman, 2005: 142). Friedman
learned  ultimately  to  see  CDM  and  CPD  as  a  "government  in  waiting",  in  which
neoconservative former liberals found themselves increasingly in the company of more
traditional conservatives (Friedman, 2005: 143).
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The Second Generation: the Eighties and Mid-Nineties
In addition to any and all disillusionments and disappointments relating to the
advancement of many of the neoconservatives' own careers, neoconservatives had
grown tired of President Carter's foreign policy, considered at the time "too soft".  These
to a degree politically homeless neoconservatives were, according to Lipset,
consequently personally wooed by presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to support his
eventually successful campaign. This time neoconservative efforts yielded concrete
dividends in the form of nominations to prominent posts29 and apparent loyalty from the
neoconservatives' side to the Reagan style Republicans. (Lipset, 1997) Consequently,
neoconservatives could claim "enormous influence" in foreign policy in the Reagan
administration (Friedman, 2005: 122).
Echoing neoconservative concerns of the 1960s, around this time (early 1980s) Jeane
Kirkpatrick was, among others, concerned that a new kind of politics was increasingly
displacing the old way of politics - that of trusting authority, valuing tradition, avoiding
open conflicts, and seeking consensus. Indeed, this seems very characteristic of the on
occasion nostalgic attitude of the neoconservative politics (Joseph, 1982: 962-963).
In addition to good formal positions in the administration, prominent neoconservatives
gained respected positions in the advisory bodies of the Reagan policy-making
machinery30. Furthermore, as was noted above, the most obvious unifying terrain from
the start between conservatives and neoconservatives was foreign policy. It should thus
come as no surprise that these nominations had primarily to do with foreign affairs. (Cf.
Lipset, 1997: 195)
Admittedly, then, the Reagan years were a time of considerable influence for
neoconservatives (Havers and Wexler, 2001). Neoconservative foreign policy ideals
were compressed into "hating détente and arms control as well as despising the
'wimpish' European allies", as was characterized by Thomas Risse (2004). This policy,
29 Jeane Kirkpatrick "was subsequently given the U.N. ambassadorship” and Richard Perle, Carl
Gershman, Elliot Abrams and Max Kampelman were appointed to major positions in the State or Defense
Departments. (Lipset, 1997:195)
30 Richard Pipes worked for the National Security Council; Norman Podhoretz and Ben Wattenberg
functioned as advisors in the international communications apparatus; William Bennett served as
Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities and Secretary of Education and was assisted by
Chester Finn and William Kristol; Gertrude Himmelfarb held a presidential appointment on the National
Council for the Humanities. (Lipset, 1997:195)
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complemented  with  the  notion  that  arms  control  "had  to  be  abandoned  in  favor  of  an
arms race in order to ruin the Soviet economy and, thus, to win the Cold War" (Risse,
2004), was arguably deeply appreciated by the White House and later turned out to be
quite emblematic of the Reagan presidency. According to Risse, these somewhat
simplified and materialistic explanations of the winning tactics of the Cold War are still
rather high on the fondest memories and greatest accomplishments list of the
neoconservatives. (Risse, 2004:  226)
In spite of these apparent similarities and close ties with the Reagan administration,
neoconservatism remained distinct from the Republican Party's ideology. Furthermore,
there were significant breaches in the seemingly smooth relationship as well, as
Fukuyama explains: "[a]lthough many [neoconservative] ideas were finally put into
practice in the Reagan administration, it remained the case that the foreign policy
establishment – the people who ran the bureaucracies at the State Department, the
intelligence community, and the Pentagon, as well as the legions of advisers, think tank
specialists, and academics – was largely dismissive of [neoconservatives].
Neoconservatives were also used to having the Europeans look down on them as
moralistic naïfs, reckless cowboys, or worse. They were used to bucking conventional
wisdom and going for solutions [...] that everyone else thought were completely out of
the realm of possibility." (Fukuyama, 2006b: 60).
It may well be down to these internal differences of opinion and some major differences
in  domestic  policies  with  the  Republicans  that  most  neoconservatives  decided  to
continue  to  identify  themselves  rather  as  Democrats  in  spite  of  the  numerous  visible
positions in the Reagan administration (Lipset, 1997:198).
It was therefore not until the very late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to visibly
lose its grip on its satellite socialist countries that the neoconservatives really received
any substantial, widespread recognition and a feeling of vindication that came with it.
Many neoconservative ideas and suggested policies that Reagan had followed despite
intense criticism from leftist and centrist intelligentsia appeared in the aftermath to some
extent  to  have  been  the  right  formula  for  "winning"  the  Cold  War,  as  opposed  to
"managing" it, as others would have seen to be fit all along. Fukuyama and numerous
others contest the idea of such easy answers, but regardless of what it was that
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ultimately "tore that wall down", what remains is that neoconservative ideals received
far more kudos than before while neoconservatives could feel their confidence soar (Cf.
Fukuyama, 2006b). To many neoconservatives, however, the end of the Cold War came
significantly later than it did to the Reagan and first Bush administrations. Most
neoconservatives were unforgivingly furious at successive U.S. administrations for
allowing Gorbachev to have had any success in his "peace offensive", which was, in
their minds, really only aiming at the same form of communist global domination as all
other Soviet leaders had, as their understanding of totalitarian rule taught to assume.
Therefore, according to Norman Podhoretz, if the U.S. did not seek strategic superiority,
"the West would become Finlandized in the name of peace" (Dorrien, 2004: 13).
Others felt at this point that neoconservatism had already long been part and parcel of
the Republican Party line. Perhaps in part because of this moment of neoconservative
victory, notable tensions were felt within the party. As Havers and Wexler argue: "[b]y
the  end  of  the  Reagan  presidency  and  well  into  the  Bush  presidency,  cracks  were
beginning to appear in the old Republican coalition of libertarians, neoconservatives,
and Christian Rightists" (Havers and Wexler, 2001).
Regardless of the neoconservatives' party of choice, Fukuyama saw that lack of
uniformity within the neoconservative movement reached significant levels after "the
unexpected demise of communism in 1989-91, when unity on foreign policy evaporated
and neoconservatives began debating among themselves the nature of American
national interests in the post-Cold War world" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 39). A symptom of
this debate is that two neoconservative heavyweights of the 1980s, Irving Kristol and
Jeane Kirkpatrick, furthered the view that neoconservatism should transform itself to
being "nationalistic realists" and pay minimal attention to everything except "America's
vital interests" (Dorrien, 2004: 75). Assertions such as these could not have been heard
before the end of the Cold War, nor would they be in the years to come.
It would therefore seem that even though neoconservatives have since adopted the view
that it was indeed their recommendations that were the best formula for countering the
perceived Soviet threat, the fall of the Soviet Union was as unexpected to them as to any
other group of observers. Consequently, the neoconservative camp was left puzzled and
confused, and even the usually provocative and quick Norman Podhoretz was left
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explaining that "he no longer knew what to think" (Dorrien,  2004: 14). It ought to be
noted, that whatever merit neoconservatives deserve for their policies on the Soviet
Union, their estimates of Soviet power until the very end have later proven to be crudely
wrong.
During the 1980s, Gary Dorrien writes, "the ideology of American global preeminence
originated" and grew stronger during the 1990s (Dorrien, 2004: 1). This ideology then
"gained power with the election of George W. Bush, and reshaped American foreign
policy after September 11, 2001" (ibid.). And so  it can be reported as having happened
in hindsight that the confusion after the end of the Cold War lasted several years, and
out of it emerged something new, yet distinctly neoconservative in the mid-1990s: a
third  generation  of  neoconservatism,  which  found its  true  moment  after  the  tragedy of
September 11, 2001.
The Third Generation: Late 1990s and on
Perhaps  it  is  that  the  1990s  were  a  fitting  time  for  a  change  in  more  than  one  ways.
Indeed, a time that would be described as lacking grand strategy, and being marked by
drift and indecision, does indeed seem typically perfect for new "big ideas". Add to this
a brilliant economic development and the possibilities may have seemed infinite. (Cox,
2004: 29-30) The neoconservatives' impact during this current phase of
neoconservatism remained, however, relatively limited through the 1990s. One of the
most notable representatives of today's neoconservatives, William Kristol, affirms this
and notes that little of his and fellow neoconservative Robert Kagan's work seemed to
have much of an impact during the late 1990s (W. Kristol, 2004: 75). September 11,
2001, of course, changed this dramatically and lifted the thus far quite latent writings of
this newest generation very much to the fore as there was "a lot more receptivity to the
argument that the world was more dangerous than it seemed in the 1990s" (W. Kristol,
2004: 75), something which both Kristol and Kagan had been warning about throughout
the 1990s.
Some observers disagree and claim that neoconservatives did in fact have a lot of
influence prior to 9/11 and that already Clinton's second term saw some noticeable
elements of neoconservative thinking amalgamated in the administration's thinking.
This disagreement can probably be explained away in part by the fact that such
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observations typically have been limited to domestic policies whereas William Kristol's
own conception had to do with foreign policy31. Regardless of their (lack of) position in
the Clinton administration, some neoconservatives clearly preferred Clinton's fresh
idealism in foreign policy after the fusty realism of George H.W. Bush. Joshua
Muravchik, for one, remarked that foreign policy stands are the more important
determinant  of  a  good  president,  and   that  on  "what  I  care  about  -  human  rights  and
promoting  democracy, keeping some sense of ideals in our foreign policy - Clinton is
more amenable than [George H.W.]  Bush" (Dorrien, 2004: 43).
Interestingly,  even after the entire administration of George W. Bush has in the media
been labeled "neoconservative" or as furthering a "neoconservative" foreign policy
agenda so many times, not all political pundits agree that there truly exists a distinctly
neoconservative school of thought among the neoconservatives as regards foreign
policy: "Neoconservatism never really had a well-explicated theory of foreign policy in
the  first  place",  writes  Marshall  (2003).  One  particular  sentence  later  in  his  text,  I
believe, gives away the reason he might feel that way. He observes that "[a]lthough it is
the sworn enemy of realism, neoconservatism has never been and is not now limited to
one particular foreign policy school" (Marshall, 2003). Admittedly, this is the genius of
the neoconservative approach in many if not all fields of policy as it has never been
confined  to  any  one  traditional  school.  Rather  it  has  drawn from a  number  of  sources
quite freely, allowing for similar confusion to arise from time to time, and leaving
several scholars, journalists and other observers confused as to the true nature of
"neoconservatism". Dorrien goes further than most and asserts that even during the
relatively quiet 1990s, when other observers had found neoconservatives mainly waging
"culture wars",  it  seemed to Dorrien "that the foreign policy issue was the key to their
identity and political future" (Dorrien, 2004: 2)
A certain diversity of views and, perhaps following this, a reluctance to be categorized,
is visible in neoconservative party identification as well. As in previous "generations",
so, too, among the 21st century neoconservatives there are those who identify
themselves more as Democrats than Republicans. Arguably most have moved to the
other side of the political fence and now identify themselves more with the goals and
31 According to Havers and Wexler in domestic issues, for example, limits of the welfare state were
recognized by Clinton's White House "along neoconservative lines" (Havers and Wexler, 2001).
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approaches of the GOP (Boot, 2004: 46-47), continuing the now close to traditional
seeming slide along the Left-Right railing. For right from the start of neoconservatism,
this appears to have been a strengthening trend: to start from the Left (sometimes the far
Left in U.S. terms) and to gradually travel to the Right.
Individually, however, a shift in political geography looks unnecessary. "Most younger
members of the neoconservative movement", Boot writes, "including some descendants
of the first generation, such as William Kristol [...], and Robert Kagan [...] have never
gone through a leftist phase, which makes the 'neo' prefix no longer technically
accurate". Boot also writes that the term neoconservative has "morphed away from its
original definition" (Boot, 2004: 47). Be this as it may - and I am not too keen on tight
orthodoxies in any case - there really isn't any other label to attach to these
neoconservative thinkers either. Of course, individually one can do what one wishes, as
Boot describes Paul Wolfowitz doing by calling himself a "Scoop Jackson Republican",
but this idiosyncratic method of definitional choice doesn't seem to carry one very far
when  more than one person is involved. I would therefore defend the conception that
neoconservatism is a distinct "school of thought", even an ideology, as we shall see
below. This does not mean that neoconservatism would not have evolved over the years.
It has, indeed, changed substantively.
A trait that is prone to give rise to bafflement regarding neoconservatives is arguably
their ability to disagree. For example, Stelzer distinguishes at least two distinct schools
of foreign policy thought inside the larger neoconservative family. According to him,
there are "neocon hawks such as Kristol and Kagan [as contrasted with] neocons such as
Krauthammer" (Stelzer, 2004: 15). Where William Kristol favored intervention in
Kosovo,  Krauthammer  opposed  it;  as  W.  Kristol  and  Robert  Kagan  support  an
ambitious Middle East reform through democratizing Iraq, James Q. Wilson and other
more moderate neoconservatives oppose it.  (Stelzer, 2004: 14; see also Boot, 2004: 45)
These divisions, and the actually quite minute breadth between the two types of
concurrent neoconservatism, are exemplified by Krauthammer, a "democratic realist"32
who has said: "[w]e will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and
treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity - meaning, places central to
32 In my book, a neoconservative.
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the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortar threat
to freedom... We are friends to all, but we come ashore only where it counts" (quoted in
Stelzer, 2004: XV-XVI). W. Kristol and Kagan might agree but tend more often than
not to be willing to go much further in their assertions, as compared to Krauthammer.
Kristolian-Kaganite Neoconservatism
The kind of neoconservatism we are primarily concerned with here - one which is seen
as stereotypically "hawkish", i.e., hard and unforgiving in foreign policy - might be
called the Kristolian-Kaganite version of neoconservatism, after William Kristol and
Robert Kagan, labeled "neocon hawks" above. Kristol and Kagan have shared a lot to
start with. Among their parents were three notable figures in the neoconservative
movement (Irving Kristol and Donald Kagan being the fathers, and Gertrude
Himmelfarb being William Kristol’s mother). In the 1990s they cofounded The Weekly
Standard magazine, and together they helped to make sense of the Republican
disorientation of the Clinton era, through the battle of ideas. (Dorrien, 2004)
Discussing different types of neoconservatives, Irwin Stelzer, too, places "on the other
end the Kristol-Kagan view", according to which "the 'purpose of American foreign
policy ought to be clear.  When it  comes to dealing with tyrannical regimes,  especially
[ed.  note:  but  not  only]  those  with  the  power  to  do  us  or  our  allies  harm,  the  United
States should seek not coexistence but transformation'" (Stelzer, 2004: XV, "ed. note"
by Stelzer, quote in quote from Kagan and Kristol in same volume). What seems to
have alienated Francis Fukuyama from his prior base of neoconservatism is the
"hijacking" of the term "neoconservative" by the two gentlemen mentioned above. A
weary Fukuyama writes that because "the Kristol-Kagan agenda has become so
indelibly associated with neoconservatism and was put into practice by the
administration of George W. Bush, it is an uphill struggle to try to redefine
neoconservative foreign policy after the fact" (Fukuyama, 2006b).
The Kristol-Kagan effort to renew neoconservatism was first laid out (systematically) in
a 1996 article in Foreign Affairs, where the authors called for a neo-Reaganite agenda
for the GOP (Fukuyama, 2006b: 40-41). Where more traditional neoconservatives such
as  Irving  Kristol  and  Norman  Podhoretz  long  preferred  to  focus  on  the  moralities  of
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their society33, William Kristol and Robert Kagan have tended to make the case for an
expressly expansive, interventionist and democracy-promoting set of foreign policy
recommendations and demands. This tendency has sometimes been sarcastically called
"Wilsonianism on steroids" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 40), Wilsonianism obviously referring
to the internationalist ideals of President Woodrow Wilson. Some traits of
Wilsonianism that are typically attached to the term were omitted by the
neoconservatives, however. These include Wilson's infatuation with multilateral
institutions (Dorrien, 2004: 119). Kristol and Kagan write that a world led by the United
States is a better, more secure one. It is so primarily because a multipolar world would,
in their interpretation, be "far less congenial to democracy and to individual liberties"
(Kagan and Kristol, 2000: 24), signifying the salience of democracy and individual
liberties as values well worth defending and promoting.
This Kristolian-Kaganite type of neoconservatism is distinct from that of the second
generation in many respects.  The late Jeane Kirkpatrick, a notable neoconservative of
the past, for example, was scolded for claiming that the U.S. need not bear such unusual
burdens now as it did in the face of World War II or the Soviet threat during the Cold
War. In opposition to Kirkpatrick's assertion, the Kristolian-Kaganite model reply is that
such a return to "normalcy" would render not only the U.S. but every other "free nation"
vulnerable to new threats and instability. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the
run up to World War II, Kristol and Kagan claim. The U.S. is supposed to act as it did
during the Cold War even if there were no rival nation in sight that could challenge its
power. Indeed, Kristol and Kagan feel it is absolutely erroneous to attach policies of the
Cold War to hegemonic rivalry - they were to be implemented in any case for the sake
of a stable and the best available international system - one which the U.S. stands for. A
premium, or rather a benign side effect, was that it was also the best approach to counter
Soviet power. (Kristol and Kagan, 2004: 61-63) Furthermore, whereas the father of
William, Irving Kristol, had after the end of the Cold War called for limiting U.S.
intervention  to  a  select  few  “vital  interests”,  W.  Kristol  and  Kagan  used  a  lot  of
ammunition to call for a  much bolder “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military
supremacy and moral confidence” (W. Kristol and Kagan quoted in Dorrien, 2004: 128).
33 For example, the themes that Podhoretz and Kristol tackle in Mark Gerson's The Essential
Neoconservative Reader (1996) are quite different from those associated with the core of
neoconservatism today. Their writings focus on racial relations, capitalism and the free society, social
reform, the welfare state as well as pornography and obscenity.
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3.3 Inter Arma Silent Leges?34 Neoconservatives and International Law
Michael Cox characterizes this newest cadre of neoconservatives as being, inter alia,
highly skeptical of international institutions. According to Cox (2004), "Reaganite by
background, hegemonist by inclination, and keenly aware that there existed a growing
gap between US military capabilities and America's ever-expanding global role, the new
ideologues on the right were determined to remove all the constraints that they felt had
been imposed on the last remaining superpower by the 'international community' in the
post-Cold War period" (Cox, 2004: 30). Fukuyama agrees and notes that
"[n]eoconservatives share with realists a skepticism about the ability of international
law and institutions to solve serious security problems" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 64). More
specifically on these newer neoconservatives, Fukuyama writes that Kristol and Kagan
have asserted that "getting tyrannical regimes to play by civilized rules through
agreements, international law, or norms was ultimately unworkable" (Fukuyama, 2006b:
42). Categorization is never as easy, however. Joshua Muravchik has been noted as
being one of the very few neoconservative exceptions to the rule, alongside John Norton
Moore and Eugene Rostow. Although it can and probably will adamantly be disputed
by many, Dorrien (2004: 119) claims that these individuals are, in fact, committed to
international  law  and  believe  in  it.  Again,  the  variation  is  far  and  wide  –  Charles
Krauthammer’s attitude towards international law is exemplified by one typical rant of
his from the emotional aggressive realism point of view in which he says, according to
Dorrien, that “[i]f bin Laden were caught and merely ‘brought to justice’, as the saying
went, his trial would be a media circus presided over by fully wigged Scottish judges at
the Hague” (Dorrien, 2004: 103).
According to W. Kristol and Kagan, the solution lies not in international institutions or
in international law, but in three other means of projecting U.S. influence:
"overwhelming military superiority; a renewed dedication to U.S. alliances; and missile
defense as a means of protecting the American homeland from counterattack"
(Fukuyama, 2006b: 40).
Ken I. Kersch (2004) presents a good example of neoconservative thinking on
international law and how it is thought to erode the U.S. system, even from the inside
34 Meaning roughly, from Latin, "In the face of arms, the laws fall mute".
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out. In his article, published in 2004 in The Public Interest35, he makes the case for
extreme caution towards international law. His main concern appears to be that judges
become "policy makers who take their cues from international popular or professional
opinion". Furthermore, he fears that this could mean that "matters of cultural difference
or principled disagreement", such as the death penalty, "would be considered
problematic aberrations or disturbances within a rapidly integrating world system"
(Kersch, 2004: 7). An even more ridiculous group of people (than social scientists
looking to persuade the U.S. to comply with international obligations) are what Kersch
calls "millennialists". This is a group with a "project aimed at integrating the laws and
public policies of the United States into the emerging [global] moral order", without
concern for U.S. interests. To Kersch, the most influential people in this effort to force
the U.S. to integrate international law into national law are law professors, however.
How legal experts teach advocates of various rights groups, for example, to make use of
arguments pertaining to international law doesn't seem to cease to amaze Kersch (2004:
8-13). The results of these developments are to Kersch nothing less than that "the nature
and path of American constitutional development will be radically altered" (Kersch,
2004: 16) - probably inestimably for the worse if you ask Kersch, for he is saddened to
take cognizance of the situation: "Today, it is the sharp constitutional distinction
between a sovereign nation and the rest of the world that is under intellectual assault"
(Kersch, 2004: 17).
Here, again, as with other issues, we find a neoconservatism which is varied in its
stances. Generally, however, the neoconservative answer to the rhetorical question in
Latin presented above is in the negative: no, the laws do not fall mute only in the face of
arms, they do so regardless of the presence or absence of arms in our world of anarchy.
For in Robert Kagan's view, whereas Europeans live "in a 'post-historical paradise' of
international law and cooperation", the United States is content in its unsurpassed role
"in the Hobbesian world of history and power, where international rules [are] unreliable
and social order [depends on] and [is] shaped by military might" (Kagan in Dorrien,
2004: 164).
35 According to Max Boot "leading neoconservative magazines include The Weekly Standard, The Public
Interest and Commentary" (Boot, 2004: 48).
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3.4 Situating Neoconservativism, Finding Neoconservative Core Values
"If you ever read a sentence that starts with 'Neocons believe', there is a
99.44 percent chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue"
(Brooks, 2004: 42)
As the words of David Brooks36  ominously call for the close to inevitable failure of this
paper's purposes, the words of former neoconservative Francis Fukuyama give some
solace in turn. For Fukuyama announces that "[n]eoconservatism is a coherent set of
ideas, arguments, and conclusions from experience that should be judged on its own
merits" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 13). This ought to make our task of both situating the
ideology and pinpointing its core values less than impossible - perhaps even raise the
probability of success slightly above the .56 percent in use - but it is interesting to note
that  neither  Fukuyama  nor  anyone  else,  to  my  knowledge,  has  been  able  to  present  a
clear, coherent presentation of neoconservative core values, fuller than a list of
stereotypical stances. Fukuyama has a decent try in his 2006 book After the Neocons,
but even this presentation falls short of calm clarity and conciseness - his recent and
contentious departure from the neoconservative ranks being undoubtedly a contributing
factor to this.
In  foreign  policy,  neoconservatives  tend  to  be  linked  with  a  certain  amount  of  trigger
happiness. Neoconservatives themselves like to think, however, that they do not rely on
power alone in their efforts to spread democracy. Stelzer wraps up the approach as
"[m]ore troops, yes; but more seminars as well" (Stelzer, 2004: 11). He claims further
that the "neoconservative doctrine is elastic enough to permit the use of both hard and
soft power, and to allow distinctions between non-democratic regimes that threaten us,
those  that  support  us,  and  those  to  which  the  Western  democracies  can  safely  remain
indifferent, which pleases both neocons and traditional conservatives" (Stelzer, 2004:
XVI).
36 Brooks paraphrases here the famous advertisement slogan of Procter & Gamble's famous Ivory soap,
little known in Europe. The industry giant's bar soap was touted by the manufacturer to have been 99.44
percent pure.
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Concerning foreign policy, the Peloponnesian War is quoted as being the favorite
"neoconservative text" (I. Kristol, 2004: 35-36). More tangibly, Kristol asserts that
neoconservative thinking today is colored by the fact that the U.S. is currently
unchallenged militarily, and that this fact brings responsibilities, welcome or not. As
distinctly neoconservative "attitudes" he lists the following:
1. Patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment, and should be therefore enhanced
by public institutions. The U.S. draws special power from patriotism because of
the country's nature as a nation of immigrants.
2. World government is a terrible idea, because it can lead to world tyranny.
3. One of the most important tasks of "statesmen" is to distinguish "friends" from
"enemies".
4. For  a  great  power  the  "national  interest"  is  mainly  not  a  geographical  term  as
might be the case for states of a limited size. Larger nations have more extensive
interests, and whereas their identities are ideological, they have ideological
interests in addition to material concerns.
To give an example of the fourth, Kristol claims that the "United States will always feel
obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from non-democratic
forces, external or internal." Therefore, in contrast to stereotypically Realist thinking, no
"complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are needed." (I. Kristol, 2004:
36).
Regarding the aforementioned label “Wilsonianism on Steroids” describing
neoconservatism in international politics, Joshua Muravchik considers Wilson’s
“commitment to multilateral cooperation [...] the ‘hollowest’ part of his legacy” (in
Dorrien, 2004: 119). What nonetheless justified the use of the term was “Wilson’s belief
in the power of ideas and moral values in international politics” (ibid.). Tellingly, at the
turn of the millennium, "[e]ven the realist-leaning neocons had messianic ambitions for
the United States, and most neocons were idealists", Gary Dorrien notes. Furthermore,
"[d]welling  on  crisis,  and  also  thriving  on  it,  they  had  a  ready-made  worldview  when
the  second President  Bush  unexpectedly  found need  of  one  in  the  crisis  of  September
2001" (Dorrien, 2004: 16).
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The Project for the New American Century (PNAC)37 is  often  claimed  to  be  a  most
influential center of the neoconservative "cabal"38.  PNAC was founded by William
Kristol in 1997 to promote U.S. leadership in the world and has, indeed, been influential
in shaping U.S. foreign policy since its founding. It seems, nonetheless, that the
organization - so far with a maximum staff of five39 and operating oftentimes as not
much more than "Bill Kristol and a fax machine" 40  (Fukuyama, 2006c) - and its
influence may have been overrated.
More  concretely,  yet  in  general  terms,  Thomas  Risse  has  made  an  effort  to  situate
neoconservatives in the field of foreign policy. According to him, three competing
groups dominate that field in the (George W.) Bush administration. Here, Risse makes
the case for two "unilateralist neoconservative" camps, and one camp stemming from
George H.W. Bush's administration, with notable conservatives such as George Shultz
advising his previous employer's son's administration as to the correct ways of
conducting oneself in the world. Fundamentally I agree with the distinction, but beg to
differ as regards the labels given to the more or less competing factions. In Risse's view,
Vice  President  Dick  Cheney  and  former  Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld
represent neoconservative thinking. I cannot accept this notion, and doubt that the
gentlemen in question themselves would either.  Dorrien, too, notes that "[h]awkish
unilateralists such as Rumsfeld and Cheney are unipolarists, but not products of the
neoconservative movement" (Dorrien, 2004: 6).  Interestingly, Risse points out that
Cheney and Rumsfeld are, at the same time "aggressive realists" - a term which I feel
quite appositely describes their foreign policy views. (Cf. Risse, 2004: 227)
Arguably the most common mistake in placing neoconservatives on a four factor chart
is to take them for realists, as Risse in part does. It will be recalled that neoconservatism
is, at the same time, considered "the sworn enemy" of Realism, as Marshall (2004) was
quoted as asserting above. Figure 1 below aims to show at a glance where
neoconservatives are situated in terms four factors when it comes to foreign policy
37 PNAC's website can be found at www.newamericancentury.org
38 Used ironically also in original context (Stelzer, 2004: 5).
39 David Brooks counts five staff members, while Irwin Stelzer comes to only four (Brooks, 2004: 41;
Stelzer, 2004: 25).
40 From an audio of Fukuyama's interview in London in March, 2006. Fukuyama said "...quite honestly,
the Project for the New American Century... people think of this... you know, monstrous conspiracy... it
was really just Bill Kristol and a fax machine. And so he'd write these letters and he'd send around these
faxes to all of his friends advocating a certain position." (Fukuyama, 2006c)
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Figure 1: Neoconservatives on a foreign policy coalitions map, a comparison with
some U.S. and European coalitions44. Chart's contents only very slightly modified after
Risse, 2004: 23045.
What is important for the purposes of this paper is a twofold question: how and why (to
which ends) ought power to be used according to these Kristolian-Kaganite
neoconservatives? I believe the answer from a Kristolian-Kaganite view is this: it is in
41 Liberalist in this context manifesting itself in the will to promote a liberal vision, i.e. enhance the
spread of human rights, democracy and market economy (Risse, p. 231)
42 "Realist" being one whose foreign policy choices are dominated by so called security interests (Risse, p.
231).
43 Unilateral/militant being the tendency to use force in order to achieve set foreign policy goals, despite
possibly lacking support from major allies or approval from the international community;
multilateral/cooperative favoring the use and promotion of multilateral institutions.
44 The European foreign policy coalitions, as devised by Risse, are included for reference only. See Risse
2004 for his analysis of the impacts of the presented differences for transatlantic relations.
45 The main modification being to call Risse's "US 'offensive realist' neoconservatives" " US Democratic
Realist Neoconservatives", a term closer to my understanding of the group and adopted from
Krauthammer, 2004. Also, a group termed "'anti-Iraq War' coalition" on the original chart was omitted.
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the United States' nature to do so, and the aim is to "create a benign, peaceful, and
democratic world order" by the means presented above as especially characteristic of W.
Kristol and Kagan46. Furthermore, it is in the country's nature more precisely because
"American foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality" (Kristol
and Kagan, as paraphrased in Fukuyama, 2006b: 102). With reference to W. Kristol and
Kagan, Dorrien asserts in a somewhat similar tone that "true neoconservatism was about
the aggressive promotion of pro-American liberal democracy throughout the world"
(Dorrien, 2004: 17).
Williams (2005) writes that neoconservatism tends to stress "political virtue" as a means
of meeting the challenge of nihilism. Explicating this further he asserts that
"neoconservatism seeks to rescue American culture through a recovery and
remobilization of republican virtue" (Williams, 2005: 310). In turn, Campbell (1998)
goes through several unifying points of view in explaining that, as seems to be the case
for neoconservatives, for classical republicanism "human nature was flawed; faith was
fragile; freedom was threatened. Under these conditions, virtue and constant vigilance
were essential. But because peace and prosperity brought ease and indulgence, they
promised certain decline" (Campbell, 1998: 122). Incidentally, Robert Kagan and
William Kristol give a textbook example of these attitudes by demonstrating similar
contempt for such, in their view ungroundedly unalarmist and self-congratulory
attitudes prevalent in the U.S. of the 1990s in their volume Present Dangers (2000),
which provides its readers with a myriad of reasons to be on the alert.
Regarding this antipathy toward nihilism and the efforts to rescue American culture
from "counter-culture", the 1960s left an especially deep mark into the memory of the
neoconservatives. For them it was a mark of an exceptionally revolting era and it would
be folly to say that they would then have been or now be at ease with the current system.
Rather, it should be changed in such a manner that the obscenities - including the
extreme vice of moral relativism, according to which "anything goes" - of the 1960s
could not plausibly return or be perpetuated. In an exemplary clear neoconservative
manner, Kimball asserts that The New Criterion "has commented often on 'the culture
wars', the vast smorgasbord of intellectual, political, and moral havoc bequeathed to us
46 These were "overwhelming military superiority; a renewed dedication to U.S. alliances; and missile
defense as a means of protecting the American homeland from counterattack" (Fukuyama, 2006b)
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by the 1960s" (Kimball, 2006). What I wish to emphasize with this example is the
opposition to moral relativism represented by counterculture, a neoconservative core
value up until the present day and beyond.
Neoconservative justifications for the war on Iraq also reveal some basic ideological
principles. As an example, consider the words of Fred Baumann in the Public Interest in
2005: "[t]he case on legal grounds (a raft of unenforced United Nations resolutions), on
national security grounds (Saddam Hussein's pursuit of nuclear weapons and his proven
use of other weapons of mass destruction), and on moral grounds (his egregious human
rights violations), was a strong one" (Baumann, 2004: 72). These three justifying
elements appear to come up in the rhetoric of neoconservatives: national security
grounds, legal grounds, and moral grounds, whereas it is to be noted that national
security is to be interpreted widely, as global interventions where the current global
system can be viewed as threatened, and that legal grounds can, to my current
understanding of the neoconservative line of thinking, without exception be overridden
by moral grounds.
Now, if one single thing plagues this arduous journey toward understanding the deeper
elements  of  neoconservatism,  it  is  the  constant  use  of  definitions  left  unexplained.
Hence, I have resorted to explaining such instances that are left open to interpretation
myself. Here, it is most obviously the concept of morality that cannot go unexplained.
"Morality" is given four meanings in the Dictionary of the English Language: 1) The
quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct; 2) A system of ideas
of right and wrong conduct: religious morality, Christian morality; 3) Virtuous conduct;
and 4) A rule or lesson in moral conduct (American Heritage Dictionary). The first
definition is in my understanding a usable one, and I will consequently understand the
word in a manner consistent with this definition. "Being in accord with standards of
right or good conduct" would obviously require further speculation on the nature of
"right" and "good", let alone the extension "good conduct", but we shall leave that to the
Philosophy  department.  Suffice  to  say,  there  is  an  element  of  improvement  in  this
definitional step forward.
As one further example of undefined assertions, Jeane Kirkpatrick's (2004) sarcastic
effusion Neoconservatism as a Response to the Counter-culture on the United States
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being  the  target  of  the  rest  of  the  world's  undeserving  criticism  shows  that
neoconservatism is sometimes just overly hard to understand. In Kirkpatrick's use, such
central  concepts  as  "traditional  American  attitudes,  values  and  goals"  are  left
unexplained for the reader to figure out. Naturally, thinking of traditional American
values, connotations such as the rights of individuals vis à vis tyrannical authorities and
such spring to mind, but all in all, the article leaves more questions open than it gives
answers  to,  if  one  is  to  make  sense  of  neoconservative  values  based  on  her  article.  Is
internationalism traditionally "American"? Is freedom of speech a decidedly
"American" value? And if so, why should it be a problem that many in the U.S. opposed
the Vietnam war - and this obviously was a problem to Kirkpatrick and her peers at the
time. And what did Kirkpatrick mean when she wrote that "morality and American
power were inextricably linked in the traditional conception" of the United States, and
then continued to bemoan the criticism toward the country's foreign policy from outside
the U.S. and also from within, in a scolding manner? (Kirkpatrick, 2004: 236-237)
As said, since the so called American values surface in parallel to undefined "morality"
over and over again in neoconservative discourse, one needs at this point to direct her
attention towards such values a little more profoundly. Furthermore, having argued
above that neoconservatism has its roots in anti-communism (and perhaps reversely,
then, "pro-Americanism"), the most fundamental neoconservative values can logically
be traced back to the Cold War - this incidentally even more so taking into
consideration  the  salience  of  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  eagerness  with
which neoconservatives take credit for having ended the Cold War. Therefore, in unity
with David Campbell's assertions, I claim that past National Security Council strategies
outlining  broadly  the  premises  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  from  an  identity-based  point  of
view 47  can disclose highly relevant information on "American" and, by extension,
neoconservative values.
One of the most central - and certainly unchallenged in its guiding nature - strategic
definitions of policy during the Cold War was the National Security Council document
68 devised in 1950 (NSC-68). NSC-68 outlined the mission of the United States and in
so doing, drew from the "fundamental purpose of the United States”, which was to
47 For a full discussion on identity and foreign policy, see Campbell, 1998.
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assure the integrity and vitality of America's free society, founded upon the dignity and
worth of the individual (Campbell, 1998: 23). In a later National Security document,
NSC 162/2, the genius, strength and promise of America was remarked to be founded
upon dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God (Campbell, 1998: 29).
In addition, what any "American values" discussion obviously must boil down to in the
context of the United States is the Declaration of Independence and the rights enshrined
in this timeless document. As Lipset states, the United States' "basic values are still
those set down in the Declaration of Indepence" (Lipset, 2003:338). These values
include, i.a., that all men are created equal and that they are endowed with "certain
unalienable Rights". These may not be the conclusive or definite American values but,
again, represent a major improvement as opposed to previous situation of no definition
whatsoever.
3.5 Neoconservatism as Ideology
"Ideology is present wherever policy-making is present, and policy-making
is the attempt to solve problems - or sidetrack them" (Seliger, 1976: 105)
Seymour Martin Lipset finds that "[n]eoconservative views remain difficult to locate
ideologically [...] because the 'ism' was invented in an effort to label a diverse group of
opponents. No one created a doctrine and called him-/herself a neoconservative" (Lipset,
1997: 199). While the foregoing is true of the term's birth and initial use, I remain
convinced that something along the lines of a neoconservative ideology exists. Mildly
supporting this opinion is Peter Steinfels's observation that neoconservatism was before
the 1980s already "an outlook that insists on its fidelity to constant principles" (Steinfels,
1979: 25).
Neoconservative  efforts  to  restrict  use  of  the  term  "ideology"  can,  especially  when
judging from a distance, seem somewhat manic and to an extent paranoid. However,
this denial can be most congruently found in neoconservative literature, according to
which there is "no such thing as a neoconservative movement" (Stelzer, 2004: 4),
neoconservatism is "not a 'movement'" (I. Kristol, 2004: 33), it is "not an ideology with
party-like planks on every issue of the day" (Wolfson, 2004: 226), and "there is no set
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of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy" (I. Kristol, 2004: 35). James Q.
Wilson writes that neoconservatism "is neither an ideology nor a movement [...], there
has never been an organization to join (or attack)" (Wilson in Gerson, 1996: vii). Stelzer
further notes with satisfaction how in one review of his book a Wall Street Journal
journalist considered neoconservatism as "not a tightly engineered ideology" (Stelzer,
2004: XII). Would this mean, however, that it is an ideology, though not a very tightly
engineered one? I doubt if Stelzer would agree, whereas I agree to the point.
Instead, however, neoconservatives consider it to be a "persuasion" with "a set of
attitudes derived from historical experience" and "theses" (I. Kristol, 2004: 33-36), a
"distinctive neoconservative sensibility" (Muravchik, 2004: 254), "an intellectual
disposition" (Wolfson, 2004: 226), and a "neoconservative tendency", that has no
central organization characteristic of a movement48.  And  then,  of  course,  there  is  the
exception to the rule in the usually dependably obstreperous Max Boot, who does use
the word "movement" to describe younger neoconservatives (Boot, 2004: 47). Joshua
Muravchik makes another deviation from the ideology-rebuttal line in saying that "the
prevailing division on Bosnia demonstrated that a distinctive neoconservative sensibility,
if  not  ideology,  endured,  or  perhaps  had  been  reborn,  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War"
(Muravchik, 2004: 254). Editor of the late magazine with a clearly neoconservative
orientation49 ,  the  Public  Interest,  Adam  Wolfson  also  considers  neoconservatism  to
have its "own distinctive qualities, its own style and substance, its own strengths and
weaknesses" (Wolfson, 2004: 216). Neoconservative aggressive realist Charles
Krauthammer favors the use of the word ideology outright: in popular understanding
that the neoconservative attitudes in foreign policy are the only valid ones, he finds
evidence  of  "the  maturation  of  a  governing  ideology  whose  time  has  come"
(Krauthammer, 2005: 26). From an outside perspective, things can appear quite
ideological, indeed, even in traditional terms, as Zhiyan Cui asserts: "US
neoconservatism is [...] forward-looking, even revolutionary!" (Cui, 2004: 246).
There naturally need not be any discrepancy here with the neoconservative assertion
that they in fact "disagree vituperatively on just about everything"50. Simultaneously,
48 Norman Podhoretz in Commentary, according to Stelzer (2004: 4)
49 But which covered a wide array of issues from a wealth of political angles during its existence.
50 Except "on Saddam", according to David Brooks in Stelzer (2004).
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there is also somewhat of a contradiction in terms of being something and nothing at the
same time, if the generic assertion of non-movement is taken for granted and as a
neoconservative  "truth".  Still,  it  is  only  when  Stelzer  adds  that  these  foregoing
"attitudes" do have "definite shape and form in the foreign policy arena", one is tempted
to simply give up once and for all and start reciting Shakespeare's tritest instead. For
neoconservatism truly appears to both be and not to be, from their own perspective.
Nonetheless, "attitudes" derived from a common base of moralities that take definitive
form and are used for political ends, are, to me, nothing more and nothing less than
manifestations of an actionable ideology.
Stelzer explains that there are at least two reasons for this involuntariness not to be
labeled  a  "movement"  (let  alone  an  ideology):  first,  since  those  who  claim  to  be  in
agreement concerning some of the "non-movement's" principles also disagree to a "non-
trivial" degree on "important points of policy", there could reasonably be no
"movement". Second, many neoconservatives have "spent their lives" lashing out on
"movements" such as the peace movement, the communist movement and the
environmental movement, which apparently makes all neoconservatives ineligible for
movements of any kind (Stelzer, 2004: 4-5). This is ultimately where a collision of
opinions occurs between Stelzer's and, for example, Martin Seliger's conception of
ideology.
Considering, for example, the heavily and undisputedly neoconservative Project for the
New American Century's attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s, "there
was a very public effort to persuade the U.S. government to adopt a view of the world
that  is  radically  different  from  that  favored  by  the  post-Cold  War  foreign  policy
establishment, but which nonetheless had roots in earlier American history" (Stelzer,
2004: 6). Is this not ideological work?
We need to come back to neoconservatism being an ideology but first, what constitutes
an ideology? Should the opening words51 of David McLellan's book Ideology (1986)
not scare one away from the subject outright, taking a moment to reflect on the meaning
and background of the concept of ideology may be in place at this stage. McLellan notes
51 "Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social science." (McLellan 1986: 1)
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that in the hands of such writers as Mao Zedong, "the term 'ideology' took a distinctly
pejorative sense associated intellectually with irrationality and politically with the
concept of totalitarianism" (McLellan, 1986: 8). Understandably, then, because of all
the unintended negative connotations most if not all neoconservatives define
neoconservatism as a persuasion and not an ideology. Indeed, and as Steinfels (1979: 39)
formulated his point, ideology can be used as or be suspected of being used as
"shorthand for Socialism or Marxism", something that the present day neoconservatives
would not appreciate.
This is an understandable misunderstanding. It is nevertheless unfortunate, for the term
"ideology"  was  in  fact  first  used  in  relation  to  late  18th  century  liberals  in  post-
revolution France (Lichtheim, 1967: 4-5). And in its original context, the term was
conceived of as positive and progressive (McLellan, 1986: 6). Admittedly, the history of
a concept's definition may not make for a huge spellbinder, but, interestingly, these
liberals ("ideologists" as Lichtheim calls them) were known to hold freedom of thought
and expression in high esteem, placed "ideal aims" before "material" interests and
would temporarily suffer an enlightened dictatorship that was leading the nation in the
correct direction (Lichtheim 1967: 5). Lichtheim regards these political figures as
forerunners to positivism, but one can easily see that the aforementioned values could
quite straightforwardly be transformed into values which most neoconservatives would
find close to their ideals of political aims. The problem with the foregoing assertion is,
naturally, that it can also be argued to be accurate as regards most other ideologies, too.
(Lichtheim, 1967: 6)
The hesitation to use the word "ideology" can be viewed from a different perspective as
well. Daniel Bell, a prominent neoconservative figure from the 1970s on wrote a book
titled "The End of Ideology", signifying the displacement of "ideologies" by something
better - perhaps a prudent political outlook and elite-driven politics is close to what he
had  in  mind.  It  might  therefore  be  considered  a  major  step  backwards  to  start  naming
existing "persuasions" ideologies. Regardless of this rationale, I agree with Steinfels in
that these recurring discussions on the ends of ideology52 can also be interpreted as
being "simply another ideological position", made to appear justified by opposing
52 Comparison with Francis Fukuyama's seminal The End of History and the Last Man can hardly be
avoided here.
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"ideologies" (Steinfels, 1979: 32-43). In Bell's and Irving Kristol's view ideologies are
to be kept distinct from "preconceptions" and they can be tested by the intensity of
belief and resistance to revision. Steinfels rightly notes that while this may sound
reasonable, it is not truthfully a distinction but "a muddle" out of which one is supposed
to be able to make sense without having even crude definitions of the variables shaping
the outcome of such an analysis (Steinfels, 1979: 43)
All in all, there seems to be something in human nature that makes us see faults in
others with considerable ease, while failing to see such in oneself. At least so it appears
to be with the use of the concept of ideology. As Kenneth R. Hoover (1987) writes:
"[m]any people think that other people's beliefs are ideological, as if that were bad, but
not their own" (Hoover, 1987: 4). John B. Thompson (1984) would be likely to concur,
as he writes that ideology is "the thought of the other, the thought of someone other than
oneself" (Thompson, 1984: 1).
It would be easy to agree with the neoconservatives' insistence that they do not
represent an ideology if they abstained from involvement in the public sphere known
generally as "politics".  If  this were the case,  I  would be more than willing to call  their
field "political philosophy"53,  but  given  ample  proof  of  the  opposite  being  the  case,  I
will undergo some intellectual strain to explain why I feel this is not so.
Hoover contends that not all political beliefs are "ideological", however. Generally, he
says, ideologies consist "of ideas about how power in society should be organized -
ideas that are derived from a view of the problems and possibilities inherent in human
nature in its individual and social aspects. All ideologies have some sort of
characterization of the human condition54 at  their  core,  even  if  it  is  the  denial  that  all
people share a common human nature" (Hoover, 1987: 4). Hoover continues that to
"understand an ideology is to see what the ideas about power involve and to understand
how they are related to assumptions about the individual and community life" (Hoover,
1987: 5).
53 Cf. e.g. Seliger, 1976: 115. Seliger asserts that the difference between ideology and political philosophy
is that the latter is not directed towards political action directly. Seliger prompts to compare das Kapital
and The Communist Manifesto to exemplify the difference.
54 The American Psychological Association (APA) defines human condition as follows "the positive and
negative aspects of existence as a human being, esp. the inevitable events such as birth, childhood,
adolescence, love, sex, reproduction, aging, and death."
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To fulfill Hoover's requirements for ideology, then, neoconservatism would obviously
need to at least attempt to answer questions concerning power, as well as the essential
nature of the human condition. These requirements are met, in my opinion. Concerning
censorship, as an example, Irving Kristol discloses some thoughts on the
neoconservative ideals on the distribution of power and of morality: in his opinion, it is
in this instance the "educated classes, upon whose judgment a liberal censorship must
rest" (I. Kristol, 2004c: 178). Further, in his article A Neoconservative Welfare State
Irving Kristol outlines what an acceptable form of welfare state would look like55. Here,
it is not the costs incurred, but rather the unintended consequences that advise Kristol
away from welfare mechanisms. The amount of costs is, in fact, irrelevant and should
not receive attention before it is clear what one wants to accomplish (I. Kristol, 2004b).
Regarding the human condition, Irving Kristol says, quoting D.H. Lawrence, that
pornography is an insult to a vital human relationship, for it treats human beings
obscenely,  and  deprives  them of  their  specifically  human dimension  (I.  Kristol  2004c:
171). He also argues that "[man] has a unique sense of privacy, and a unique capacity
for shame when this privacy is violated" (I. Kristol, 2004c: 172), and, in summarizing
what neoconservatives think, Karlyn Bowman asserts that "[Irving] Kristol argues that
traditional conservatives and neocons (but not libertarians) are equally alarmed by
cultural trends in divorce, out-of-wedlock births, crime, drugs, and declining social
mores" (Bowman, 2004: 266).
Irving Kristol looks back on the earlier days of neoconservatism and reminisces that
"we [at the Public Interest] soon discovered that behind the hard realities of economics
and social science were the equally hard realities of morality, family, culture, and
religion  —  the  'habits  of  the  mind'  and  'habits  of  the  heart',   as  Tocqueville  said,  that
determine the quality and character of a people" [...] "this mode of thought took the
form of what came to be known as neoconservatism" (I. Kristol, 2005: 9). I argue that
these few exemplifications are extremely hard to take as individual observations of the
human condition, but rather stand for distinctly neoconservative moral judgments of
55 Consistent with the moral principles of "our" civilization; avoidance of unintended outcomes a priority.
One such outcome might be that "young girls [who] permit themselves to get pregnant" see welfare as an
opportunity to start households of their own - and because living on their own can be viewed as fun and
conducive to making them more passive members of society, they should not receive any housing
allowance but rather stay with their parents.
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"right"  and  "wrong".  And,  as  Seliger  points  out,  "[a]ll  ideologies  are  [...]  neither
paradigms of logical argumentation nor entirely illogical structures", and "[h]ence, in so
far as politics implies the pursuit of policy [...] there is no politics without ideology"
(Seliger, 1976: 99).
Thompson adds that to call a view ideological typically equals to criticizing it, "for
'ideology' is not a neutral term". (Thompson, 1984: 1-2). According to Thompson, the
term is used in two different ways: following "a neutral conception of ideology", in
which ideology is understood in terms of systems of thought and belief systems, and "a
critical conception of ideology" in which ideology is linked fundamentally to sustaining
asymmetrical relations of power, to maintaining domination. Thompson, for his part,
defends the critical conception of ideology, which is where our ways will part.
(Thompson, 1984: 3-4). Also Martin Seliger makes a distinction between two kinds of
conceptions of ideology. The first one Seliger calls "the restrictive conception", the
other "the inclusive conception", which, as Seliger explains, contains also "those
conceptions which stipulate the applicability of the term 'ideology' to all political belief
systems" (Seliger, 1976: 14).
A definition of ideology that meets Seliger's (and by extension my own) requirements is
the following:
1. Ideology is linked to politics no less than politics is linked to ideology - ideology
requires politics "as its mode of implementation while political decisions are
always [...] related to moral principles";
2. Ideology cannot be separated from factual knowledge, tolerably rational
justifications or moral prescriptions;
3. No theory of ideology can be adequate without taking into account overlapping
of ideologies (ideological pluralism);
4. Ideology is action-oriented thought and thus its functioning (or perceived ideal
functioning) has effects on its own nature. (Seliger, 1976: 15)
As regards Seliger's first requirement, morality, Roger Kimball criticizes in The New
Criterion how the liberal experiment (especially with its flirtatious relationship to
multiculturalism) has as its "chief existential symptom [...] moral paralysis, expressed,
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for example, in the inability to discriminate between good and evil" (Kimball, 2006).
Irwin Stelzer proudly defends the non-ideology position, by raising a point made by
Suzanne Moore which can, actually, be used to counter the argument itself, as it
underlines the neoconservative ideology's morality-based outlook: "Neoconservative
thought is persuasive precisely because it presents itself not as ideology but as morality
- and, moreover, morality charged with optimism" (Suzanne Moore in New Statesman,
November 1, 2004, quoted in Stelzer, 2004: XVII, footnote 3). Without further
explanation or definition, Stelzer himself also talks of the moral dimension of
neoconservatism (Stelzer, 2004: 23). Stelzer also claims that the neoconservative road
contains several forks, leading in opposite directions and again contends that there is no
"neoconservative" path. This contention shows that Seliger's third point concerning
inevitable overlapping of ideologies has not been understood. From my perspective, it is
no ground for refuting the case for ideology that a given "political outlook" happens to
overlap with many ideologies "proper". In fact, just as "overlapping of ideologies is
inevitable", so is the only unideological form of politics a completely incoherent one
(Seliger, 1976: 102-104). And as for the case of neoconservatism, Fukuyama argues,
"the fact that neoconservatism is not monolithic does not imply that it does not rest on a
core of coherent ideas" (Fukuyama, 2006b:14). Indeed, it does.
And so, in line with the usage by Martin Seliger and Alvin Gouldner56, my intention is
to use the word "ideology" in referring to neoconservatism in the fashion of a "neutral"
or "inclusive" conception of ideology. For my purposes of clarity over a useful
definition, Seliger's persuasive argumentation hits the bull's-eye in stating that "an [...]
inclusive [...] conception of ideology [...] is justified in that it can be shown that politics
cannot be reduced to argument over technicalities, but either proceed from or develop
into  argument  over  priorities,  some  of  which  are  always  a  moral  texture,  that  is
ideologically determined" (Seliger, 1976: 17).
Seliger offers further clarity by adding three more general criteria for ideologies, all of
which I find the neoconservatives to fulfill:
56 As referred to in Thompson (1984: 4)
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1. Not every belief system can be called ideology. Only those which directly guide
organized social action or analyze it for the sake of guiding it do;
2. The main concern ought not to lie with isolated ideological statements but with
their being part of a system of beliefs;
3. The term 'system' may be applied to the loose contexts in which information is
placed and provided with meaning.
A belief system exists even if it is not defended in terms of logic by those who live by it.
For  a  belief  system's  relation  to  ideology  is,  according  to  Seliger,  equal  to  that  of
religion to theology. To sustain the system itself, theology (ideology) gives explanations
to practices that are larger than their immediate significance and purpose (Seliger, 1976:
97). I believe this to be close to the meaning and purpose of neoconservatism today: to
preserve ways of functioning politically in order to secure the change[s] needed in the
political system.
To highlight the controversiality of the concept of ideology, Seliger takes note of
Huntington, who has argued, that "unlike liberalism, democracy, communism and
fascism, but like radicalism, the word 'conservatism' does not convey how a society
should be organized" (Seliger, 1976: 92). Rather, the core of it would be to defend one
or another political system. However, Seliger does not feel this to be adequate and
reiterates points made by Huntington, such as the fact that each "ideology proper" turns
into conservatism once its goals have been sufficiently solidified into a system. Also, an
image of the past - in the case of the neoconservatives one easily thinks of the Founding
Fathers and their ideals, or Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson (with
some exceptions) and Ronald Reagan - can be the object of "conservation" efforts of
conservatives - it does not necessarily have to be the reality of today. Seliger concludes
his academic dialogue with Huntington by saying: "[s]o, contrary to Huntington's view,
conservatism contains an 'ought' demand reflecting an 'ideational' and not merely a
'positional' belief." (Seliger, 1976: 92)
Finally, the point made here is rather that the use of the term "ideology" is not meant in
the least in any pejorative sense, but rather a neutral and inclusive one. Whereas I
understand the "restrictive" usage of the term where properly explained, I also call for
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understanding of my selection of the proper use of the word in the framework of this
limited piece of work in the spirit explained above.
I conclude this discussion on neoconservatism being an ideology among others with an
example to lead us into the next theme, which is to address links between the ideology
and the current Bush administration. Joshua Muravchik explains why neoconservatism
was particularly appealing to the Bush administration as it was searching for ideological
answers  to  a  crisis:  "[n]ot  only  did  the  neocons  have  an  analysis  of  what  had  gone
wrong in  American  policy,  they  also  stood  ready  with  proposals  for  what  to  do  now",
and, in addition, they "offered a long-term strategy for making the Middle East less of a
hotbed of terrorism". What could sound more ideological than having ready made short
and long term plans for such elementary political controversies? Personally, I cannot
think of many such examples.
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3.6 Neoconservatism and the 43rd Presidency
Many observers have claimed neoconservatism to be an extremely influential interest
group or lobby in the current administration, even a dominating one. Let us therefore
spend a while drawing a rough picture of the framework in which neoconservatives
operate when trying to influence U.S. foreign policy.
Bruce Russett (1990) based his study of the U.S. president's powers in national security
policies on a triangular relationship of powers:
Figure 2: The triangle of forces within which the United States president operates in
foreign policy.
Figure 257, simplified as it is, serves to show the interconnection between the different
actors (or quoting Russett, "forces") which influence U.S. foreign policy. Obviously,
57 Figure after Russett, 1990: 8; "Figure 1.1. The triangle of forces within which the United States
president operates in foreign policy".
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Russett remarks, a country's leadership operates in the world beyond its national borders
and tries to effect change in that world (or, perhaps, to resist change and perpetuate the
status quo). In turn, it is affected by the outside world and it inevitably encounters
external actors - states, international organizations, multinational corporations based
abroad, terrorist organizations - which it cannot influence at an acceptable cost, and it is
subject to the efforts of those actors to influence its own behavior. (Russett, 1990: 7)
A similar figure could be made to represent the context in which the neoconservatives
operate when trying to influence U.S. foreign policy. As Russett says, "Washington is
full of people within their own bases of power and with much experience in using their
power" (Russett, 1990: 9). Neoconservatives in the 21st century fall into this category
with considerable ease. Leaving semantics aside, a taxonomy of three in the current
Bush administration appears justified. This will divide the foreign policy "interest
groups" mainly influencing U.S. policies in the 21st century into these three groups:
1. Aggressive realists  who see the United States' role as world policeman to keep
order in a system of anarchy;
2. Moderate, traditional conservatives who feel the U.S. cannot "go it alone" and
are rather skeptical of the neoconservatives' imperial ambitions and nation-
building implications that these imply;
3. Neoconservatives, who are prepared to use power to promote liberal values and
construct a global order of liberal democracies, universal human rights, and
capitalism.
These factions compete both inside and outside of the bureaucracy of the Bush
administration, as Risse (2004) points out 58 . To illuminate the context of
neoconservatives operating mainly outside of the official bureaucracy, figure 3 below is
derived from Figure 2 and represents the lower left corner of the first triangle - which
we can call the "domestic corner" - in more detail:
58 Though he does at one point differentiate between neoconservatives and the traditional conservatives
by labelling them "the Pentagon party" and the "State Department party", respectively. This obviously
leads one to think in terms of bureaucracy and the administration's inner tiers.
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Figure 3: "The Domestic Corner"; actors involved in Washington lobby.
To conclude and give a clear understanding of the conceivable context of the
neoconservatives, one can merge the two previous figures into one as follows:
Figure 4: Russet's triangle of forces in president's foreign policy with the "Domestic
Corner"; actors involved in Washington lobby.
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In then moving on to ponder the extent of influence that neoconservatives might have
on foreign policy issues in the context presented above, Daalder and Lindsay (2003)
pose a blunt question: "George W. Bush presided over a revolution in foreign policy,
but was he responsible for it? Commentators across the political spectrum said no. They
gave the credit (or blame) to neoconservatives, within the administration, led by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who they said were determined to use America's
great power to transform despotic regimes into liberal democracies. One critic alleged
that Bush was 'the callow instrument of neoconservative ideologues'. Another saw a
'neoconservative coup' in Washington and wondered if 'George W fully understands the
grand strategy that Wolfowitz and other aides are unfolding.'" (Daalder and Lindsay,
2003: 15). In a similar vein, Daalder and Lindsay quote Senator Joseph Biden as saying
that the "[neoconservatives] seem to have captured the heart and mind of the president,
and they're controlling the foreign policy agenda" (ibid.).
This  is  not  true  on  two counts,  say  Daalder  and  Lindsay.  First,  there  is  a  fundamental
misunderstanding of the intellectual currents inside the Bush administration and the
GOP - neoconservatives are simply more prominent outside the administration. Inside,
Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld (who is incidentally now outside the administration, too)
are not neoconservatives, and neither is Bush. Rather, all three are traditional hard-line
conservatives and assertive nationalists. What these two camps shared, however, was
deep skepticism toward traditional Wilsonianism in its commitment to rule of law and
international institutions. Both placed faith in power and resolve, not diplomacy or
treaties. This understanding allowed for a marriage of convenience in casting the cold-
war approach to foreign policy aside. The second and more fundamental mistake has
been to grossly underestimate George W. Bush. (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 15-16).
Indeed, to many, neoconservatism has passed for almost a synonym for the George W.
Bush    administration's  foreign  policy,  perhaps  downplaying  the  role  of  the  president.
Therefore, a word or two on the alleged linkages may prove useful in this context.
Fukuyama emphasizes the need and warns: "the connection [between neoconservatives
and the Bush administration] is often overstated and glosses over a much more complex
reality" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 4). Max Boot echoes this by saying that "the neocons have
no representatives in the administration's top tier" (Boot, 2004: 45), gaining support
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from Adam Wolfson who intimates that neoconservative influence can be easily
exaggerated  and  that  it  often  is  knowingly  so  by  hostile  critics  for  their  own purposes
(Wolfson, 2004: 229)
Of course, there are clear links, too. Wolfson is the first to admit this: "Bush's politics
and  policies,  it  must  be  admitted,  have,  as  did  Ronald  Reagan's,  a  certain
neoconservative resonance", he says (Wolfson, 2004: 225). As a further example,
Robert Jervis (2005) lists four elements59 of the “Bush doctrine” which, in my judgment,
might  also  serve  as  valid  examples  of  neoconservative  foreign  policy  points  of
departure. It therefore appears unwise and futile to try to refute that there is a
relationship between neoconservatism and the current Bush administration. However, I
will remain loyal to the (neoconservative) notion that the relationship is an indirect one,
and that any other competing ideology could have won the attention of the White house
after  September  11,  2001.  In  other  words,  the  Bush  administration  seems
neoconservative because it chose to follow the ideology's basic recommendations – not
because the administration is inherently neoconservative, or made up solely or even
mainly of neoconservative individuals. It is not.
Joshua  Micah  Marshall  (2003)  explains  that  neoconservatives  "may  be  powerful  at
magazines such as The Weekly Standard and think tanks such as the American
Enterprise Institute, but key movement figures such as Deputy Secretary of Defense60
Paul Wolfowitz and Pentagon adviser Richard Perle actually missed out on the top
appointments" (Marshall, 2003). According to Boot, the administration of George W.
Bush might be most accurately called a "traditional national-interest conservative" one
(Boot, 2004: 45), whereas Jervis finds that the administration policy-makers are
"Realists in their views about how states influence one another", but "Liberals in their
beliefs about the sources of foreign policy" (Jervis, 2005: 577). Boot acknowledges
nevertheless that the National Security Strategy issued in September 2002 is a
"quintessentially neoconservative document", and, strengthening my foregoing
assumption, adds in a complacent manner that neoconservatives have been influential
59 1) a strong belief that foreign policy is to a large extent dictated by domestic regime and that now is the
time to "transform international politics"; 2) great threats can only be defeated by new, vigorous policies,
i.a. preventive war; 3) willingness to act unilaterally if need be; and 4) peace and stability require the U.S.
to "assert its primacy in world politics" (Jervis, 2005: 576).
60 Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, now President at World Bank.
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not because of their position, wealth or connections,  but because of the strength of their
arguments (Boot, 2004: 48). The 2002 National Security Strategy formalized what has
become to be known as the Bush doctrine in foreign policy. Its main elements are
preemptive strike, the promotion of democracy, and military supremacy (Cui, 2004:
241). And as we have seen, these translate very, very close to neoconservative ideals in
foreign policy. Zhiyan Cui, too, remarks many fully or partly neoconservative
predecessors to these ideals, such as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance by Paul
Wolfowitz, and the 1997 Project for the New American Century mentioned earlier.
In truth, many of the most extreme accusations of neoconservative "conspiratorial" and
nefarious influence on U.S. foreign policy are perhaps, as Adam Wolfson claims, less of
an analysis of the true sources of Bush's foreign policy thinking than an attempt from
political adversaries to discredit both the administration and the neoconservatives
(Wolfson, 2004: 227). This seems a plausible explanation, and yet, although correlation
does not equal causation, it is also clear that there is a distinctly neoconservative long-
term influence involved. One such lineage is easy to establish, as Stelzer eagerly proves:
"the  views  of  the  U.S.  government  [...]  are  a  lineal  descendant  of  a  'Defense  Planning
Guidance' (DPG) prepared in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy" (Stelzer, 2004: 16).
Irwin  Stelzer  adds  that  the  "close  similarity  between  neocon  policy  proposals  and  the
[George W.] Bush administration's policy on Iraq [...] may explain why many European
and other observers consider neocons to be in control of American foreign policy".
These observers ignore, however, according to Stelzer, to which extent events rather
than  ideology  dictate  policy  (Stelzer,  2004:  14).  I  can  agree  with  the  notion  of  a
European fallacy of seeing overwhelming neoconservative power in the administration,
but argue that the difference between "events" and "ideology" is rather what Seliger
calls operative ideology and fundamental principles, explained below. Norman
Podhoretz feels that the "military face of [GWOT] is preemption and the political face is
democratization" (Podhoretz in Rago, 2006). Manfred Steger sees the GWOT
comprising of "an uneasy marriage" of neoconservatives and neoliberals or globalists
who "felt they had little choice but to enter into a shaky ideological compromise with
the ascending neoconservative forces" (Steger, 2005: 33). This marriage between
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neoliberal economic policy and neoconservative security agenda was to mark the
beginning of an "imperial globalism" led by the United States.
While it is absolutely essential to bear in mind Daalder and Lindsay's warnings that the
neoconservative movement does not equate one-to-one to the highest ranking Bush
administration officials or indeed the administration as a whole, and that the "neocon
factor" may be somewhat overstated in current political discourse, it is also noteworthy
and inescapable to acknowledge the movement's salient role in the administration's
policies, most notably its foreign policy. A colorful way of stating the same is "[t]he
neoconservatives have not always written the libretto [in U.S. foreign policy], but the
score has in most cases remained in their hands" (Marshall, 2003).
3.7 Neoconservatives and the Individual
At the broad level, neoconservatives "view the idea that individuals have interests (and
that  they  should  be  allowed to  pursue  these  interests)  as  an  important  moral  principle,
and as a bulwark of individualism, liberty and a market society" (Williams, 2005: 312).
However, this is only one half of the neoconservatives' attitudes towards individuals.
Because individual are prone to self-gratification that ultimately leads to life becoming
"empty" and "meaningless", some limits on these interests in the name of social order is,
in neoconservative understanding, inevitable (Williams, 2005).
The promotion of human rights - either as part of promoting liberal democracy in the
world or quite separately - is widely attributed to the neoconservatives (Risse, 2004:
227). Paul Wolfowitz writes that a great accomplishment of the Reagan era was to
preserve the State Department's Office of Human Rights. Consequently, in his view,
human rights and the promotion of democracy can be seen as emblematic features of
Reagan administration foreign policy (Wolfowitz, 2000: 319). These examples signify
the great importance the individual and her rights get in neoconservative thinking, in
spite of the aforementioned caveat. A further example is the caution with which
neoconservatives tend to approach all attempts of social engineering, which they see as
extremely prone to failure. This thinking tends to reveal parts of the important position
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of the individual vis à vis the government, too, favoring the individual's liberties over
the government's intentions.
Furthermore, it seems clear that in its efforts to promote democracy, neoconservatism is
not just interested in promoting a system of governance, but more broadly the values
that  liberal  democracy  entails.  We  saw  above  that  neoconservatism  has  its  own  ideas
about  the  human  condition  and  that  it,  therefore,  has  adjusted  itself  to  a  more  careful
standing on many aspects of "liberalism" or "modernity". This has some interesting
effects on neoconservative ideas on the individual. As such, these thoughts are
dichotomous: in the first place, it is human rights and liberal democracy that
neoconservatives want to promote, emphasizing the importance of the rights of the
individual vis à vis evil tyrants raging in the Hobbesian world. In the second, modernity
and liberalism with their overly individualistic "anything goes" mentality is clearly a
problem to neoconservatives, who favor respect for traditions and authority over
freedom in some instances.
In  an  attempt  to  situate  himself  and  thus  the  correct  way  of  seeing  foreign  policy
between Realism and Liberalism, William Bennett notes that "historical traditions
remind us that American foreign policy has always been most successful when interest
and principle converge" and continues that to Americans' great fortune, "historically,
principle and interest have been virtually indistinguishable on the big issues that the
nation has confronted" (Bennett, 2000: 290).
Conceding that he uses oversimplifications, Seymour Martin Lipset lists four variables
that the United States emphasizes more than any other modern non-communist
industrial nation, namely achievement, equalitarianism, universalism, and specificity.
According to Lipset, the emphasis on equalitarianism, universalism, and specificity
means that expectations concerning fair treatment according to the merits of individual
cases or individuals' abilities are justified (Lipset, 2003: 213-214). In turn, Paul
Wolfowitz lists four (neoconservative) principles that ought to be apparent in U.S.
foreign policy. The first two are relevant in this discussion, as they concern, first, the
primacy of democracy and human rights over "efficiency", and, second, strengthening
"the international norms in favor of democracy and human rights" to demonstrate
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reliance on "a shared moral vision of human life in the twenty-first century", rather than
sheer practical necessities (Wolfowitz, 2000: 333).
3.8 Neoconservatives and Torture
Charles Krauthammer vented out his frustrations on the, from his point of view
excessive,  discussion  on  the  ban  of  torture  in  the  United  States  and  the  world  in  The
Weekly Standard (Krauthammer, 2005). In his highly polemic61 article, Krauthammer
describes the "enemy combatants" as being "entitled to no protections whatsoever"
(Krauthammer, 2005b). He continues that "people seem to think that the postwar
Geneva Conventions were written only to protect detainees", seriously misinterpreting
the nature of  international law, which would prescribe protections under human rights
law in every case,  regardless of whether or not humanitarian law steps in. It is unlikely
that he would care if anyone dared point out his misgivings, for he goes on: "[b]reaking
the laws of war and abusing civilians are what, to understate the matter vastly, terrorists
do for a living. They are entitled, therefore, to nothing. Anyone who blows up a car
bomb in a market deserves to spend the rest  of his life roasting on a spit  over an open
fire"  (ibid.).  According  to  Krauthammer,  "we"  do  not  do  this,  however,  because  "we"
are civilized. A civilized solution, bound by Mr. Krauthammer's understanding of moral
duty, is to have an alleged "terrorist", or "miscreant", as he refers to these individuals,
"hang by his thumbs" (ibid.). Tellingly of a wider sentiment among the subscribers of
the neoconservative magazine, a Weekly Standard's reader's response considered
Krauthammer's piece "a reasoned and eloquently written argument" (the Weekly
Standard (2005).
Norman Podhoretz is as straightforward. He sees criticism concerning harsh methods as
terribly unjustified and the resulting lack of intelligence the "only reason in my opinion"
the United States is having as much trouble in Iraq. "You can only get [good]
intelligence by squeezing it out of prisoners. That's all there is to it" (Podhoretz in Rago,
2006). Downplaying and redefining torture is also one of Podhoretz's tactics: "The
things they're calling 'torture' have never been and have no business being considered
61 undoubtedly intentionally so
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torture." In his opinion, then, the anonymous "they" are in criticizing "trying to make it
impossible to fight terrorism". (Podhoretz in Rago, 2006).
Heather McDonald's article in the Weekly Standard also seems characteristic of
neoconservative sentiments on the issue of torture. She too appears absolutely
convinced that redefining torture is what the U.S. needs at the moment. She also
explains that the responsibility for harsh interrogation methods lay elsewhere: "[t]he
military began experimenting with such 'stress techniques' only after it became clear
that traditional Army methods of questioning lawful prisoners of war, which play on
homely emotions such as pride or homesickness, were ineffective in getting war on
terror detainees to talk. The stress methods aimed to increase a detainee's sense of
uncertainty about the interrogator's limits, and thus to persuade him to cooperate."
(MacDonald, 2005)
David Tell, writing for the editors of the Weekly Standard in 2005, comes closest to
condemning  torture  in  neoconservative  circles  as  far  as  I  can  tell.  Tell  sees  many
positive things in the rhetoric of the Republican Senator John McCain against the use of
torture and, surprisingly, Tell contemplates the possibility that the administration's
position62 on the use of torture could be "both politically and morally unsustainable". At
this juncture, though, Tell falls back on safely neoconservative jargon and starts
wondering "[w]hat makes everybody so sure the situation isn't just a teeny bit more
complicated than that?" (Tell, 2005). Raising his eyebrows sky high, he wonders if it
could ever have occurred to anyone anywhere what would happen if the rights
enshrined in the Constitution and its amendments would be afforded to "terrorists".
Insinuating a consequent catastrophe, he speculates with one particular case fresh from
his own admiringly vivid imagination: a detainee – "a murderous foreign enemy" – who
was denied entrance to the United States in August 2001 would have, if it weren’t for
his detention, according to Tell, been on one of the planes on September 11, 2001,
slitting the throat of a female purser. To Tell, this is apparently more than enough
evidence that his rights must not be respected. Tell most probably views himself a
"progressive" in this matter, however, as his conclusion is that "a serious, detailed,
public debate about how, exactly, a civilized country is really supposed to deal with
62 At the time, there was a heated ongoing discussion on McCain's proposal to ban all forms of torture,
which the White House threatened to veto.
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such men once it's caught them" is needed,  as "[w]e haven't figured it out yet, that
much is clear" (Tell, 2005).
As was mentioned earlier in this paper, a look into the imaginable rewards of an
approving neoconservative attitude concerning harsh interrogation methods, including
the use of torture, would be beneficial in light of the "psychology of insufficient
reward" phenomenon presented above. The reasons for condoning torture seem scarce
to begin with. Alternatively, they seem only justified by layman psychology or common
sense generalizations, such as condoning harsh methods, including torture, being simply
an  extension  of  "Wilsonianism  on  Steroids".  Further  and  more  careful  studies  are
needed to find the true rewards and punishments in play, but it seems obvious that the
need to remain committed to what became known as a neoconservative doctrine,
quickly labeled “the Bush doctrine” by many observers, and implemented by the
administration, carried the perk of being able to maintain ownership and certain
guidance of the doctrine. Departures from the customary policy line could possibly have
rendered this ownership less plausible and open to suspicion63.
Interestingly, though, the neoconservative attitude towards torture can be as
condemning as it can be condoning. Concerning torture in the hands of a “tyrant”, it is
utterly abhorred, as well as used as a justification to intervene. Most notably, such
neoconservative statements abound concerning the discussion prior to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq64.
Astonishingly,  amidst  all  controversy  of  torture  in  the  hands  of  U.S.  agents,  James  G.
Poulos presents yet another dimension of viewing torture, only this time, it is torture on
film. In parallel to Irving Kristol's blanching at the idea of torturing even a willing
masochist on stage, Poulos finds that new forms of horror and torture on the silver
screen  "[invade]  the  human  soul  and  [allow]  evil  to  triumph  over  the  dignity  of  the
human" (Poulos,  2006). It is, in a word, incredible that the neoconservative narrative on
63 Interestingly, as the Iraq war became less and less popular in the U.S., neoconservatives did start to
question the administration's implementation of the ideology's plans. Nothing implies that this could not
have happened in the case of torture, but the public has seemed to be, to a large extent, satisfied with the
reasoning of the Bush team on this issue.
64 Cf. e.g. Kaplan and W. Kristol (2003), Chapter 1, pp. 3-14.
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torture  can  continue  in  such  a  dichotomous  manner.  Yet,  this  seems  exactly  what  the
neoconservative narrative on torture is about.
The foregoing passages on morality, principle and interest that tend to coincide at least
in neoconservative thinking aim to prove that the neoconservatives claim to be
genuinely concerned for human rights inseparable in liberal democracies. Combined
with the understanding that torture is all but universally condemned and bindingly
prohibited in all cases, I feel it justified to expect statements denouncing the use of
torture in all cases arising from the fundamentals of neoconservatism.
3.9 Liberal democracy exigencies, "American values?"
As the neoconservative rhetoric is filled with referrals to "liberal democracy" and its
promotion, and as this is undoubtedly one of the ideology's core values, it is necessary
to pause a while to reflect on the "exigencies" of liberal democracy: what does it mean
to defend and promote such a system of governance? Lauri Karvonen has valuable
insights on the matter. In his view, the majority principle does not go very far as far as
modern liberal democracy is concerned. Indeed, while rule of the majority is historically
the most basic definition of democracy, Karvonen notes that there are "inalienable
rights that belong to each individual and which are not to be breached or abolished even
if such a measure would be the result of a majority decision. An independent judiciary
is a mechanism through which a democracy monitors itself. These limitations on
majority rule encapsulate the essential of the idea of the state governed by law."65
(Karvonen, 1997: 22)
In his book Democracy and Human Rights, David Beetham distinguishes five
indispensable elements of liberalism in democracy, making the case for liberal
democracy. I  find that one of the five elements is  directly related and as such of great
importance to this study of what liberal democracy entails for neoconservatism in
relation to torture. Namely, Beetham deems an institutional separation of powers
65 My translation to English. Karvonen's (1997) original text in Swedish: "oförytterliga rättigheter som
tillkommer varje individ och som inte får kränkas eller avskaffas även om en sådan åtgärd skulle
tillkomma genom ett majoritetsbeslut. Ett oavhängigt domstolsväsende är en mekanism varigenom en
demokrati övervakar sig själv. Dessa begränsningar av majoritetens makt uppfångar det centrala i
rättsstatsidén."
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between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary elementary for the realization of
the "rule of law". Therein lies the question of the guarantee of a fair trial and due
process, which I claim all uses of torture undermine (Beetham, 1999: 35). Beetham also
makes an insightful observation concerning the liberal in liberal democracy and writes:
"attempts to abolish these liberal features in the name of a more perfect democracy have
only succeeded in undermining the democracy in whose name they were attacked."
(Beetham, 1999: 36)
A "torture-friendly" approach to amending the workings of a liberal democracy would
probably seek justification in that it is for the collective good - a justification which
Beetham also uses as one typical example to "attack" individual rights. Beetham
proceeds to say that whatever the good intentions, such projects have on average only
"succeeded in cutting the democratic ground from under their feet". The reason for this,
according to Beetham, is that democracy is a set of arrangements for securing people's
control over the decision-making system, not for securing the right to decide whatever
suits them best at a given moment. (Beetham, 1999: 36)
If we are discussing democracies, liberal or not, are they not - and the rights endowed
by them -  not  really  designed  only  to  meet  the  demands  and  needs  of  citizens  of  their
sovereign home countries? The most flagrant alleged cases of torture in U.S. hands have
been cases where the person allegedly subjected to torture has been a "foreigner" from a
U.S. perspective. Does this affect our reasoning and does this leave U.S. democracy in
tact in spite of alleged torture cases where victims are not U.S. citizens? The answer to
both  these  questions  is:  not  really.   The  idea  of  human  rights  has,  as  Beetham  notes,
"from the outset been universalist in aspiration and global in its scope of operation."
And again, "as the term 'human' indicates, these are entitlements ascribed to human
beings everywhere" (Beetham, 1999: 137). Furthermore, "[h]uman rights [...] take the
individual as their point of reference, and seek to guarantee to individuals the minimum
necessary conditions for pursuing a distinctively human life" (Beetham, 1999: 90).
Therefore the individual and her position are central in discussions of liberal democracy
and its promotion.
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3.10 The Role of Leo Strauss
The neoconservatives’ "trouble with modernity" is often connected with the influence of
Leo Strauss66, author of 15 books mainly on the giants of political philosophy and their
veiled and edifying meanings. Strauss can with confidence be said to have been of
greatest interest to neoconservatives, especially representatives of the earlier generations.
Boot, for example, notes that some early neoconservatives were influenced by him
directly, but that few of today’s neoconservatives could be said to (Boot, 2004: 51).
William Kristol of the younger neoconservatives can arguably be counted as belonging
to the select few, as he was “schooled in Straussian theory”, according to Dorrien (2004:
132).  The  continuing  emphasis  on  Strauss’s  role  can  perhaps  be  attributed  to  the  fact
that the defense of values seems to have been especially dear to Strauss (Meier, 2006) –
a feature which can be found most agreeable to contemporary neoconservatives, too.
Steven Lenzner and William Kristol give an account of Strauss's work in the Public
Interest, and assert thus when closing in for their conclusion of the otherwise seemingly
apolitical article: "President Bush's advocacy of 'regime change' [...] is a not altogether
unworthy product of Strauss's rehabilitation of the notion of regime" (Lenzner and
Kristol, 2003: 38)67.  Naturally,  statements  such  as  this  are  likely  to  spur  interest  in
Strauss’s role further.
What tends to fascinate many in Strauss’s alleged influence in neoconservatism, is also
that some of the most undemocratic and elitist traits said to be found in neoconservatism
are casually attributed to him. Given that he never really actively spoke for or against
real life politics – except along the broad lines of liberal democracy being generally
good and fascism and tyranny evil – neoconservatives have had little trouble shooting
down such criticism. There are, however, important direct personal linkages between
some, admittedly only a handful, neoconservatives and Strauss, as well as some obvious
links between Strauss' thoughts on ideal types of governance derived from historic texts
and neoconservative ideals. At a very minimum, one can easily assert that such ideals
would appear to have had great appeal to neoconservatives. One such thought is that of
66 Francis Fukuyama vents out that "[m]ore nonsense has been written about Leo Strauss and the Iraq
war" than most other subjects. (Fukuyama, 2006b)
67 Could Lenzner and Kristol have resisted the temptation to use some of Strauss's favored exotericism
techniques in the texts, if only to make a point? Perhaps this example of "popular and edifying teaching"
concerning the current administration would need to be interpreted against other elements of the text, too.
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civic virtue, which Strauss saw threatened by liberalism's tendency for immediate "self-
interest and libertinism". A better and perhaps nobler way of informed guidance to
virtue, rather than merely providing the framework in which to individually "pursue
happiness", had in previous times been the goal of public policy. Strauss's skepticism
toward tyranny and world government also finds resonance in neoconservative
skepticism toward supranational institutions such as the UN (Weinstein, 2004: 210).
Neoconservative skepticism toward international law can, by extension, be attributed
partly to Strauss, too.
I agree with Williams on the role of Strauss when he writes that "there is little doubt that
Strauss's thinking has been influential", but goes on to deny the alleged inordinate
weight of Strauss by adding that "too strong an emphasis on the Straussian dimension
can lead to a tendency to look for a cabal" (Williams, 2005). Furthermore, without
repudiating Strauss's high importance to some notable neoconservatives and relative
importance to the movement as a whole, Williams states the obvious in that "the roots
of neoconservatism are broader than Straussian philosophy alone" (Williams, 2005:
308-309). And all in all, it is important to bear in mind that Strauss recognized liberal
democracy as the only viable and just alternative for the 20th century (Weinstein, 2004:
208; see also Fukuyama, 2006b: 22), and encouraged his students to study and defend
the political foundations of the United States (Meier, 2006: xviii).
Indeed, Strauss's alleged influence on current foreign policy appears to be somewhat
inflated as more so called Straussians served under president Reagan than do under
George W. Bush (Weinstein, 2004: 205). To me, the two most credible influencing
elements of Strauss's comprehensive writings would appear to be  the notion of politics
in service of a greater good, of promoting the best possible way to live and the
promotion of virtue (instead of an uncritical settling for the liberal ideal of a framework
within which each individual can pursue one's individual happiness, often contradictory
to other people’s similar desires and unproductive as common, “nobler” goals are
regarded); and that "[m]uch of his work can be seen as a response to Nietzsche and
Heidegger" (Fukuyama, 2006b: 22), both arguably among the more disliked
philosophers among neoconservatives68.  One  can  see  clear  hints  of  this  thinking,  and
68 According to Fukuyama, because they "had left modernity without a deep philosophical grounding for
its own beliefs and institutions", i.e. could be seen as furthering nihilistic views.
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undoubtedly of many other "Straussian" ways, too, yet I recognize the possibility of not
seeing the links I am suggesting. These links are, I might add, in my opinion of little
relevance here.
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4 Torture
Just what amounts to torture? Surely one cannot explore the use of and attitude towards
something which is not expressly defined and explained, especially in light of the
complaint about the neoconservative tendency not to define concepts. Also, the United
States' relationship to international law is relevant because the neoconservatives do not
operate in a vacuum, but rather in a living and changing realm of U.S. politics,
influenced by, i.a., the country’s legal commitments.
As will be established below, the absolute prohibition against torture in international
and U.S. national law is valid many times over with or without the Geneva Conventions,
the application of which have been the object of intense debate during the GWOT. With
the help of firm and rather unequivocal definitions of "torture" in international human
rights treaties, one would assume it to be easy to interpret these binding regulations and
act accordingly. Interestingly, the equation is not as simple in the case of the United
States of America in the context of the GWOT. Human rights groups made it a point
early  on  to  remind  the  U.S.  of  the  absolute  prohibition  against  torture  in  international
law.69 Arguably,  as  an  intermediate  way out  of  being  heavily  accused,  the  rationale  of
the U.S. has tended to be to redefine the meaning and definition of torture.
This doesn't mean public support for torture, however. Quite the contrary - President
Bush has shown contempt for the use of torture on many occasions, such as his annual
State of the Union speech. In fact, he has claimed the United States' absolute
refrainment from using it on several occasions.70 To underline this message and, most
probably, to psychologically distance his administration from these apparently barbaric
torturers,  he  said  in  January  2003:  "[t]he  dictator  who  is  assembling  the  world's  most
dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages -- leaving thousands of his
69 See e.g. Human Rights Watch press release November 11, 2001 "Torture Not an Option. Human Rights
Watch Issues Backgrounder" at www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/torture1120.htm. Human Rights Watch
makes the claim that "[t]he prohibition against torture is absolute and applies even during times of armed
conflict or when national security is threatened"
70 See e.g. Washington Times 23.6.2004, where President Bush is quoted as saying: "The values of this
country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being”, Amnesty International's "Open
letter to President George W. Bush on the question of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment" (AI Index AMR 51/078/2004) in which President Bush is quoted as having said: "the United
States is committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example".
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own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are
obtained -- by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. International
human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq:
electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric
drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning." 71
Regardless of such lofty rhetoric, there have been numerous and persistent allegations
that the U.S. military, too, has used torture in the framework of the GWOT. If one
would assume at least some of these allegations to hold up to the truth, there would be
an interesting discrepancy to explain away on the U.S. administration's side. As
suggested above, one response to this discrepancy between actions and rhetoric has in
part been a new definition of the term "torture". Furthermore, practiced U.S.
interrogation standards are in a constant flux, it seems. Such high officials as (now
former)  Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld  and  Lieutenant  General  Ricardo
Sanchez have authorized techniques that appear to be "impermissible by both military
manuals and international law", which can oftentimes be confusing to the military
personnel on the field (Human Rights First, 2004: 7).
Another question one would want clear answers to is whether the new flexible and
changing definitions of torture offered by the United States in fact change international
law. The prohibition of torture is widely considered jus cogens72 and yet a major actor is
allegedly constantly breaking or, at least, seriously bending this legal norm. Scott and
Ambler (2007) discuss issues closely related to this challenging question in their article
"Does Legality Really Matter?" Discussing the Theory of International Law as Ideology
(ILI), they reason that it is possible to uphold the ideology while acting in a manner that
would most likely be interpreted as being illegal. This is made possible by justifications
based on another party's  illegal actions,  such as,  in our case,  acts of "terrorism" (Scott
and Ambler, 2007: 73).
The notion of customary international law would obviously require a major part of the
world to obey a prohibition for it to be considered valid in the real world. Interestingly
71 President George W. Bush in his State of the Union speech, January 28, 2003. Available online at:
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html
72 Peremptory norm of international law.
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enough, Pieter H. Kooijmans notes on the question of torture and customary
international law, however, that "[f]rom a legal point of view [...] [this wide discrepancy
between professed legal and moral conviction and actual practice], is not negated by the
widely divergent practice" (Kooijmans, 1995: 14). This is perhaps best enlightened with
the  fact  that,  in  effect,  no  democratic  government  goes  as  far  as  to  say  that  torture  is
inevitable or even needed. Rather, torture allegations are as a rule disputed and
sometimes even ridiculed by governments alleged to condone or promote torture73.
Kooijmans notes further that  states in general  do not claim that torture should be used
even under states of emergency, which are generally known to be particularly conducive
to torture. Instead, "the alleged facts are usually vehemently denied" (Kooijmans, 1995:
15).
The U.S.-based organization American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has received a
wealth of information concerning the treatment of detainees by the United States74. The
ACLU has demanded documents from authorities claiming their right to do so under the
U.S.  Freedom  of  Information  Act.  Without  ACLU's  and  other  independent
organizations'  efforts  to  gain  knowledge  of  the  treatment  of  detainees  at  Guantánamo
and elsewhere in U.S. custody, available information would be very scarce, indeed.
Mark Danner (2004) illustrates the justification of the extraordinary means in the
context of GWOT by referring to (then) president's counsel Alberto Gonzales' definition
of fighting "terrorism" as a "new kind of war" (Danner 2004: 75). It is indeed to a large
extent that Mr. Gonzales can act to personify the allegedly permitted use of torture
within this war. Gonzales' much paraphrased evaluation of the Geneva Conventions and
their implementation in GWOT is a prime example: "this new paradigm renders
obsolete  Geneva's  strict  limitations  on  questioning  of  enemy  prisoners  and  renders
quaint some of its provisions" (ibid.).
73 See e.g. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan's answer to a question from the media on 25
May, 2005: "Q: Amnesty International report today, saying the U.S. is a top offender of human rights.
Does the White House dispute that assessment?" Mr McClellan: "I think the allegations are ridiculous
and unsupported by the facts. The United States is leading the way when it comes to protecting human
rights and promoting human dignity". Transcript available online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050525-3.html
74 All documents obtained by the ACLU can be found at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
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One  may  wonder  just  what  the  logic  of  unilateral  action  in  a  seemingly  politically
unifying and democratizing world can be. Vice president Cheney offers a peek to one
explanation in his saying that eventually "a good part of the world [...] will come around
to our way of thinking" (Cheney on NBC, quoted in Marshall, 2003).  This concrete
example of a widespread argument appears a clear and simple case of a noble end
justifying a wide array of means, a pattern critical for accepting torture as a tool for
progress in the stated goals of the GWOT.
The U.S. Supreme Court found in the summer of 2004 that the detainees held at
Guantánamo  Bay  are  entitled  to  be  heard  in  a  court  of  law.  In  response,  the
administration set up so called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) to review
detainees' cases. The CSRTs lack "even the most basic due-process protections"
(Cooper, 2007), such as the rights to representation, to see, present and contest evidence,
and to an impartial decision-maker. In spite of some clear improvements in the form of
guiding principles concerning the treatment of detainees, the aforementioned
proceedings  were  in  effect  consolidated  with  the  adoption  of  the  Detainee  Treatment
Act in 2005, denying the right to habeas corpus75 to the Guantánamo Bay detainees
(Cooper, 2007).
Summa summarum, in the words of Christol, "[i]t has become necessary to determine if
international law, with its historic content dealing with the laws or customs of war, and
international agreements to which the United States is a party, have application to those
charged with acts of terrorism" (Christol, 2004: 25).
75 In other words the right to have the legality of one's detention reviewed by an independent court of law.
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4.1 Preconditions to Torture
In a chillingly laconic listing, Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid give the usual
preconditions to torture in two categories, a set of social conditions and a set of legal
conditions (Crelinsten & Schmid, 1995). Alarmingly, these conditions are fulfilled to
the point in the most common torture allegations against the U.S. military:
Social conditions:
· a national emergency or other perceived threat to security76
· the need to process large numbers of suspects77
· the dehumanization of an outgroup (national, religious or ethnic)78
· a high level of authorization to violate normal moral principles79
· the presence of a "sacred mission" which justifies anything80
Legal Conditions:
· a long period of incommunicado detention, particularly without access to a lawyer81
· the inability to identify interrogators82
76 See e.g. the Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorist Attacks by President
Bush on September 14, 2001: "A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World
Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of
further attacks on the United States" and "NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the
United States of America [...], hereby declare that the national emergency has existed since September 11,
2001". Available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-4.html
77 See e.g. Amnesty International (2005b) report "Guantánamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit of
unchecked executive power" which claims the US holds 70,000 prisoners in the name of the "Global War
on Terrorism".
78 See e.g. President Bush's quotes in "Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool". Bush is quoted as
saying: "Remember, these are  --  the ones in Guantanamo Bay are killers.  They don't share the same
values we share."  A White House Press Release; Office of the Press Secretary of the White House,
March 20, 2002. Available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020320-17.html
79 President Bush Discusses War on Terror at Naval Academy Commencement in Annapolis, Maryland
on May 27, 2005. President Bush said: "These enemies will not be stopped by negotiations, or
concessions, or appeals to reason", available online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050527.html
80 E.g. on September 16, 2001, president Bush said at a press conference: "This is a new kind of  -- a new
kind of evil.  And we understand. [...] This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while".
Available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html
81 See e.g. Amnesty International (2005) report "Guantánamo and Beyond", page 5: "Hundreds remain in
US custody in Afghanistan, with some in Bagram air base having been detained without trial and
virtually incommunicado for more than a year" or page 27: "After all, in the southeast corner of Cuba,
the US government continues to operate a military detention camp in which detainees have been kept
virtually incommunicado without charge or judicial review for more than three years".
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· trials under military law or similar procedure83
· the absence of independent checks on the detainees' medical condition84
· rules of evidence which do not automatically rule out confessions obtained under
torture85
According to Crelinsten and Schmid, these are the traditional preconditions to torture. A
closer study immediately reveals that most if not all of these preconditions are fulfilled
in the reported and alleged torture cases the United States has had to face in the course
of its "Global War on Terrorism".
4.2 Prohibition of Torture
International Law
It can be taken as a given fact that states accept the fact that something called
"international law" truly exists and that this law regulates the actions by and sanctions to
state actors. In other words, "there is no modern-day example of a state claiming that it
is not bound by general rules of international law" (Dixon, 1990: 4). Further, it is just as
clear  that  torture  is  a  nearly  universally  condemned act.  The  Universal  Declaration  of
Human Rights states in Article 5 that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"86. Technically not a binding treaty, the
declaration is certainly respected87 (Ding, 1998) and can be seen as part of international
customary law.
82 See e.g. the International Herald Tribune February (2005a) article Outsourcing Torture: "Terrorism
suspects have often been abducted by masked American agents" or NY Times (2005) that describes in
article In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths how US military personnel had covered
their name tags at Bagram Air Base.
83 See e.g. "Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool", A White House Press Release; Office of the
Press Secretary of the White House, March 20, 2002.  President Bush said: "we'll be using the [military]
tribunals if in the course of bringing somebody to justice it may jeopardize or compromise the national
security interests". Available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020320-17.html.
84 See e.g. Amnesty International (2005a) report US detentions in Afghanistan: an aide-mémoire for
continued action. Neither of the two men deceased in US custody at Bagram Air Base in December 2002
had been seen by the ICRC. Most detainees at Guantánamo Bay are being monitored by the ICRC, but
not immediately after their arrival when " the risk of torture or ill-treatment is at its peak" (page 2).
85 Cf. Amnesty International (2005) report Guantánamo and Beyond, page 2: "The [Combatant Status
Review Tribunals], meanwhile, can draw on evidence extracted under torture or other ill-treatment in
making its determinations".
86 G.A. Res. 217 (A) (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)
87 James Ding writes that "[t]he Declaration was passed and proclaimed as a resolution by the United
Nations. It was not an international treaty, and strictly speaking, it was not legally binding. However,
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Furthermore, Martin Dixon (1990) asserts that international law exists and prevails,
though "just as there will be murder and theft in national law", there will be occasional
breaches of international law (Dixon, 1990: 4). It would seem, however, that the actions
undertaken by the United States to override essential elements of international law
today are somewhat more systematic and rejecting in their nature than what Dixon
referred to in 1990.
A binding treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of
1966 put into practice the spirit of many of the rights already embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2002: 12). Concerning torture,
Article 7 of the Covenant states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". Furthermore, as Pieter H. Kooijmans
notes,  Article  10  of  the  Covenant,  which  provides  that  "all  persons  deprived  of  their
liberty  shall  be  treated  with  humanity  and  with  respect  for  the  inherent  dignity  of  the
human person", is highly relevant (Kooijmans, 1995: 16). Kooijmans adds that
violations of Article 10 are almost without exception the first step toward violations of
Article 7". Conversely, "compliance with Article 10 [...] is the best preventive measure
against the violation of Article 7" (ibid.). The United Nations General Assembly
reaffirmed its opposition to torture in 1975 when it passed the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Amnesty International, 2002: 12).
Of all international treaties and declarations, it is quite naturally the United Nations
(1984) Convention against Torture (CAT) 88  that remains the most quoted and
universally most ratified international treaty condemning torture; as of June 8, 2005, the
Treaty had 139 state parties89. The treaty prohibits the use of torture in all cases, without
exception and defines torture in Article I as follows:
because of its worldwide recognition under the domestic law of many countries and by other
international human rights instruments, arguably, it formed part of the customary international law.
Moreover, as it was passed unanimously, (with only 8 abstentions) it could also be treated as an
authoritative interpretation of the human rights provision in the United Nations Charter".
88 Available online at www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm
89 Source: www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm
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"the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in
or incidental to lawful sanctions." (United Nations, 1984)
Although marked by clear misreading of international law, the Bush administration's
interpretation that the Geneva Conventions do not apply in the context of the GWOT
cannot be totally ignored as it has caused a significant amount of confusion.
Furthermore, it appears elementary in the creation of an atmosphere around the question
of torture. The New York Times, for instance, reported that "with President Bush's final
determination in February 2002 that the [Geneva] Conventions did not apply to the
conflict with Al Qaeda and that Taliban fighters would not be accorded the rights of
prisoners of war, the interrogators believed they 'could deviate slightly from the rules'"
(New York Times, 2005). As a result, misinterpretations on a massive scale have come
up: according to one sergeant of the U.S. military, "there was [sic] the Geneva
Conventions for enemy prisoners of war, but nothing for terrorists" (ibid.). Of course, it
ought to be clear that whenever international humanitarian law is not applicable,
international human rights law is. Similar confusion is found in a letter from Captain Ian
Fishback of the U.S. military to U.S. Senator John McCain. The letter was published in
The Washington Post in 2005 and managed to stir a discussion on the rules of the
ongoing "war". In his letter Fishback, who had by that time served in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, pleaded for more clarity on the issue of treatment of detainees, as he had for
17 months tried to determine the standards for himself to no avail. "Instead of resolving
my concerns", Fishback wrote, "the approach for clarification process leaves me deeply
troubled. Despite my efforts, I have been unable to get clear, consistent answers from
my leadership about what constitutes lawful and humane treatment of detainees. I am
certain that this confusion contributed to a wide range of abuses" (Fishback, 2005).
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Further adding to this type of insecurity were sentiments indicating that "the detainees
[...] were to be considered terrorists until proved otherwise" (the New York Times,
2005). Again, the Geneva Conventions aside, article 2 of the Convention against
Torture underlines the total prohibition of torture in saying that there can never be any
"exceptional circumstances whatsoever" to justify torture. The article explicitly reads
further  that  orders  from  superiors  cannot  be  used  to  justify  acts  of  torture.  Again,  the
Convention against Torture applies in all cases and the absolute prohibition of torture is
overwhelmingly considered jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law that
cannot be violated legally.
Prohibition of Torture in U.S. law
Prior to the "Global War on Terrorism", U.S. military doctrine acknowledged four
categories of detainees: 1) Enemy Prisoner of War; 2) Retained Personnel; 3) Civilian
Internee; and 4) Other Detainee. Today, these categories are complemented by many
categories that make it more likely and easier to deviate from previously established
military rules and international law, such as the Geneva Conventions. These new
categories include such labels as "Enemy Combatant", "Under-privileged Enemy
Combatant", "Security Internee", "Criminal Detainee", "Military Intelligence Hold",
"Person under U.S. Forces Control" and "Low Level Enemy Combatant" (Human
Rights First, 2004: 7).
The Fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution are relevant legal
texts as regards the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody: the fifth amendment
guarantees due process (although the amendment notes exceptions for times of war), the
eighth prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and the fourteenth again guarantees due
process and also equal protection of the laws to citizens and, importantly, any person
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  U.S.  An act  of  torture  is  defined  in  U.S.  law (18  U.S.C.
§2340) as an "act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe pain or suffering [...] upon another person within his custody
or physical control"90 (Danner,  2004:  108).   It  has  been  noted  further  that  it  is  also  a
"criminal  offense  for  any  person  outside  the  United  States  [to]  commit  [...]  or  attempt
[...] to commit torture" under 18 U.S.C. §2340A (Danner, 2004: 108, from a
reproduction of a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to the White House).
90 Text available online at: http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002340-
---000-.html
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Although  not  a  piece  of  legislation,  the  U.S.  Department  of  the  Army's  Field  Manual
34-52 is probably the most profound an average member of the military gets in legal
readings concerning the treatment of prisoners and detainees. The manual makes it clear
that, relating to intelligence interrogation, all forms of torture or inhumane and
degrading treatment are strictly prohibited, including such methods as "use of force",
"threats", "insults" and "exposure to unpleasant [...] treatment" (American Journal of
International Law, 2004: 592).
Of the Nature of Torture
If the above definition is the most useful and widespread and widely accepted legal
definition of torture, one could use as a definition of the nature of torture one used by
Kooijmans: First of all, "torture is the absolute negation of [human] dignity". Second, it
is "intended to destroy and wipe out the victim's personality" and third, it is "the
violation par excellence of the physical and mental integrity - in their indissoluble
interdependence - of the individual human being" (Kooijmans, 1995: 15). In a similar
vein,  Bruce  Ackerman  considers  the  "torture  memos"  of  the  U.S.  Justice  Department,
"prepared in secret to provide confidential guidance to the security apparatus", to be "a
recipe for legalistic inhumanity". For Ackerman, the "extremely permissive"
interpretation of legally acceptable methods of interrogation - considered by the same
administration "'torture' when undertaken by Saddam Hussein" - was not the key issue.
For  him,  it  was  rather  that  the  memoranda  "assured  members  of  the  security  services
that they could violate these permissive definitions and escape criminal prosecution as
torturers". (Ackerman, 2006: 110).
Another aspect of the nature of torture is that it is often considered a crime of obedience.
If torture takes place in violation of clear orders and regulations, it is considered an
ordinary crime. However, the essential character of torture is, as Herbert C. Kelman
notes, that it is a crime of obedience: "a crime that takes place, not in opposition to the
authorities, but under explicit instructions from the authorities to engage in acts of
torture, or in an environment in which such acts are implicitly sponsored, expected, or at
least tolerated by the authorities" (Kelman, 1995: 21). Even if the guilty party acted on
her own initiative, it is still very much possible that the torture crime committed would
be a crime of obedience if the atmosphere, so to speak, has been conducive for this to
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happen. In other words, so long as the perpetrators can prove to have had good reasons
to have believed their actions to be tolerated, it makes for a crime of obedience in
Kelman's eyes. Naturally, in most cases, proof of such tolerance is very hard to present.
4.3 Use of Torture in GWOT
Torture in the context of the U.S. Global War on Terror has become a hot and widely
debated issue both nationally in the USA, as well as internationally. Nationally, this
debate has produced clashes between the dominant political parties, the Democratic
Party and the Republican Party. In addition, it has produced notable clashes inside these
major parties as well. John McCain of the Republican Party has become somewhat of an
exceptional icon against the use of torture within the party, whereas ex-Democrat Joe
Lieberman was scolded for being too like-minded with the more, in this sense, proactive
Republicans. Criticism has also been directed to the current administration from outside
the party-political framework, namely several U.S. NGOs as well as academic figures.
Internationally, criticism toward the United States has been harsh if not effective. Vocal
critics have included the European Union and several of its member states, the Council
of Europe, some UN member organizations as well as large international human rights
organizations such as Amnesty International,  Human Rights Watch and Human Rights
First.
As regards the United States' international legal obligations pertaining to the
Convention against Torture, its oversight body, the Committee against Torture, last
reviewed the United States in 2006. Criticism from the committee was harsh, too. The
committee found, i.a., that "despite the occurrence of cases of extraterritorial torture of
detainees, no prosecutions [had] been initiated under the extraterritorial criminal torture
statute". The report further reminds the U.S. that the Convention applies to all areas
under the de facto effective control of the U.S. and expresses its concern over a myriad
of torture related matters, including but not limited to "the involvement of the [United
States] in enforced disappearances", the fact that in 2002 the United States authorized
the use of "certain interrogation techniques that have resulted in the death of some
detainees during interrogation". The Committee further finds that "'confusing
interrogation rules' and techniques defined in vague and general terms, such as 'stress
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positions', have led to serious abuses of detainees", and finds concern in "allegations of
impunity", and has learned through "reliable reports of acts of torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment". (Committee against Torture, 2006)
Torture cases have come most clearly and explicitly to daylight in the incomprehensible
pictures of Abu Ghraib. It is perhaps wise to remind oneself at this stage that the U.S.
administration has never claimed that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to prisoners
of war in the War in Iraq. Obvious questions, therefore, include one in particular: what
is  going  on  in  places  where  prisoners  are  not  extended  the  rights  that  Abu  Ghraib
prisoners were meant to enjoy?
Treatment of Guantánamo Bay prisoners
"By December, 2002, approximately 600 prisoners from 43 countries had been
transported for safekeeping to the U.S. Naval Base in Cuba. They were captured in
Afghanistan. They have been labeled 'detainees' in order to avoid their claim that they
are prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention. Underlying this form of
detention is the opportunity to carry on intensive interrogation in order to obtain
information concerning the location of terrorists and their plans." (Christol, 2004: 56)
A common trait of reports on the prisoners in Guantánamo Bay is that access to the
detained people is strictly controlled. This is to be expected, of course, to some extent
with individuals alleged to be dangerous "terrorists". The obvious result, however, as
Jane Meyer wrote for the New Yorker after her visit to the detention center, is that "only
one side of the story was available: that of the U.S. military" (Davidson, 2005). On the
other hand, Mayer, who visited the naval base in 2005, was surprised at how much the
Department of Defense let her see, producing an odd mixture of feelings of being in the
know and not knowing at all what was going on at Guantánamo. For example, Mayer
got a chance to follow an Administrative Review Board hearing where detainees are
allowed to challenge the grounds for their detention, or "their status as a danger to the
U.S.", as Mayer put it. In this hearing, Mayer observed what she called a "complete
breakdown of communication and understanding between the U.S. officials and the
detainee, and also the utter lack of due process. It looked like a court hearing, but there
were no lawyers." To aid him, the detainee had a military representative. As in all cases
the review board refused to share any evidence it had with the detainee - a procedure
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which is, in Mayer's words, "radically out of synch with U.S. standards of justice"
(Davidson, 2005). These are, as is recalled from the previous chapter, perfect examples
of legal preconditions to torture (a long period of incommunicado detention, particularly
without access to a lawyer; trials under military law or similar procedure). Kooijmans's
notion above on how compliance with Article 10 of the ICCPR, treating detained people
with humanity and "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person" relates to
violations of Article 7, are brought to mind here as well.
Furthermore, parts of the non-treating medical personnel at Guantánamo are reported as
having assisted in interrogations, thus violating the apparent consensus that medical
personnel clearly ought to distance themselves from all coercive or abusive, let alone
torturous treatment of the detainees. Among the violations this procedure entails are the
World Medical Association's 1975 protocol91 and "pretty much every other national and
international standard", according to Mayer (Davidson, 2005). Here, it may be healthy
to  remember  that  Crelinsten  and  Schmid's  legal  conditions  for  torture,  as  they  were
presented above, included "the absence of independent checks on the detainees' medical
condition", a rule which would appear to be compromised by these U.S. proceedings.
Physicians for Human Rights has, indeed, recommended interviews with health
personnel at U.S. prisons and detention facilities to assess physicians' role in
interrogations (Human Rights First, 2004: 12). This, along with allegations of the
misuse of the role of medical personnel has raised concern that physicians might be
involved in planning or implementing interrogation methods that amount to torture or
abuse. Not everyone loses sleep over this, as Heather MacDonald demonstrates in the
neoconservative magazine the Weekly Standard. She notes that "[i]f military doctors
have monitored and possibly helped craft lawful interrogation plans, they are
committing no war crimes but are serving their country with honor" (MacDonald, 2005).
The Bush administration apparently chose Guantánamo Bay as the location for most of
the detainees captured in Afghanistan and other countries during the months following
the attacks of September 11, 2001, because it could function as a place where no law -
or rather only the rules of the administration - would apply. In other words, the "jailers'
91 Mayer refers here probably to the WMA Declaration of Helsinki (1964), concerning Ethical Principles
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. The declaration has been amended five times since
1964, including in 1975.
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edicts would prevail in place of civil law" (International Herald Tribune, 2005b).
Cooper  concurs  and  says  Guantánamo  Bay  was  "explicitly  chosen  from  the  start  as  a
way of evading legal controls" (Cooper, 2007).
By fall 2004, eight cases of detainee abuse by U.S. forces had been officially verified by
U.S. military investigations (Human Rights First, 2004: 1, 2).  All in all, at Guantánamo
Bay, as well as in U.S. prisons and detention facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere in the world, the military has concluded that at least five deaths in custody
have been the result of torture or abuse. More than 30 detainees have died in U.S.
custody, although U.S. officials have claimed most of these deaths have been the result
of natural causes or enemy attacks (Human Rights First, 2004: 2).
The  ACLU  received  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI)  files  concerning  the
treatment of detainees that have revealed some extreme behavior on the part of the U.S.
military personnel92. Generally, examples of the treatment range from the detainees not
knowing where or how their families are, to flushing the Koran down the toilet, to
guards "dancing around" while detainees are praying, to being beaten by U.S. military
forces, to calling detainees "son of a bitch" and "bastard", and finally, to guards jumping
on the back of a detainee and hitting, kicking and spitting on detainees (FBI Memos,
Agency Stamp 3836-3838).
More specifically, the FBI records show, one detainee is alleged to have been "tortured
for two (2) days [...] not afforded treatment for his wound [and] taken to another house
where he was again tortured and repeatedly ordered to admit he was Al' Queda [sic] and
had met USAMA BIN LADEN. [The detainee] [...] admitted he was Al Queda [sic] and
had met UBL and then his wound was treated" (FBI Memo, Agency Stamp 3894-3895).
Another FBI file shows that a Guantánamo Bay detainee "claimed that when he was
first  captured,  he  was  tortured  by  those  asking  him  questions.  He  had  to  stand  up  for
five days straight and answer questions. He was also forced to strip naked and stand in
front of a female interrogator" (FBI Memos, Agency Stamp 3979-3981).
92 Available online at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/052505/
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In  a  nutshell,  and  to  put  it  in  the  plainest  of  words,  the  treatment  of  prisoners  at
Guantánamo has been, according to the ICRC among others, "tantamount to torture"
(Davidson, 2005).
Treatment of prisoners/detainees at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan
Nearly 2000 pages long, a classified file prepared by the U.S. Army's criminal
investigation and obtained by The New York Times, reveals among other things that
military personnel at Bagram were "young, poorly trained" and "guilty of 'repeated
incidents of abuse'" (New York Times, 2005). The newspaper also reports the deaths of
two detainees, one of whom was considered by most interrogators to be "an innocent
man who simply drove his taxi past the American base at the wrong time" (ibid.).
U.S. officials have long maintained that cases of ill-treatment and abuse that have
surfaced are isolated cases that do not represent the treatment of detainees at large.
Interestingly, The New York Times reports of a series of abuses at Bagram that has led
nowhere in terms of a systematic crackdown on detainee ill-treatment or abuse. Rather,
it suggests that "harsh treatment by some interrogators was routine and that guards
could strike shackled detainees with virtual impunity". Furthermore, the newspaper
reports, "[s]enior officers frequently toured the detention center, and several of them
acknowledged seeing prisoners chained up for punishment or to deprive them of sleep".
The two deaths in custody reported by The New York Times and acknowledged by U.S.
officials occurred in December 2002. As of May 2005, no one had been convicted in
either case and only seven soldiers have been charged with offenses linked to detainee
abuse (New York Times, 2005). Indeed, it took nearly two years for the military to
press individual charges against suspects in the two homicides at Bagram Air Base
(Human  Rights  First,  2004:  5-6),  which  can  seem  somewhat  emblematic  of  the
confusion and lack of will to combat abuse in the military.
The Army Inspector General has estimated in his report that "up to 80% of those held
for security or intelligence reasons were potentially eligible for release upon proper
review of their cases" (Human Rights First, 2004: 8). The report further notes that
detainees were being held from three to fifteen times longer than military doctrine
permits (ibid.). The FBI files obtained by the ACLU show that detainees have indeed
been severely mistreated and subjected to abuse and torture. Individual cases highlight
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this in a plain manner: "[a]fter being moved to an unknown facility in Bagram, [the
detainee's] head was placed against the cement floor and his head was kicked. As a
result of other beatings in Bagram, [the detainee] received a broken shoulder (FBI
Memos, Agency Stamp 3882-3883).
"Extraordinary Rendition"
"When an al Qaeda training manual fell into U.S. hands a few years ago, it
warned of countries, besides Israel and Jordan, where interrogators were
the most brutal: Egypt, Syria and Saudia [sic] Arabia. The manual listed
burning, dog attacks and electrical prods." (Haddock, 2001)
The use of "extraordinary rendition", a pseudo-legal term coined by the U.S.
administration, is closely related to the question concerning the use of torture in GWOT.
It has been called a "way in which the administration has circumvented accountability
for torture [...], that is, allowing the CIA secretly to grab suspected foreign terrorists and
deport them to countries known for use of torture" (Cooper, 2007). A much used
descriptive statement of a U.S. official involved in "rendition" procedures is "We don't
kick  the...out  of  them.  We  send  them  to  other  countries  so  they  can  kick  the...out  of
them"93. These "other countries" include the countries listed in the al Qaeda training
manual, thus intimating a knowing tactic of sending suspects to countries where the
prohibition of torture is not respected, what the suspects would fear, and where,
consequently, they would suffer the most.
4.4 Torture and the Individual
Ultimately, torture is always about the individual. It is about the individual who is
tortured for information that is considered essential, punishment for alleged actions, or,
in some cases, punishment for existence, if the individual is dehumanized and
demonized as member of an out-group heavily enough. Abu Ghraib also seems to
suggest that some sort of recreational humiliation of human beings amounting to torture
is possible. What international law aims to do, by way of prohibiting the torture of
individuals, is provide a system where all people can uphold their inherent dignity as
human beings, no matter what their crime.
93 Quote from a Washington Post article by Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, as cited in Cooper, 2007: 66.
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Torture is also always about the other individual or individuals, those who commit the
acts  of  torture.  As  Cooper  has  noted,  torture  has  also  been  condemned  "for  its
dehumanizing effect on the torturer and for its degrading impact on society" (Cooper,
2007, emphasis added). Furthermore, how their legal responsibilities lie in relation to
the institutions they represent is not an easy matter.
Torture that takes place outside the framework of the rule of law, but with the
knowledge of the governing elite, appears similar to "legal" torture94.  This is  a critical
observation as it is crucial in finding out or judging who the responsibility lies with.
There are strong suggestions that the political elite in the Bush administration -
including the neoconservatives "on the fringes" of the administration - have been in the
know about a number of cases in the hands of United States of America military forces
in  its  "Global  War  on  Terror"  context.  Cooper  explains  that,  to  say  the  least,
"interrogators were under heavy pressure from Washington to collect intelligence", and
with  referral  to  seven  different  sources,  convincingly  claims  that  this  has  been
"extensively documented" (Cooper, 2007).
If remarkable amounts of information leading to corroborating such hints are not
followed, this, in my opinion further suggests a severe case of scotoma95, not a dearth of
available information, and it is indeed not believable that the silence on
neoconservatives' part could be attributed to not knowing. I will argue that in parallel
and similar to executions, torture is the ultimate denial of the individual's rights. This
interpretation that puts torture and capital punishment in an analogous relationship finds
corroboration also elsewhere (see e.g. Steinfels, 1979).
In conclusion on the subject of torture, I give the reader two different examples of being
wary of torture for practical reasons: in the first instance, according to Mayer, the FBI
(which has had years and years of experience of needing to extract critical information
from suspects, Mayer notes), "has found that non-coercive interrogation methods yield
more reliable results". In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Israel prohibited the use
94 I argue that international law permits no form of "legal" torture whatsoever.
95 or blind spots
88
of torture, "after finding that it resulted in too many false confessions and too much
moral baggage" (Davidson, 2005).
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5 Cognitive Dissonance in Neoconservative Positions on
Torture in GWOT
Coming now back jointly to the issues dealt with separately above, our next attempt is
to set in motion an analysis where the object is the neoconservative ideology and its
positions on torture, and the tool used for this purpose the theory of cognitive
dissonance.  Our  first  task  is  to  consider  some further  elements  and  applications  of  the
theory as regards this analysis.
5.1 Difficulty in Decision Making and the Attractiveness of Competing
Alternatives
Festinger makes use of one classification of a study 96  that categorizes choices in
decision-making into three types: 1) Preference: decisions characterized by a clear
preference for one alternative over the other; 2) Conflict: decisions characterized by
considerable difficulty because of near equal attractiveness of choices; and 3)
Indifference: decisions characterized by lack of clear preference, one way or the other.
(Festinger, 1957: 73-74). In light of what has been noted above, it should be clear that
neoconservative choices toward the use of torture fall into the second category: on the
one hand, neoconservatives tend to take "intelligence extraction" and similar
justifications for the use of torture very seriously and some openly favor it. On the other
hand, the very neoconservative rhetoric that celebrates liberal democracy and moral use
of  U.S.  power,  let  alone  the  oft-heard  aim of  promotion  of  human rights  in  the  world,
give a certain impression in quite another direction, leaving a student of
neoconservatism with little more than a conclusion that each is an attractive alternative.
According to Festinger, the study shows how very difficult, sometimes indeed
impossible, it is to reverse a decision in this choice category labeled "Conflict" once it
has been made. Indeed, Festinger expected and the study confirmed a decision in this
category to arouse "considerable dissonance", and, consequently, pressures following
the decision to alleviate this state by increasing the attractiveness of the chosen
96 See Martin, A.H. (1922): An experimental study of the factors and types of voluntary choice; in
Archives of Psychology, No 51.
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alternative, decreasing the attractiveness of the unchosen one, or both. Remarkably, the
post-decision dissonance reduction efforts lead to the alternatives ultimately becoming
"more different than during the decision", Festinger notes. (Festinger, 1957: 77)
Therefore we should not expect sudden reversals in neoconservative attitudes toward
the use of torture. Neither should it be surprising to be able to argue with some ease for
a difficult decision concerning the use of torture in the "GWOT" on the
neoconservatives' side based on the most basic neoconservative premises. However,
manifestations of these differences would be expected to disappear or cool off after "a
decision"97 has been made.
Of course, one source of dissonance may be interaction with others, as Festinger also
notes (Festinger, 1957: 133). In this respect, even this paper might be able to - in a
critical but not entirely dismissive neoconservative reading - produce dissonance among
neoconservatives by e.g. pointing to contradictions and, at times, appearing to disagree
with some neoconservative premises. The same mechanisms to reduce dissonance that
have  been  presented  above  would,  of  course,  be  in  play.  In  addition,  Festinger  would
expect a blend of some of the following responses to this hypothetical new dissonant
information: "attempts to escape or avoid further exposure, erroneous interpretation or
perception of the material, or any other technique or maneuver which will help to
abolish the newly introduced dissonance and to prevent the further introduction of
dissonance." In a similar vein, Festinger quotes studies in which subjects prefer to not
have to defend themselves or admit error and thus rather not face implications of ideas
opposed to theirs. (Festinger: 134-135) In other words still, "[w]hen dissonance exists,
persons will be able to evade the impact of dissonance-increasing information, even
when forcibly exposed to it, by various means such as misperception, denying its
validity, and the like."98 (Festinger, 1957: 176)
97 The word "decision" here is in quotation marks because it is not easily imaginable that one could
discern a moment where a neoconservative consensus had been reached and consequently a "decision"
been made. Judging from neoconservative discussion - and to a certain extent lack of it - such an
understanding appears to exist, however, regardless of lack of a specific point in time where it has been
reached.
98 I recognize the danger of being perceived as unfair in first writing that one's own writing can induce
dissonance, and then, with referral to an external authority, claiming that counterattacks will be a natural
response, hinting that such responses might not contain any justified criticism. This is not my intention.
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5.2 Dissonance related to disagreement in groups
As discussed rather extensively above, a typical neoconservative is likely to claim that
neoconservatism is such a loose network of people connected in such a loose manner
that  it  is  not  prudent  to  say  there  is  in  fact  much  of  a  movement.  There  are  no
headquarters,  no  party,  and  no  system  for  bringing  about  such  a  thing  as  the  "official
line" of the neoconservatives. What is more, neoconservatives are likely to consider
themselves very tolerant towards differing ideas within the "movement". In addition to
our discussion on neoconservatism being an ideology above, consider the effects of
Francis Fukuyama's book "After the Neocons" (2006b), which was sure to make him a
persona non grata among former fellows. In this work he presents his readers page after
page of good reasons to abandon and replace the broken ideology. Naturally enough,
Fukuyama was ostracized from the in-group far away to the other side of the outskirts of
politically acceptable persons (see e.g. Fukuyama, 2006b). Had there not been any
"right" and "neoconservative" ways of seeing the non-movement, Fukuyama might
logically have been cordially welcomed to debate the different aspects of policy-making
he so poignantly criticizes in his book within an intellectually attuned circle of peers.
To illustrate the two-way character of cognitive dissonance in groups, let us therefore
consider the case of Francis Fukuyama for a while. Fukuyama's tale - having been an
important part of the neoconservative movement until noticing how great the
discrepancies between his personal views and those of other neoconservatives on
evaluating "success" in Iraq, and consequently publicly taking distance from the
ideology - is an edifying one in many ways, but in this context none is as enlightening
as showing the effect of cognitive dissonance in action. For example, Matz and Wood
(2005) see "good theoretical reason to believe that dissonance arises from interpersonal
inconsistencies in judgments". Indeed, in their study Matz and Wood found that "being
grouped with others who hold opinions opposed to one's own induces feelings of
dissonance discomfort" which was further increased if interaction with these others was
foreseeable (Matz and Wood, 2005: 27).
Furthermore, Jervis makes a point concerning the amount of negative consequences of a
decision and voluntariness. According to him, the theory of cognitive dissonance
foretells that a person who voluntarily steps down from office (or in the case of
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Fukuyama leaves the ranks of an ideology) will feel more derogation towards his or her
previous positions than one who leaves involuntarily, whatever these reasons might be.
This has implications to how reliable information from Fukuyama on neoconservatism
after the fact ought to be perceived. Jervis explains this by noting that the political
implications of voluntariness are clear: "if a decision-maker feels he had no choice but
to make a given decision, he will be less prone to avoid or distort information than he
would if he had acted freely" (Jervis, 1976: 400). This is not to claim that Francis
Fukuyama, whom I respect a great deal, is a pathological (or any other type of) liar. It is
simply to be expected that he be overly critical and avoid favorable information on
neoconservatism after making his decision to deem the ideology unworthy of his
continued support.
Incidentally, for Fukuyama, the straw that broke the camel's back was Charles
Krauthammer's  speech  at  the  American  Enterprise  Institute,  at  what  most  likely  was  a
very social setting for like-minded pundits (See Fukuyama, 2006b). Matz and Wood
find further that "bolstering self-worth reduces the dissonance that is generated when
people's actions threaten their personal integrity". Others, those who might have
disagreed as Fukuyama did but "stayed the course" and did not publicly change their
cognitions, may have taken advantage of "the emotional benefit consensus" by changing
their own thoughts to fit the overall agreement within the group, were there such a need.
Others  in  disagreement  still  may have  followed a  third  potential  way to  rid  oneself  of
dissonance, namely that of joining another, more attitudinally congenial group (Matz
and Wood, 2005:27-35). Coming back to Fukuyama and his reaction, though; what
more could a highly esteemed scholar such as he do to bolster his self-worth than to
write a book (or two) denouncing the neoconservative ideology and asserting analyses
which were more "right", and to travel around the world promoting this message? I
think not much more, and this in itself makes his case a particularly intriguing one from
the point of view of cognitive dissonance.
5.3 Determining the Conditions for an Analysis and Specifying the
Cognitive Elements
Festinger reminds us that determining whether or not dissonance exists should start with
specifying the cognitive elements which are under consideration and then examining
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whether,  considering  either  one  alone,  the  obverse  of  the  other  follows.  If  a  dissonant
relation is thus found, one should specify further what would reduce the magnitude of
the dissonance (Festinger, 1957: 279). This is specifically the task which we intend to
undertake under the current heading.
Furthermore, it ought to be clear from the theory's principal statement above - two
elements will be dissonant if the obverse of the other follows from the first - that,
reversely, two elements will be in consonant relation if, "considering these two alone,
one  element  follows  from  the  other"  (Festinger,  1957:  261).  In  the  case  of
neoconservatism and its attitude towards torture in the GWOT, we thus have two major
and mutually exclusive options:
1. A dissonant relation between condoning the use of torture and
neoconservatism's core values; where neoconservatism's core values dictate that
the use of torture is wrong, or;
2. A consonant relation between condoning the use of torture and
neoconservatism's core values; where acceptance of the use of torture can be
logically inferred from neoconservatism's core values.
Furthermore, as was noted above, neoconservative resistance to change could be
explained by either of two things: because change would be painful or involve loss
(magnitude of resistance to change determined by extent of pain or loss); or because
present behavior is satisfying (resistance to change being a function of satisfaction
obtained from present behavior).
As also stated above, however, our main object of interest lies in finding potential
cognitive dissonance in the neoconservative ideology as regards two things: core values
in the ideology on the one hand, and, on the other, torture as an accepted if not preferred
means of tackling "terrorism" in the context of the GWOT. How is one going to know if
there is such a dissonance and, further, if there exists such a dissonance, how is one to
find  out  about  its  severity?  In  reading  one's  Festinger,  the  answer  is  rather  simple  and
straightforward: "If two elements are dissonant with one another, the magnitude of the
dissonance will be a function of the importance of the elements" (Festinger, 1957: 16).
In our current case, this would translate into turning to the salience of personal freedom
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and liberties in the neoconservative ideology and proving or discarding my previously
stated point that torture is the ultimate denial of personal liberties. To reiterate, the
cognitive elements are thus found to be:
A. Neoconservative core values discussed above and;
B. Use  of  torture  in  GWOT  or,  rather,  neoconservative  positions  on  the  use  of
torture in the context of the GWOT.
5.4 Examining whether the Obverse of the Other Follows Considering it
Alone
To see whether or not a state of cognitive dissonance ought to occur, we will now move
on to study neoconservatism's core values more closely in  relation to torture: can it be
said logically that condoning, even promoting the use of torture is the obverse of these
values? If answered in the affirmative, a state of dissonance can indeed be expected to
take place. Following Festinger's advice, we will then endeavor to find what would
reduce the magnitude of such dissonance, other than an obvious change of heart, which
would  naturally  dissolve  all  dissonance  as  one  of  the  two  dissonant  cognitions  would
cease to exist, and if the new, substituting cognition followed from the core values and
produced a new, consonant relation.
As we have seen, at the heart of the neoconservative ideology are the creation of an
international moral order, as well as spreading American political and economic
principles (Kristol and Kagan, 2004: 62). In order to avoid excessive repetition and to
condense our foregoing discussion into a few simple words, the neoconservative core
values at play here can be said to be "morality", human rights, democracy, and so called
American values. In order to be able to make a case for a state of cognitive dissonance
to arise, therefore, the obverse of these values ought to emerge in neoconservative
thinking. Let us briefly discuss the nature of each and look for "an obverse" version
these values.
The obverse of morality is as easy and challenging as its point of departure: the
antonym for morality must logically be immorality, yet it remains just as ill-defined as
"morality" in the hands of neoconservatives, as we noted before. We have above
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committed ourselves to using the word morality in the following fashion, to denote the
quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct. The obverse being,
quite naturally, the quality of being in violation of standards of right or good conduct.
Having above also noted that the prohibition of  torture is absolute and undisputed in the
world, as well as that the United States is bound by international and national law to not
torture,  it  seems  fair  to  say  that  the  use  of  torture  is  in  fact  in  grave  violation  of
standards of right or good conduct and, thus, "immoral".
The same applies, quite obviously, for human rights, a second neoconservative core
value. For it is indeed not fathomable that violations of a clear, universal and absolute
prohibition in international human rights law would not constitute the obverse of such a
prohibition and, consequently, a human right so protected.
Finding the obverse of democracy is not as easy - intuitively it would be tyranny,
oligarchy, or some other decidedly undemocratic form - but instead, we look back at the
foregoing discussion and recognize the value of the words of Lauri Karvonen and David
Beetham, cited above on liberal democracy exigencies. As we recall, these included
human rights - "entitlements ascribed to human beings everywhere" (Beetham, 1999:
137) – "which take the individual as their point of reference, and seek to guarantee to
individuals the minimum necessary conditions for pursuing a distinctively human life"
(Beetham, 1999: 90). The absolute reversal of democracy may indeed be tyranny, but
the obverse of a liberal democracy is arguably and reasonably also an illiberal form of
democracy. Thus, if neoconservatives call for torture (or do not oppose it), it should
logically breach the inherent exigencies of another of their core values, liberal
democracy.
So-called American values tend to reflect the inherent dignity of the individual human
being. We have found on earlier pages of this study that American values have
separately been claimed to be founded on the dignity and worth of the individual, and
that the genius, strength and promise of America is founded upon dignity, equality and
freedom of the human being. As it also transpires from our foregoing discussion, the use
of torture is inextricably linked to three things: 1) the absolute negation of human
dignity; 2) the intention to destroy the victim's personality; and 3) the violation par
excellence of the physical and mental integrity of the individual human being
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(Kooijmans, 1995). It is an understatement, perhaps, to simply laconically note that
these characteristics are the obverse of what is understood by the mentioned "American
values".
5.5 Evaluating the Magnitude of Dissonance
According to Festinger, the magnitude of dissonance is a direct function of the
importance of the elements in a dissonant relation (Festinger, 1957: 262). However, this
is  not  all  there  is  to  the  extent  of  dissonance,  for  in  addition  to  the  importance  of  the
elements, the relative attractiveness of unchosen alternatives increases the dissonance
further.  Therefore, if one had to choose between living or dying, it would be easy for
most to choose the former and not regret their decision. Also, the magnitude of the
dissonance introduced by the expression of disagreement by others is a factor, although
this decreases as the number of consonant cognitive elements99 increases. This means,
in turn, that the state of dissonance can be alleviated by seeking out and adding
consonant cognitions, the obverse of which is to block out dissonant information, used
as a means to decrease dissonance. (Festinger, 1957)
In this case specifically the total magnitude of dissonance between our two clusters of
cognitive elements is a function of the weighted proportion of all relevant relations
between the two dissonant clusters, discussed above, each dissonant relation weighted
according to the importance of the decision and relative attractiveness of unchosen
alternatives (Cf. Festinger, 1957: 262). It will be further recalled that the theory of
cognitive dissonance states that "the more cognitive elements there are corresponding to
desirable features of the rejected alternative, the greater would be the dissonance
following the decision and, hence, the greater the pressure to reduce dissonance"
(Festinger, 1957: 66).
If  one  were  to  take  the  issue  of  torture  as  a  question  of  morality  -  as  we  indeed  are
obliged to do by way of having been guided by the neoconservative core value of
"morality", and "moral use of power", "use of power  for moral good", etc. -  it would
be tempting to contrast the amount of space granted in, say, The Weekly Standard, to
99 These elements can either be objective facts or knowledge that other people hold same opinion
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discussions on the morality in the use of torture in the GWOT with the - in the view of
most leading neoconservatives much reviled and abhorred immorality of president
Clinton’s Lewinsky scandal. Contrasting such extremes would in fact not be very
difficult as the former has hardly been discussed at all, and virtually any number of the
Weekly Standard in 1998 was filled with libel, quip, serious analysis concerning the
morality and honesty of Clinton, accompanied with calls for his impeachment by
William Kristol and his colleagues. William Kristol's own writings on the theme of
torture and/or harsh interrogation methods have been markedly few, but on the
condoning side (Cf. e.g.  W. Kristol, 2006).
As was explained above, the resistance to change socially constructed reality is related
to  how difficult  it  is  to  find  other  people  to  agree  with  the  changed  attitudes.  We also
saw above that a change in views on a given policy entails a "silent bargaining"
including other political views, making change less likely. As we have not seen
fundamentally diverging neoconservative views on the question of torture, we must
assume that the resistance to change is enhanced by a socially constructed agreement
within the ideology on the issue. But, as the ongoing debate on who qualifies as a
neoconservative  and  who  doesn't  (Cf.  e.g.  Fukuyama,  2006a)  shows,  there  is  a
continuing uncertainty and perhaps will to identify with the "ideology". This could be a
sign of cognitive dissonance among the ideology's past supporters and taking distance to
it surely could be a sign of a way out of this unpleasant feeling. These speculations
notwithstanding, one would have to be sure that the unpleasantness really boils down to
the GWOT and the use of torture in that context, which is an assumption we cannot
truthfully make.
In addition, a central point in pinpointing potential cognitive dissonance within the
neoconservative ideology is to gauge the salience of the critique's source to
neoconservatives. This can play a major part in shaping the different ways critique will
be accepted or declined. As Festinger (1957) argues in his introductory notes already,
under circumstances in which a person judges the source of critique negatively or
positively, "there is a marked tendency to change either the evaluation of the opinion
involved or the evaluation of the source in a direction which would reduce the
dissonance" (Festinger, 1957). In other words, critique towards one's own ideology
tends to be judged by who is giving it, and if the source is defined in less than flattering
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terms, chances are the source will lose much of its remaining credibility rather than its
critique being heard. Indeed, neoconservatives label "the continued hand-wringing" of
the neoconservatives' critics - notably the left-wing press in Britain and liberal100 press
in the U.S. as "inappropriate" (Stelzer, 2004: XIV), making critique from these sources
most probably useless as regards absorption of new information.
Unfortunately, however, we can only speculate on the importance and priority orders of
given issues to neoconservatism. But given the fact that the elements in play have been
identified as being the neoconservative ideology's core values, one would have to
assume that the importance of these elements is high, if not critical, to the supporters of
the ideology. It is, for example, not imaginable that these core values would be traded
for other substitutive values. Considering on the other hand the other side of the
dissonant  relation,  the  condoning  position  on  the  use  of  torture  in  the  GWOT,  we can
clearly see that a trade-off is easily imagined. Logically, nothing stands in the way of
neoconservatives taking a stand against the use of torture: indeed, their core values
appear to even call for such action. Therefore, the attitudinal alternative seems to be, at
least theoretically, extremely attractive to the neoconservative ideology. Of course,
some factors in neoconservative policies intimate otherwise. Such examples include the
traditional distrust in international law and institutions. So, again, whereas it is
impossible to measure the magnitude of dissonance that the incongruence between core
values and the position on torture arouses, we can safely assume it to be substantial in
light of the foregoing.
5.6 Means of Diminishing Cognitive Dissonance: Diffusion or Denial of
Responsibility
Matz and Wood (2005) take notice of earlier research on cognitive dissonance and find
that "the diffusion of responsibility for a dissonance-producing act to others in a group
and the misattribution of dissonance arousal to dislike for an out-group" are group-level
practicable means of diminishing dissonance in groups. This can be a further reason
why the neoconservatives do not appear to agonize over the potentially high levels of
cognitive dissonance we have observed. In a similar vein, Gosling et al. also reason that
100 In the political sense of the word as understood in the U.S.
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if "the feeling of responsibility affects the level of dissonance arousal", as it
undoubtedly does, then "denial of responsibility should reduce it" (Gosling et al., 2006:
723). Wicklund and Brehm have also concluded in discussing the role of responsibility
that "[i]f a person feels no psychological connection between himself and the
consequence, dissonance will not be arroused [sic]" (Wicklund and Brehm, 1976: 66).
Gosling  et  al.  also  point  to  the  fact  that  denial  of  inconsistency  and  denial  of
responsibility are separate phenomena. In the case of this paper, the difference ought to
be clear: it is indeed not the same thing to claim that neoconservatives deny the obverse
relation between condoning torture and their ideology's core values emphasizing liberal
democracy and human rights, as to claim that neoconservatives refute responsibility for
acts  of  torture.  True,  both  alternatives  imply  denial,  but,  as  Gosling  et  al.  put  it:  "they
differ in which object is denied" (Gosling et al., 2006: 723).
Intriguingly, Jervis has found that specifically in foreign policy decisions the higher the
price of a given policy, the greater the belief that the achieved end result was "worthy of
their sacrifice" (Jervis, 1976: 394). Naturally, this is logically not so. To claim that there
is a natural correlation between the extent of sacrifice and amount of excellence in a
decision would be absolutely ludicrous. But it is understandable from a dissonance
reduction point of view, nevertheless. Admittedly, there is no neoconservative sacrifice
immediately attached to the use of torture, but some sacrifice has arguably been made in
the form of deteriorated relations with former and contemporary allies, one could claim.
One could also claim that it is unimportant to focus on past discrepancies in
neoconservative positions and their relation to the ideology's fundamental values.
However, the study of past, present and future neoconservative behavior is important
work because, as Jervis explains, "the person tries to maintain consistency between his
past and future behavior. If in justifying what he has done, the person alters his values
or beliefs, later decisions will follow the new path." (Jervis, 1976: 406)
It  is  also  fathomable  that  through  group  membership  of  sorts,  by  subscribing  to  a
broadly defined ideology, neoconservatives could reduce their sensations of dissonance
by diffusing responsibility for negative acts to the group as a whole (Gosling et al., 2006:
723).
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Revisiting Seliger, it is possible to distinguish between two modes of "ideology in
action". The first one, which Seliger has labeled that of "fundamental principles", is
close  to  the  grand  ideas  of  the  ideology.  These  typically  color  fanciful  pictures  of  the
end state of when the ideology has proven successful. In the case of Marxists, this
would probably be the state of world communism having grown out of the capitalist and
the socialist phases, whereas for neoconservatism, this end state would plausibly liken a
state of world democracy, where the United States stands tallest as the vanguard of
liberty of other democratic capitalistic states. The other side of ideology concerns
justifications  of  real  life  policies.  These  are  set  under  the  "grand  illusions"  of  the
fundamental principles and labeled "operative ideology".
In both of these dimensions, all six interacting components of Seliger's ideological
thought -  description, analysis, moral description, technical description, implementation
and, finally, rejection (Seliger, 1976: 109) - and their criteria are activated, but with
different emphases.
Figure 5 after Figure 2 in Seliger, 1976: 110
In the case of apparent cognitive dissonance on the ideological level for the
neoconservatives as regards torture, it is to be noted that the two-dimensional
argumentation and its inherent deviation from fundamental principles can, in the words
of Martin Seliger, be "sincerely believed to be temporary" (Seliger, 1976: 110). As an
example of existing bifurcations of ideological thinking in neoconservatism, Fukuyama
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D = description; A = analysis; Pm = moral prescriptions; Pt = technical prescriptions; I = implements, i.e. the ways and means of
implementation; R= rejections
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explains concerning the war on Iraq that "the abstract ideas were interpreted in certain
characteristic ways that might better be described as mindsets or worldviews rather than
principled positions. The prudential choices that flowed from these mindsets were
biased in certain consistent directions that made them, when they proved to be wrong,
something more than individual errors of judgment" (Fukuyama 2006b: 5). On the other
hand, neoconservatives have repeatedly defended themselves from criticism concerning
the GWOT by pointing to the poor implementation of their ideas by the George W.
Bush administration (see e.g. W. Kristol, 2004: 76),  thereby saving the fundamental
side of ideology in tact, and shifting the responsibility for failure onto the operative
ideology of the Bush administration.
Coming back to the specific issue of the use of torture, it is of course not very strange
that torture is seen as categorically unacceptable and subject to censorship even if
volunteers could be found or if the setting were entirely fictional (Cf. I. Kristol, 2004c;
Poulos, 2006), but it seems odd that torture as a tool for interrogation is accepted
without noteworthy objections. It is apparently the use of torture as a tool for achieving
larger aims that renders it tolerable. The results of this appear to be two-fold: first,
inferring from the "American values" discussion, neoconservatives would logically need
to be wary of condoning torture, if nothing more. In cases of condoning torture, there
ought to be clear signs of cognitive dissonance among neoconservatives. Second,
neoconservatives, nearly all but especially so those which I have here labeled
Kristolian-Kaganites, tend to at times see promotion of liberal democracy as a means to
maintain the current hegemonic position of the United States, not to promote human
freedom as such. In this light it is not particularly surprising to find that there is no
cognitive dissonance apparent, as what really matters is the United States of America
and its military-political interests in relation to other nations, not individual laments
outside its borders. This dual thinking is reflected in Wolfowitz's writing, too. He
asserts that while U.S. foreign policy reflects U.S. core principles, it is not "a Kantian
notion in which ultimately only the purity of one's intentions counts. Rather, policies
must be effective in the world", he concludes. This is baffling as we have concluded
above that certain limitations follow from being a liberal democracy, that
neoconservatism  claims  to  base  its  morality  to  a  large  extent  on  the  promotion  of
(liberal) democracy and human rights; and that these appear to be contradictory in
relation to the above stated neoconservative objective of being effective. In fact, that is
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what Wolfowitz states himself just two short pages prior to writing the exact opposite.
(See Wolfowitz, 2000: 333 and 335, respectively).101
Beasley and Joslyn (2001) point to yet another way of dissonance which involves a
reaction to an outcome (Outcome-Based Dissonance). Their study had to do with
electoral behavior and, thus, the context was quite different from ours. For while in
elections, "the outcome [...] offers a clear reality constraint in that it is difficult to deny
who won" (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001: 524), the question of attitude towards the use of
torture is a more intricate one. It is, of course, still imaginable that a prevailing notion of
a "right" and a "wrong" way to fight the "War on Terror" would influence the
neoconservatives. If, for instance, indisputable evidence of a catastrophe claiming the
lives of a significant number of civilians caused  by acting on a wrongful testimony
given in response to interrogation  methods amounting to torture were presented, a
similar kind of dissonance, based on the outcome of using torture,  would be possible.
In spite of many and wide differences between the context of democratic elections and
neoconservative judgments of the use of torture, there are certain similarities as well.
Consider, for example, how Beasley and Joslyn explain the difference between electoral
choice and choices more traditional in the study of cognitive dissonance: "an electoral
choice does not necessarily lead to an outcome. Although irrevocable, electoral
commitment  does  not  necessarily  wed  the  individual   to  the  outcome  in  the  same
fashion as, say, choosing  a toaster and then living with that choice"102 (Beasley and
Joslyn, 2001: 537). Therefore, Beasley and Joslyn suggest, the implications of electoral
commitment might not be as great as for other actions. Nevertheless, they conclude that
their "results indicate that the characteristics of the act of voting are sufficient to arouse
dissonance that leads to greater attitude differentiation in post-election comparative
candidate evaluations among voters" (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001:  533). If this is the case
101 In the name of fairness, it should be added that Wolfowitz (2000) was contradictory inasmuch as
"efficiency" and "being effective in the world" can be understood as roughly the same. It goes without
saying that they are not exactly the same. Uses of the words are reproduced here, so the reader can see for
herself whether or not she thinks my judgment fair. Wolfowitz scolded the "pre-1980s 'formula' for
progress" which centered on "a willingness to sacrifice democracy and human rights on the altar of
'efficiency'" on page 333. Two pages later, on page 335, he ridiculed the Kantian notion of having "only
the purity of one's intentions count" while, in his own mind, "policies must be effective in the world".
102 Living with the choice of having picked this or that toaster may seem somewhat undramatic in the
present context. What Beasley and Joslyn had in mind was most likely a classic study of cognitive
dissonance referred to in Festinger (1957), where participants could, in fact, choose, among other options,
a toaster.
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with electoral choice, having cast a ballot among thousands - indeed in Beasley and
Joslyn's case (presidential elections in the U.S.)  tens of millions - of other people, I dare
suspect that a choice to support the use of harsh interrogation methods can, too.
"[D]enial of responsibility is a defensive reaction following an action that one does not
want to be accountable for, whereas looking for other responsible agents is a more
complex and elaborate cognitive operation, which individuals may engage in later in
order to justify the denial of responsibility" (Gosling et al., 2006: 723). In this light, the
Kristolian-Kaganite approach to torture, mainly silence, and no discernible coherent
attitudes, would appear to fit the first part of this definition. By not saying much at all,
they would in effect evade the otherwise impending state of dissonance. Krauthammer,
Podhoretz et al., on the other hand, by advocating a hard-line pro-torture policy, would
appear to have to travel through the first stage and arrive at the second. At first glance,
this  may  seem  a  little  at  odds  with  their  rhetoric,  after  all,  they  do  not  seem  to  be
seeking denial of responsibility in any way, but are seemingly content with their
assertions.  I  argue,  however,  that  it  is  in  placing  the  responsibility  on  the  alleged
"terrorists" that the justification of denial of responsibility makes itself visible. Clearly,
neither Krauthammer nor Podhoretz would want to torture any civilized person, or any
person for that matter, if it weren't for the necessities of World War IV (Podhoretz's
term, see Rago, 2006), and the imminent threat of the end of the world as we know it.
Therefore,  responsibility  lies  with  the  enemy  as,  in  the  words  of  Krauthammer,  "This
time the enemy knows no reason." (Krauthammer, 2004: 19)
In addition to this quite obvious "blame game", the aforementioned fact that
neoconservatives remain separate from the George W. Bush administration, creates
further space for denial of responsibility. Neoconservatives have also repeatedly - while
simultaneously  giving  credit  for  acting  out  on  the  right  causes  -  scolded  the  Bush
administration for wrong ways of implementing their grand ideas. This clearly distances
the architects of the strategy from the working men and women who are in the process
of building it. David Rose's article Neo Culpa for  Vanity  Fair  magazine  gives  an
abundant number of examples of this denial of responsibility as regards the war in Iraq
gone awry. Many central neoconservative policymakers and otherwise adamant pundits
demonstrate denials that are, frankly, quite acrobatic in nature. Kenneth Adelman, for
example, according to Rose "a lifelong neocon activist", had turned from the Adelman
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claiming that "liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk" to blaming the administration
(which he too was part of until 2005) as flagrantly incompetent and thus guilty of all
mistakes made. Adelman continues that while the "policy can be absolutely right, and
noble, beneficial, [...] if you can't execute it, it's useless". (Rose, 2006) David Frum,
who has been very closely associated with the White House, is quoted as saying that the
situation "must ultimately be blamed on 'failure at the center' - starting with President
Bush."  To  Frum,  Bush's  not  absorbing  the  ideas  in  spite  of  "saying  the  words"  is  the
root of "everything" (ibid.). Richard Perle goes perhaps furthest of all, though. He
claims that neoconservatives had "almost no voice in what happened" in Iraq, and notes
that he is getting very tired of being described as an architect of war. Perle concludes
with words that are especially suitable for our analysis. Regarding plans for
overthrowing Saddam Hussein he contests: "I had no responsibility for that" (ibid.).
This is in line with the findings of Gosling et al. (2006), according to which "individuals
tend to deny responsibility for their act as a means to reduce cognitive dissonance",
when given the chance to do so. The study indicated further that the effects of denial of
responsibility were even greater than expected in light of other previously established
modes of dissonance reduction. Interestingly, denial of responsibility also functions as a
means  to  diminish  dissonance  after  another  "tool"  has  been  taken  advantage  of
("trivialization"103),  in  contrast  to  many other  means  which  only  work  when used  as  a
first way of dealing with dissonance.
What is more, in the study conducted by Gosling et al., the findings built on previous
research arguing that "when individuals become involved in the defense of principles or
values independently of any personal or financial interest, they feel positive emotions
called 'deontic', linked to satisfaction of a moral requirement". Admittedly there are
personal and financial perks involved in neoconservatives' involvement in public affairs,
but I argue that it is just as certain that they are genuinely interested in making the world
a better place, thus eligible for this "deontic bonus" or added incentive. Reversely, if the
actions transgress internalized moral values,  a  feeling  of  guilt  or  related  "moral
emotions", ought to surface. Gosling et al. found that denial of responsibility was an
excellent way of reducing cognitive dissonance related to shame and guilt in a free-
103 Confirmed by Gosling et al (2006) to be an entirely separate form of reduction.
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choice  condition  through  a  mechanism  of  disengagement  from  one's  own  behavior.
Magnificently, this disengagement has such powers that, according to Gosling et al.,
"individuals are no longer conscious of the inconsistency between their attitude and
their behavior" and "the self [is] protected, and individuals do not feel any negative
affect." (Gosling et al., 2006: 729-730)
The foregoing becomes understandable when Irving Kristol condemns the use of torture
as part of an art performance, even if the victim was willing to subject him- or herself to
the treatment. Speaking for an abstract "we", Irving Kristol declares that we would not
allow  someone  willing  to  commit  suicide  do  so  on  stage  as  part  of  a  play  "any  more
than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on stage, even if the victim were a
willing masochist" (I. Kristol, 2004c: 170, emphasis added). I do not believe that either
Krauthammer, Podhoretz or any other neoconservative person objected to this assertion
if and when they read it in its original context, and most likely did not reflect on other,
more obvious contexts of torture, where victims have been alleged "terrorists", many of
whom may have been wholly third party individuals and thus innocent.
There is some reason to believe that neoconservatism might also suffer from what is
known as the overconfidence effect104. In short, this effect entails "feeling confident in
the accuracy of one's beliefs and judgments" bringing about "a sense of security in the
face  of  both  mundane  and  important  decisions",  regardless  of  the  fact  that  this
confidence is often most unwarranted when evaluated against cold facts. According to
Blanton et al. this overconfidence can result from a desire to see oneself as a competent
or accurate perceiver, a wish most if not all political figures and movements are bound
to have. In parallel to the findings of the theory of cognitive dissonance, which Blanton
et al. use in their study of overconfidence, feelings of confidence can occur when people
give greater weight to supporting evidence for own beliefs and opposing evidence for
alternatives. (Blanton et al., 2001: 373-374)
Blanton  et  al.  discovered  in  their  study  what  they  called  "an  important  connection
between cognitive dissonance and overconfidence", and noted that where "cognitive
dissonance associated with feeling uncertain increased, confidence increased in a way
104 See Blanton et al. (2001)
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that was not warranted by increases in accuracy" (Blanton et al. 2001:382). We must
therefore leave open the possibility that overconfidence and keeping faithful to the
approach taken before can, to an extent, alleviate cognitive dissonance even if assertions
conflict. Blanton et al. also suggest that overconfidence may be more prevalent than
elsewhere where there are strong social grounds for presenting oneself in good light, i.e.
as knowledgeable, and where attention is "focused on the self". (Blanton et al. 2001:
382) Expressions of political opinions, in my view, are very powerful in both instances
and it would be no wonder if this were one element in dissonance reduction for
neoconservatives.
Openness of decision making and deliberations have also been found to be a factor in
harder commitment to decisions, as Jervis (1976: 401) has pointed out.
Neoconservatives, for their part, have repeatedly refuted claims of their ranks being a
"cabal" by the fact that their communications are as open as is possible. Jervis notes that
such circumstances help to make decision makers especially resistant to new
information. New information can obviously be acceptable even from such sources that
would otherwise be deemed unreliable if the information provided is consonant with
previous cognitions. Concerning the blatant atrocities of Saddam Hussein, for example,
such  sources  as  Human  Rights  Watch,  Amnesty  International,  and  the  UN  Human
Rights Commission are apparently deemed reliable by most neoconservatives105. Should
criticism stemming from the same not induce cognitive dissonance when such criticism
is clearly directed towards policies advocated by the neoconservatives?
Scott and Ambler (2007) consider a similar question from an ILI106 perspective, as
regards the wanting legality and legitimacy of the U.S. attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraq
and find that evidence suggests that "international law rhetoric [...] served as a vehicle
for achieving a particular foreign policy objective", rather than "having constructed the
driving force behind U.S. policy" (Scott and Ambler, 2007: 79). Generic analogies
between the invasion of Iraq and the use of torture remain handicapped on many levels,
but are, at least in this case, useful in highlighting the "backwards" role of international
law in U.S. foreign policy reasoning.
105 See e.g. Kaplan and W. Kristol, 2003. The volume's notes include numerous references to the
mentioned organizations.
106 Theory of International Law as Ideology
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Moreover, Scott and Ambler find that U.S. military personnel have been responsible for
interrogation methods amounting to torture, that even the U.S. military's own
investigations found that U.S. soldiers had committed "egregious acts and grave
breaches of international law", that the Convention against Torture had been violated,
and that the ICRC confirmed allegations of serious prisoner abuse in Iraq. The reactions
to this are, according to the theory of ILI, best understood principally as revealing a
breach against the "image not only of the US but of international law as compulsory and
politically neutral in the sense of treating all states equally." Importantly, it "also
underlined the falseness of any image of international law as dictating US policy."
(Scott and Ambler, 2007: 80).
However, Gawronski and Strack (2004) declare that "a dissonance producing
inconsistency between two propositions" - in our case condoning the use of torture and
the core values of neoconservatism - "is defined only by an assignment of truth values."
This  means  that  in  order  for  dissonance  to  emerge,  both  propositions  will  have  to  be
regarded as true. As we saw before, Festinger held that ideology is equal to
"knowledge", and logically, what one regards as knowledge, one holds as true.
Therefore, given that neoconservative core values have been accurately explained, and
given that torture by U.S. forces in the context of the GWOT has taken place, both
propositions will pass for truths107.
In line with Festinger's original theory, Gawronski and Strack argue that the consequent
dissonance is resolved "either by explicitly rejecting one proposition as being false or by
finding an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency", in other words by
disclaiming the former truth value of either, or deliberately attributing further justifying
values to the behavior (Gawronski and Strack, 2004: 536). Again, it cannot be credibly
said  that  either  one  of  the  propositions  would  be  false  -  changing  the  core  values
incrementally may be natural and happen through similar mechanisms, but, following
neoconservative rhetoric, this remains an unlikely explanation; disputing cases of
torture is unconvincing in light of the foregoing quotations by neoconservatives - and
107 Unfortunately this assertion, too, needs to be taken with a spoonful of salt as neoconservatives might
theoretically claim not to believe that torture has in fact taken place. On the other hand, existing
neoconservative commentaries regarding the favorable aspects of torture suggest that there might not be
such objections.
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thus, it would appear palpable that the way in which the state of dissonance has been
alleviated has been to add justifying values to the behavior.
This finds support in both the statements favoring the use of harsh interrogation
methods, which without exception emphasize the moral grounds for such behavior: it is
only used for saving the lives of the many innocent in contrast to abusing the rights of
"just one" or "few".
Another question looking to be answered is this: do neoconservatives feel responsible
for torture in GWOT? Judging from their political proclamations, a layman's analysis
might well be that they should. However, as Gosling et al. show in their article (2006),
"[i]f the individual does not feel responsible for the counterattitudinal behavior, even if
this behavior is inconsistent with the initial attitude and if both elements are important,
the individual will not feel discomfort and therefore will not be motivated to reduce
dissonance".
Of course, neoconservatives will have had and continue to have an infinite number of
possible positions on the use of torture in GWOT. This is by no means a problem in the
theory of cognitive dissonance. Certainly, as Festinger (1957: 36) also notes, it "makes
the analysis of the decision process difficult, but, happily, adds very little complexity to
the analysis of the dissonances which exist after the decision is made". In other words,
all elements not present in the newly made decision, be it to support the use torture in
GWOT, like support for the absolute prohibition of torture, are now dissonant with the
cognitive elements corresponding to the action taken. The extent of this dissonance is
dependent on several factors. These include the importance of the decision (proximity to
core values); the relative attractiveness of the unchosen alternative(s) (this attractiveness
can of course easily move into either direction in light of sudden changes in the political
atmosphere) and the degree of cognitive overlap (loosely "similarity") between two
elements or choices of the alternatives involved in the decision.
As regards political opinions within groups of likes such as the neoconservatives,
"dissonance can be resolved through group-level mechanisms, including the diffusion of
responsibility for a dissonance-producing act to others in a group and the misattribution
of dissonance arousal to dislike for an out-group" (Matz & Wood, 2005).
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In politics, it should be noted, counterattitudinal behavior arouses feelings of dissonance
only in cases where politicians etc. feel that this behavior has influenced others (Jervis,
176: 404). In the present case, it should be clear that the neoconservatives understand
and accept their role in influencing the president and his administration. Oftentimes they
are the first to claim ownership of or show support for new policies. Furthermore, one
would find insurmountable obstacles in attempting to try to in advance draw lines
between such neoconservative policy recommendations that will be taken seriously in
the White House and those that will not. Therefore, all indications of recommendations,
not to mention demands, from the neoconservative side, should be taken as potentially
seriously  affecting  the  official  policy  -  even  more  so  in  light  of  the  highly  successful
track record of the movement during the last couple of years. This is not to say that
dissonance could not be reduced by way of denying one's responsibility. Of course it
could, and it can.
Although we at this point can only conclude that neoconservative core values do indeed
clash with contemporary neoconservative action and rhetoric on torture, thus giving rise
to a state of cognitive dissonance, our further steps remain severely limited. It is indeed
inevitable that our analysis leaves us with very little except some speculations as to
what the neoconservatives themselves have done and will do regarding this cognitive
dissonance. We need not speculate if there are measures taken to alleviate this
discomfort. Logically, there must be, for the state of cognitive dissonance is not a
tolerable one. Francis Fukuyama's case shows one extreme way of dissolving such
incongruence, but unfortunately that tale tells us nothing of the use of torture, although
it, too, may have played a part.
I argue that a point made by Jervis, mentioned earlier in this paper, seems at this stage
the most plausible outcome, although probably not the only one. According to Jervis
"people must often rearrange their perceptions, evaluations, and opinions" in order to
construct one or more "defensible postures" supporting their self-image (Jervis, 1976:
406). Logically, this rearraying of "perceptions, evaluations, and opinions" will affect
every other attitude of a given ideology, thus attributing to a spillover effect of sorts. To
predict how exactly attitudes and even central values such as the promotion of human
rights are now arrayed inside of neoconservative ideology must be the object of quite
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another, separate study. What we can say at this point already, however, is that the
principles of liberal democracy, "American values", human rights, and "morality" are
experiencing a steep downward trend in U.S. neoconservatism at the moment.
It seems fitting to remind the reader at this late stage of the United States' third president
Thomas Jefferson's idealism by quoting him: "A society that will trade a little liberty for
a little order will deserve neither and will lose both"108. The concepts of freedom,
democracy and the rule of law will remain the cornerstones of the United States' history.
Whether they will be central in the image of the nation's future will depend on its
commitments to its own ideals, the implementation of which will be for the nation itself
to decide.
5.7 Concluding Discussion
Having declared that a state of cognitive dissonance occurs logically between
neoconservative core values and condoning the use of torture, we ought to pause a while
before rushing to obligatory complacent concluding remarks instructing the reader to
appreciate the insights of the writer. The premise of this paper was always to explore the
explicit core values of the neoconservative ideology in relation to the allegedly
condoning attitude towards the use of torture in the GWOT. So far so good. We have
established that the explicit core values of neoconservatism are not unfamiliar with the
promotion of liberal democracy and human rights, that torture has taken place in GWOT,
that neoconservatives appear to condone it; and that there is an irreconcilable conflict
between these. We have also speculated with the idea of neoconservatism adding an
"extra" element of justification, saving the lives of huge amounts of innocents by
breaching the rights of one or few, to appease this conflict. The trouble with the
foregoing is that it rests to a large extent to the explicit core values of neoconservatism.
It would be folly and naïve to claim that these values are the only true values.
A similar dichotomy is presented by Gawronski and Strack who found corroboration for
the assumption that cognitive dissonance can be potent in changing explicit attitudes but
that implicit attitudes are far more resistant to change. (Cf. Gawronski and Strack, 2004).
108 As quoted in Baker and Stack, Jr., 2006: 230
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Is it possible that the implicit attitudes of neoconservatives would remain unchanged in
the face of overwhelming evidence, boosted by the overconfidence effect? The answer
is most likely yes.
In fact, one need only trawl through some neoconservative writings to find indications
of the opposite. Wolfson, for example, avows that the promotion of democracy is not so
much for the sake of democracy and human rights themselves but rather for upkeeping
the United States' dominant position in the world. According to him, only a principled
foreign policy can keep up the U.S. public's interest for foreign affairs in the long haul
(Wolfson,  2004:  227).  Naturally,  this  changes  the  above  analysis.  As  was  stressed
before, the results remain irrespective of the truth values: the results indicate whether or
not cognitive dissonance ought to arise between the sketched variants of the two
conflicting propositions. I have argued this to be the case.
Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol declare that "American principles" are universal
and that "[e]xporting democracy does further America's vital interests" (Kaplan and W.
Kristol, 2003: 104). According to them, speaking in terms of democratic rather than
American aims helps relay a favorable image of U.S. efforts. Mixing these assertions
with the "theory" of democratic peace, the writers conclude that the "ethics and
institutions of democracy encourage compromise", thus benefiting all people and
peoples in the world. Yet, in the end, the bottom line remains unchanged: "The more
democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is to be congenial to America".
(Kaplan and W. Kristol, 2003: 105).
The results of this paper must therefore unfortunately remain inconclusive. What we
have established is a clear conflict between the explicit core values and condoning the
use  of  torture.  In  addition,  however,  we  have  cast  doubts  on  the  explicit  core  values
being more or less tools, rather than inflexible and guiding moral principles. This
finding leads to intriguing and novel questions that, one hopes, future studies of the
subject will aim to answer, for example: what implications does the alleged demotion of
liberal democracy and human rights to "tools" of maintenance of the existing world
order have?
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In any case, neoconservatism ought to remain relevant as an object of study. Having
been buried in the past as irrelevant, William Kristol could recently express this
candidly by saying that "Neoconservatism is today stronger than ever" (W. Kristol,
2004: 76)
Regardless of the relative strength or weakness of the neoconservative ideology, one
thing seems certain: their grip on formerly held beliefs is not going to get any weaker in
the foreseeable future. According to Jervis (1976: 404), where dissonance is held and
both the individual and the dissonant information (or sources of such information) she is
facing are resistant to change, few other choices remain but to add new consonant
elements  to  one's  own  set  of  beliefs.  This  effect  is  called  "the  Boomerang  effect"
because of the return to and reaffirming of existing attitudes, but it is also, and perhaps
even more accurately, known as "anti-learning" (Jervis, 1976: 405).
My feeling is Bennett might have phrased his thought better than he intended in his
discussion  concerning  morality  and  U.S.  foreign  policy.  He  noted,  in  a  somewhat
circular argument, that analogous to individuals, moral action by states must be
constituted by more than mere expressions of morality, it must entail moral actions and
judgments, measurable by a moral standard. Bennett claims however that for states,
unlike for individuals, there is no universally accepted or enforced law (Bennett, 2000:
294). I argue that the prohibition of the use of torture is close enough, although hardly
strictly enforced. In concert with Bennet, Joshua Muravchik notes that "political acts are
subject to measurement against moral standards, and that the virtues of kindness
compassion, generosity, honor, and reason should guide public life as well as private"
(Muravchik quoted in Dorrien, 2004: 117). Ironically, in criticizing U.S. liberals whose
"social justice" ideals he scorns, Irving Kristol (1995: 257) raises the question of liberty
being the penultimate value in society, but has, to my knowledge been still as a mouse
regarding the deprivation of fundamental freedoms of those alleged "terrorists" who
may turn out to be innocent.
So what do we know that we didn't know before understanding the logic of dissonance
presented above? For one, we now understand that neoconservatism has changed, and
that this change has been caused by dissonance between the ideology's core values and
the actual positions assumed by its supporters. We also realize that, while avoiding
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being overly fatalistic, this change to an extent predetermines what neoconservatism can
be in the future. For it is similarly understood that in "reducing dissonance [… ] people
alter their beliefs and evaluations, thereby changing the premises of later deliberations"
(Jervis, 1976:387).
But here, once again, right before the close, a word of caution is in place. This paper has
aimed not so much at getting to ground truth about the philosophical underpinnings and
foundations of neoconservative political thinking as finding out how it manifests itself
in "real life". I have attempted to do so by way of introducing myself to as much
academic and non-academic literature and other material on the subject as has been
reasonably available. This literature consists of neoconservative and pro-
neoconservative as well as critical literature, and I have attempted to form a fair and
balanced  view of  "what  the  neoconservatives  are  all  about".  To  this  end,  I  do  not  feel
that a deeper analysis of, for example, the works of Leo Strauss would necessarily have
brought about too many advantages. The history and premises of neoconservative
political thinking are, however, the obvious point of destination if later reading of this
work proves many of my assertions concerning the ideology false.
Regarding the ideological background and neoconservatism, Strauss in particular, it is
to be noted that certain uncomfortable questions rise here before the end for some
implicitly  or  explicitly  “Straussian”  neoconservatives.   Namely,  their  relationship  to
Strauss’s idea that “modernity was about the denial of truth, including moral truth,
which led to the worship of power/intolerance” (Dorrien, 2004: 132) can cause
discomfort, for using torture as a means of extracting alleged truths ought logically to
qualify as worship of power/intolerance, in most people’s view at least. And, as has
been explored above, torture is not acceptable according to U.S. or international law,
ultimately reflecting U.S. and other democracies’ deeply embedded values.
I wish to acknowledge another fresh view concerning the study of neoconservatism. An
article by James O'Connor (forthcoming) has caught my interest recently.  O'Connor's
article views neoconservatism as "the most militant variety of US exceptionalist self-
perception" (O'Connor, forthcoming). O'Connor's cynical analysis of the "radical
occasionalism" of neoconservatism that renders neoconservatism a movement willing to
use most any rhetorical means to accomplish unrelated things it set out to do in the first
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place:  "sovereignty, freedom, democracy, the collective will or essential character of
the nation, and suchlike - are perceived purely as instruments for self-empowerment"
(O'Connor, forthcoming). Commentaries of neoconservatism along these lines can make
analyses such as mine seem starry-eyed rather than fair and balanced. Indeed, one need
to  pause  to  think  what  the  true  value  of  "democracy"  or  human  rights  is  if  they  are
demoted to tools of hegemony preservation, promotion and extension as
neoconservatism  tends  to  view  them,  at  least  partially.  In  my  opinion  such  usage  of
those concepts tells a short but revealing story of the hegemon itself and little more. Is it
truly believable that people will acquiesce on a large scale with a notion of reducing
morality, perhaps even love, to maintenance of order? And what will be left if this is
truly  the  case?  In  any  case  all  such  efforts  seem  so  very  futile  to  me  and,  more
alarmingly, counterfinal, as my current understanding of the human condition is that the
resulting "order" for the sake of order - not for human development, mutual
understanding,  some  form  of  "happiness"  or  some  such  "higher  reason"  -  will  remain
empty, hollow, transparent and conducive to dissatisfaction, leading to disorder once
more. Naturally, any and all vocal defendants of the neoconservative ideology will add
that this is the absolute negation of what their ideology is all about, and then it will be
actions over words to turn the minds of disillusioned critics of the ideology.
Countering  human rights  NGOs'  criticisms  of  the  U.S.  treatment  of  GWOT detainees,
Kenneth Anderson (2005) declares in The Weekly Standard things that seem highly
ironic in the light neoconservatism has presented itself above, e.g. heavily contradicting
one's values. Anderson says: "[t]here is something morally perverse about [different
human rights organizations' criticisms of the United States]. Can you really hold these
positions simultaneously and still count yourself a human rights organization acting
solely on principle? Unlikely.  What it  means in the real  world,  of course,  is  that  these
human rights organizations, whether Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch,
simply indulge themselves in rhetorical overkill. They do not mean what they say"
(Anderson, 2005). The same applies too often to neoconservatism.
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6 Conclusions
Our study has given support for the notion that neoconservatism is a movement with
distinct characteristics, political goals and shared values. It is therefore defensible to call
it an "ideology" in a positive sense. Neoconservatism has proven to be extremely varied
in  its  manifestations,  yet  the  belief  that  U.S.  power  can  be  used  for  "moral  purposes"
and that liberal democracy and human rights ought to be promoted seems relatively
uncontested, unifying all of neoconservatism. Francis Fukuyama's dissociating himself
from the ideology based on too wide a discrepancy between personal views and those of
the ideology, although possibly entirely unconnected to the issue of torture, serves as a
valid example of cognitive dissonance taking place in groups and within ideologies.
Our discussion on the different aspects of torture - in international and national law, as
well as the "essence" of torture - has convinced us of the central role that the individual
and her dignity inherently play. Furthermore, we have discussed the use of torture as it
has taken place in U.S. custody in the context of GWOT, and how the neoconservative
ideology feels about the issue.
In  this  study,  we  have  identified  two  cognitive  elements  potentially  in  a  dissonant
relation within neoconservatism. These elements are: neoconservative core values on
the one hand, and neoconservative positions on the use of torture in the context of the
GWOT on the other. In order to analyze the potential arousal of cognitive dissonance
we have studied neoconservatism and found its core values to be, roughly the following:
"morality", human rights, democracy, and so called American values. We have
attributed content to each of these concepts and tried to locate the obverse of each to
find whether or not Festinger's condition for cognitive dissonance could be fulfilled:
that the obverse of the other follows from this. We concluded this thin analysis to
indicate that a state of cognitive dissonance ought indeed to arise.
We have shown that typically post-decision dissonance reduction efforts lead to the
alternatives becoming "more different than during the decision" (called also the
"spreading apart" of alternatives). A prerequisite of this phenomenon is that
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neoconservatives avoid conflicting information or dismiss it out of hand as irrelevant.
Therefore we should not expect sudden reversals in neoconservative attitudes toward
the use of torture, however much in conflict in the ideology's core values they appear to
be in light of what has been noted above.
Regarding the magnitude of the resulting dissonance, we can only conclude that because
it is a function of the importance of the elements and because the elements in play here
present  themselves  as  important  if  not  critical,  we  could  consequently  expect  a  decent
amount of dissonance. The mechanisms of dissonance reduction are varied and effective,
however, leaving us with just hints of how neoconservatism has taken on the challenge
of cognitive dissonance. The fact that we are dealing with a social group makes attitude
change despite dissonance difficult. Furthermore, the neoconservative attitude may have
been securely "locked in" by now, making it thus resistant to change. Moreover, if
neoconservatives and neoconservatism deeply believe in their attitude being justified -
as they appear to do with all their heart - persuasive efforts may be in vain as Forsberg
noted above. Criticism towards neoconservatism has been harsh and voiced, quite
naturally, mainly by political opposition. This has made neoconservative attitude
change even less likely, as changes in the evaluation of the sources of dissonant
information (likeability, reliability etc.) is easily done, as Festinger has shown.
Perhaps most importantly, however, dissonance may have been reduced by means of
denial of responsibility, an excellent means of reducing dissonance caused by
transgressions of internalized moral values, as we have noted with a reading of Gosling
et  al.  Neoconservatives  have  demonstrated  great  willingness  and  ability  to  blame  the
Bush administration for failure in the war on Iraq; it could do so also as regards the use
of torture. Furthermore the real responsibility has been found to be with the victims of
torture, or "terrorists", if with anyone. So far, an extensive denial of responsibility has
not been necessary, as neoconservatives have not been accused of advocating torture to
any real extent. It might prove yet to be a way out of dissonance.
Jervis's related notions on foreign policy "sacrifices" having a distinct role in assuring
the  decision  maker  of  the  decision's  noble  nature  may  play  a  role,  too.  Instead  of
admitting to having violated their own and more general moral principles, it seems more
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plausible that neoconservatives experience that there was never a choice and that one
must stay the course.
The fundamental side of ideology (as opposed to operative ideology) must be most
important to any ideology, for it defines the grand strategies of the movement. It seems
further that neoconservatism as a fundamental ideology would not condone the use of
torture in any case, but does so currently on the operative level. We have noted Martin
Seliger's explanation that such discrepancies can be "sincerely believed to  be
temporary", yet recall Jervis's pointing out that recent  decisions tend to direct following
ones. Therefore the fundamental side of ideology is not, truthfully, the only source of
guiding information for an ideology.
What we are ultimately left with here is the presumption that while neoconservatism's
core values as such may not have changed, an internal rearranging of sorts has, which
has further manifested itself on the operative level. Although we cannot know this,
Jervis's observation that people must often rearrange their perceptions, evaluations, and
opinions in order to construct one or more "defensible postures" supporting their self-
image seems at this stage the most plausible and sustainable rationalization for
neoconservative dissonance reduction.
To conclude, it is fascinating to think for a moment what a neoconservative critique of
this paper might look like. One of the first thoughts that comes to mind is that criticism
might be directed at this paper being overly moralistic, petty, and perhaps idealistic in
its finding opposition to the use of torture. The author of this paper does not believe in
value-free writing, academic or not, but rather believes that science ought to be
normatively based. And so such criticism may be in place and justified from certain
points of view. Should such criticism originate in neoconservative cadres, the author
would anxiously await the next opportunity to point at several sources of cognitive
dissonance arising from such critique: after all, it is hard-boiled idealism and moral uses
of power that the ideology advocates.
118
7 Literature
Ackerman, Bruce (2006): Before the Next Attack. Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism;
Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Anderson, Kenneth (2005): An American Gulag? Human rights groups test the limits of moral
equivalence; in the Weekly Standard, Volume 010, Issue 37.
Baker, Thomas E. and Stack, Jr., John F. (eds.) (2006): At War with Civil Rights and Civil Liberties;
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham.
Baumann, Fred (2004): Our Fractious Foreign Policy Debate; in the Public Interest, Fall 2004, Issue
157, pp. 67-84.
Beasley, Ryan K. and Joslyn, Mark R. (2001): Cognitive Dissonance and Post-Decision Attitude
Change in Six Presidential Elections; in Political Psychology.  Vol. 22,  No. 3, 2001.
Beetham, David (1999): Democracy and Human Rights; Polity Press, Cambridge.
Bennett, William J. (2000): Morality, Character and American Foreign Policy; in Kagan, Robert and
Kristol, William (eds.) (2000): Present Dangers. Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and
Defense Policy; Encounter Books, San Francisco, California.
Blanton, Hart; Pelham Brett W; DeHart, Tracy; and Carvallo, Mauricio (2001): Overconfidence as
Dissonance Reduction; in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 37, pp. 373-385.
Boot, Max (2004): Myths about Neoconservatism; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism;
Atlantic Books, London.
Bowman, Karlyn (2004): Neoconservatives and the Court of Public Opinion in America; in Stelzer,
Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Brooks, David (2004): The Neocon Cabal and Other Fantasies; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004):
Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Campbell, David (1998): Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity;
University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota.
119
Christol, Carl Q. (2004): International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy, University Press of America,
Lanham, MD.
Cooper, Belinda (2007): Torture: Now Congress Is Accountable; in World Policy Journal, Winter
2006/2007.
Cox, Michael (2004): The Bush Doctrine and the Lessons of History; in Held, David and Koenig-
Archibugi, Mathias (eds.) (2004): American Power in the 21st Century; Polity Press, Cambridge.
Crelinsten, Ronald D. & Schmid, Alex P. (eds.) (1995): The Politics of Pain; Westview Press Inc.;
Boulder, Colorado.
Cui, Zhiyan (2004): The Bush Doctrine: A Chinese Perspective; in Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi,
Mathias (eds.) (2004): American Power in the 21st Century; Polity Press, Cambridge.
Daalder, Ivo H., Lindsay, James M. (2003): America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy,
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Danner, Mark (2004): Torture and Truth. America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror; Granta Books,
London.
Davidson, Amy (2005): Q. & A. In Gitmo. An interview with Jane Mayer; from The New Yorker website
www.newyorker.com, posted July 6, 2005. Retrieved January 21, 2007.
Ding, James (1998): Reflections on Human Rights; in Princeton University Law Journal, volume II,
Issue 2, Spring 1998
Dixon, Martin (1990): Textbook on International Law; Blackstone Press Limited, London.
Dorrien, Gary (2004): Imperial Designs. Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana; Routledge,
Abingdon, Oxfordshire.
Evans, Gareth and Sahnoun, Mohamed (2002): The Responsibility to Protect; in Foreign Affairs
Nov/Dec 2002, Vol. 81, Issue 6.
Festinger, Leon (1957): A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance; Stanford University Press, Stanford
California.
Fishback, Ian (2005): A Matter of Honor; in Washington Post, Wednesday, September 28, 2005, A 21.
120
Forsberg, Tuomas (1996): Historia vastaan teoria: kylmän sodan päättyminen uusrealismin testinä; in
Kosmopolis, Vol. 26:2/96.
Friedman, Murray (2005): The Neoconservative Revolution. Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of
Public Policy; Cambridge University Press, New York, N.Y.
Fukuyama, Francis (2006a): After Neoconservatism; in the New York Times, February 19, 2006.
Fukuyama, Francis (2006b): After the Neoconservatives. America at the Crossroads; Profile Books,
London.
Fukuyama, Francis (2006c): Interview with Jonathan Freedland; in the Fukuyama Experience on the
Guardian's website
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/brian_whitaker/2006/03/the_fukuyama_experience.html. Retrieved
October 4, 2006.
Gawronski, Bertram and Strack, Fritz (2004): On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency:
Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitude; in The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
40, pp. 535-542.
Gerson, Mark (1996): The Essential Neoconservative Reader; Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Reading, Massachusetts.
Glazer, Nathan (2005): Neoconservative from the Start; in The Public Interest, Issue 159, Spring 2005,
pp. 12-18.
Gosling, Patrick; Denizeau, Maxime and Oberlé, Dominique (2006): Denial of Responsibility: A New
Mode of Dissonance Reduction; in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2006, Vol. 90, No. 5, pp.
722-733.
Haddock, Vicki (2001): The Unspeakable. To get at the truth, is torture or coercion ever justified?; in
the San Francisco Chronicle, p. D-1; November 18, 2001.
Hakli, Raul (2006): Group Beliefs and the Distinction between Belief and Acceptance; in Cognitive
Systems Research 7 (2006), pp. 286-297.
Havers, Grant and Wexler, Mark (2001): Is U.S. Neoconservatism Dead?; in Quarterly Journal of
Ideology; Vol. 24, 2001, No. III.
121
Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (eds.) (2004): American Power in the 21st Century; Polity
Press, Cambridge.
Hoover, Kenneth R. (1987): Ideology and Political Life; Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Belmont,
California.
Jervis, Robert (1976): Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Jervis, Robert (2005): Understanding the Bush Doctrine; in Ikenberry, G. John (ed.) (2005): American
Foreign Policy. Theoretical Essays; Fifth edition, Pearson Longman, New York.
Joseph, Lawrence B. (1982): Neoconservatism in Contemporary Political Science: Democratic Theory
and the Party System; in the Journal of Politics; Vol. 44, No. 4 (November, 1982), pp. 955-982.
Kagan, Robert and Kristol, William (eds.) (2000): Present Dangers. Crisis and Opportunity in
American Foreign and Defense Policy; Encounter Books, San Francisco, California.
Kagan, Robert and Kristol, William (2000): National Interest and Global Responsibility in Kagan,
Robert and Kristol, William (eds.) (2000): Present Dangers. Crisis and Opportunity in American
Foreign and Defense Policy; Encounter Books, San Francisco, California.
Kaplan, Lawrence F. and Kristol, William (2003): The War Over Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and
America's Mission; Encounter Books, San Francisco, California.
Karvonen, Lauri (1997): Demokratisering; Studentlitteratur, Lund.
Kelman, Herbert C. (1995): The Social Context of Torture; in Crelinsten, Ronald D. & Schmid, Alex
P. (eds.) (1995): The Politics of Pain; Westview Press Inc., Boulder, Colorado.
Kersch, Ken I. (2004): Multilateralism comes to the courts; in The Public Interest, Winter 2004, Issue
154, pp. 3-18.
Kimball, Roger (2006): Introduction: After the Suicide of the West; in New Criterion, January 2006.
Kirkpatrick, Jeane (2004): Neoconservatism as a Response to the Counter-culture; in
Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Kooijmans, Pieter H. (1995): Torturers and Their Masters; in Crelinsten, Ronald D. & Schmid, Alex
P. (eds.) (1995): The Politics of Pain; Westview Press Inc., Boulder, Colorado.
122
Krauthammer, Charles (2005): The Truth about Torture. It's time to be honest about doing terrible
things; in the Weekly Standard, Volume 011, Issue 12.
Krauthammer, Charles (2004): Democratic Realism. An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar
World; The AEI Press, Washington, D.C.
Kristol, Irving (2005): Forty good years; in The Public Interest, Spring 2005.
Kristol, Irving (2004): The Neoconservative Persuasion; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004):
Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Kristol, Irving (2004b): A Conservative Welfare State; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism;
Atlantic Books, London.
Kristol, Irving (2004c): Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.)
(2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Kristol, Irving (1995): Neoconservatism. The Autobiography of an Idea; The Free Press, New York, N.Y.
Kristol, William (2006): The Trap. There is now a clear and live contrast between Bush and the
Democrats on an important issue in the war on terror; in The Weekly Standard, Volume 012, Issue 02.
Kristol, William (2004): Postscript - June 2004. Neoconservatism Remains the Bedrock of U.S. Foreign
Policy; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Laqueur, Walter (1986): Reflections on Terrorism; in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1986, Vol. 65 Issue 1, pp.
86-100.
Lenzner, Steven and Kristol, William (2003): What was Leo Strauss up to?; in The Public Interest, Fall
2003.
Lichtheim, George (1967): The Concept of Ideology And Other Essays; Vintage Books, New York.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1997): American Exceptionalism. A Double-Edged Sword;  W.W.  Norton  &
Company, New York.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (2003): The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. The
First New Nation; Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick.
123
MacDonald, Heather (2005): Torturing the Evidence; in The Weekly Standard, Volume 010, Issue 18.
Marshall, Joshua Micah (2003): Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives; in Foreign
Affairs, November/December 2003.
Matz, David C. and Wood, Wendy (2005): Cognitive Dissonance in Groups: The Consequences of
Disagreement; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 88, No 1, 22-37, American
Psychological Association.
McLellan, David (1986): Ideology; Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Meier, Heinrich (2006): Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem; Cambridge University Press,
New York, N.Y.
Monten, Jonathan (2005): The Roots of the Bush Doctrine. Power, Nationalism, and Democracy
Promotion in U.S. Strategy; in International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112–156.
O'Connor, James (2006): Exceptions, Distinctions and Processes of Identification : The 'Concrete
Thought' of Carl Schmitt and US Neoconservatism as Seen through Readings of Kenneth Burke and
Jacques Derrida; unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Department of Political Science.
O'Connor, James (forthcoming in 2007): US Neoconservatism and the Rule of Radical Occasionalism -
Carl Schmitt's War on Terror?; in Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2005.
Poulos, James G. (2006): 'Tis the season for carnal carnage--all year 'round; in the Daily Standard
August 12, 2006.
Press, Eyal (2004): The Neocon Man; in the Nation, May 10, 2004.
Rago, Joseph (2006): The Weekend Interview. Unrepentant Neocon;  in  Opinion Journal  from the  Wall
Street Journal Editorial Page, Saturday, August 12, 2006. www.opinionjournal.com. Retrieved February
22, 2007.
Risse, Thomas (2004): Beyond Iraq; in Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (eds.) (2004):
American Power in the 21st Century; Polity Press, Cambridge.
Rose, David (2006): Neo Culpa; in Vanity Fair: Politics & Power at www.vanityfair.com November 3,
2006; retrieved November 29, 2006.
124
Ruotsila, Markku (2006): Amerikkalaisen neokonservatismin uusimmat tulkinnat; in Politiikka 48:1
2006, pp. 76-79.
Russett, Bruce (1990): Controlling the Sword. The Democratic Governance of National Security;
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Scott, Shirley V. and Ambler, Olivia (2007): Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline
in US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq; in European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 13 (1).
Seliger, Martin (1976): Ideology and Politics; George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London.
Steger, Manfred B. (2005): From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American
Power after 9/11; in Globalizations, May 2005, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 31-46.
Steinfels, Peter (1979): The Neoconservatives. The Men who are changing America's politics; Simon and
Schuster, New York.
Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Stelzer, Irwin: Neoconservatives and Their Critics. An Introduction; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004):
Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Tell, David (2005): Where does the logic of the McCain amendment lead?; in the Weekly Standard,
Volume 011, Issue 11.
Thies, Cameron G. (2001): A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries; in Political
Psychology Vol 22, No. 4, 2001.
Thompson, John B. (1984): Studies in the theory of ideology; Polity Press, Oxford.
Weinstein, Kenneth R. (2004): Philosophic Roots, the Role of Leo Strauss, and the War in Iraq; in
Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004): Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Wendt, Alexander (1999): Social Theory of International Politics; Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
Wicklund, Robert A. and Brehm, Jack W. (1976): Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance; Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey.
125
Williams, Michael C. (2005): What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR
Theory; in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11(3), pp. 307-337.
Wolfowitz, Paul (2000): Statesmanship in the New Century; in Kagan, Robert and Kristol, William
(eds.) (2000): Present Dangers. Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy;
Encounter Books, San Francisco, California.
Wolfson, Adam (2004): Conservatives and Neoconservatives; in Stelzer, Irwin (ed.) (2004):
Neoconservatism; Atlantic Books, London.
Articles, reports
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition: morality. (n.d.); from
Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/morality; retrieved March 13, 2007.
American Psychological Association (APA) in Webster's New Millennium™ Dictionary of English,
Preview Edition (v 0.9.6): human condition. (n.d.) from Dictionary.com website:
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/humancondition; retrieved March 13, 2007.
American Journal of International Law (The), Vol. 98, No. 3, (July, 2004): U.S. Abuse of Iraqi
Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison; pp. 591-596, American Society of International Law.
Amnesty International (2007): Justice delayed and justice denied? Trials under the Military
Commissions Act; AI Index AMR 51/044/2007
Amnesty International (2005a): US detentions in Afghanistan: an aide-mémoire for continued action,
AI Index: AMR 51/093/2005.
Amnesty International (2005b): Guantánamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit of unchecked
executive power, AI Index: AMR 51/063/2005.
FBI Records obtained by the ACLU, agency codes DETAINEES 3836-3838; 3882,-3883; 3894-3895;
available online at www.aclu.org/torturefoia, retrieved October 11, 2006.
International Herald Tribune (The) (2005a): Outsourcing Torture; February 12-13, 2005.
International Herald Tribune (The) (2005b): Guantánamo and the law; February 22, 2005.
International Committee of the Red Cross (1999): International Humanitarian Law  Answers to your
Questions, ICRC Publications, Geneva.
New York Times (The) (2005): In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths. 20 May,
2005
Weekly Standard (The) (2005): On Torture and Bear Bryant; December 19, 2005, Volume 011, Issue
14
126
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, OTHER LEGAL TEXTS AND DECLARATIONS
Committee against Torture (2006): Considerations of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article
19 of the Convention. Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture. United States
of America; Thirty-sixth session 1-19 May, 2006, CAT/C/USA/CO/2.
United Nations (1984): Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, December 10, 1984; General Assembly Meeting No. 93; A/RES/39/46
United Nations (1948): Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948; General Assembly
resolution 217 A (III).
